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"My grandmother was her master's daughter; and my mother was her 
master's daughter; and I was my master's son; so you see I han't got but 
one-eighth of the blood. Now, admitting it's right to make a slave of a 
full black nigger, I want to ask gentlemen acquainted with business, 
whether because I owe a shilling, I ought to be made to pay a dollar?" 
- Lewis Clarke, fugitive slave, 18421 
"If the old saying 'one drop of Black blood makes you Black' were 
reversed to say one drop of White blood makes you White, would the 
biracials still be seeking a separate classification?" 
- Letter to the Editor, Ebony Magazine, November 19952 
INTRODUCTION 
For generations, the boundaries of the African-American race 
have been formed by a rule, informally known as the "one drop 
rule," which, in its colloquial definition, provides that one drop of 
Black blood makes a person Black. In more formal, sociological 
circles, the rule is known as a form of "hypodescent"3 and its mean­
ing remains basically the same: anyone with a known Black ances­
tor is considered Black. Over the generations, this rule has not only 
shaped countless lives, it has created the African-American race as 
we know it today, and it has defined not just the history of this race 
but a large part of the history of America. 
Now as the millennium approaches, social forces require some 
rethinking of this important, old rule. Plessy v. Ferguson, 4 which 
affirmed the right of states to mandate "equal but separate accom­
modations" for White and "colored" train passengers, is a century 
old. Brown v. Board of Education, 5 which effectively overruled 
Plessy and instituted the end of de jure discrimination, was decided 
over a generation ago. Nearly thirty years have passed since the 
Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia, 6 invalidated any prohibition 
against interracial marriage as unconstitutional. Since the 1967 
Loving decision, the number of interracial marriages has nearly 
1. JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, SLAVE TESTIMONY 152 (1977). 
2. Mary Smith, Letter to the Editor, EBONY, Nov. 1995, at 298. 
3. Hypodescent is the practice by which "racially mixed persons are assigned to the status 
of the subordinate group." F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? 5 (1991) (citing MELVIN 
HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS 56 (1964)). 
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the United States Supreme Court distinguished Plessy 
holding that, "in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no 
place." 347 U.S. at 495. However, lower federal courts interpreted it as prohibiting all state 
authorized segregation and the Supreme Court regularly affirmed such rulings. See ALFRED 
H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 591 (1991). 
6. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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quadrupled.7 This trend has even extended to Black-White 
couples,8 whose intermarriage rate has traditionally lagged behind 
that of other racial and ethnic groups.9 For the first time, opinion 
polls indicate that more Americans approve of interracial marriage 
than disapprove.10 The number of children born to parents of dif­
ferent races has increased dramatically,11 and some of the offspring 
of these interracial marriages have assumed prominent roles in 
American popular culture.12 
Some of these children of interracial marriages are now arguing 
cogently for a reappraisal of hypodescent. Their movement13 has 
sprung to public consciousness with the recent bid by multiracial 
7. In 1970, there were 310,000 mixed race couples. By 1992, there were 1,161,000 such 
couples. See Arlene F. Saluter, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1992, in U.S. 
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, X 
(Dec. 1992). 
8. The number of intermarriages between Whites and Blacks has increased significantly 
since Loving. Census figures indicate that there were 65,000 Black-White couples in 1970. In 
1992, there were 246,000 such couples. This represented an increase from 0.1 % to 0.5% of all 
marriages. Between 1980 and 1990, Black-White interracial marriages increased over 50%. 
See id. at XI. 
For a fuller discussion of intermarriage trends, see E. Porterfield, Black-American Inter­
marriage in the United States, 5 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 17 (1984); M. Belinda Tucker & 
Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, New Trends in Black American Interracial Marriage: The Social 
Structural Context, 52 J. OF MARRIAGE & TliE FAM. 209 (1990); see also Steven A. Holmes, 
Study Finds Rising Number of Black-White Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1996, at A16. 
9. The African-American intermarriage rate hovers at about 7%. See Saluter, supra note 
7, at XI. In contrast, interracial marriage in some Asian-American communities is normal. 
The Japanese-American/White intermarriage rate is at 55%, while the current Chinese­
American/White intermarriage rate is at 40%. See Interracial Marriages Blur Social, Ethnic 
Lines, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 13, 1995, at 44A. 
10. A 1991 Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of all Americans approve of marriage between 
African Americans and Whites, while 42% disapprove. Apparently the rate of approval var­
ies by race. While 71 % of African Americans approve of interracial marriage, only 44% of 
Whites approve. Significantly, 64% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 approve of 
marriage between African Americans and Whites. See Most in Poll Approve of Interracial 
Marriage, ST. Loms POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 1991, at 16A. 
On the other hand, a 1994 poll showed that 14.7% of White Americans still favor a law 
making interracial marriage illegal. See Up From Separatism, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1995 at 
30. 
11. In 1991 alone, it is estimated that over 128,000 children were born to parents of differ­
ent races. See Jane Gross, UC Berkeley at Crux of New Multiracial Consciousness, L.A. 
T1MES, Jan. 9, 1996, at Al. It also is estimated that nearly two million children have parents 
that identify with different racial groups. See Linda Mathews, More Than Identity Rides on 
New Racial Category, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1996, at Al. 
12. For example, playwright August Wilson, mystery author Walter Mosely, Olympic 
Gold Medalist Dan O'Brien, golfer Tiger Woods, actress Halle Berry, and musician Lenny 
Kravitz are all "biracial." 
13. Some cite the genesis of the "movement" as the 1992 Loving Conference, held in 
recognition of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court decision in Loving v. Vir­
ginia. The primary purpose of the conference was to organize a federal lobbying effort to 
modify existing racial classifications and to put "the American government on notice that a 
new multiracial movement had found its way on to the national political stage. " Bijan 
Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the Color Line, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 183, 184 (1993). 
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organizations, over the objections of civil rights groups,14 to put a 
"multiracial" category in the "race" section of the forms that will be 
used when the next decennial census is conducted in the year 2000. 
This proposal has immense practical importance because the census 
provides the nation with its main source of racial and ethnic data. 
For example, implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Equal Employment Opportu­
nity Act of 1972 all depend on racial and ethnic statistics culled 
from the census, and the addition of a new category could change 
the count of the existing racial groups and alter the way these laws 
are implemented. ls 
One wing of this new multiracial movement argues that a new 
"multiracial box" should be made available for the growing number 
of children of interracial marriages. Another wing of this move­
ment, in books and law review articles, suggests that the addition of 
this category should be part of a wholesale redefinition of the racial 
identities of most Americans. The thinking of both wings of the 
multiracial movement is informed by their rejection of hypodescent 
and the "one drop rule." To date, the participants in this discourse 
have emphasized the racist notions of White racial purity that gave 
rise to the one drop rule. They have concluded that the effects of 
this old rule are mainly evil and that the consequences of aban­
doning it will be mainly good. Based in part on such reasoning, the 
more activist wing of this movement has proposed several neat, 
symmetrical, and radical redefinitions of African-American racial 
identity. Under one such proposed definition, any Black person 
with White or Native American ancestry would become "multi­
racial."16 Under another, any Black person with a "majority of [his] 
origins in the original peoples of Europe" would become European 
American.11 
My purpose in this article is to critique this discourse. I agree 
that the one drop rule had its origins in racist notions of White pu-
14. Organizations that expressed reservations about the addition of a multicultural cate­
gory at Congressional hearings include the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders, the 
National Urban League, and the National Congress of American Indians. See Hearings 
Before the Subcomm on the Census, Statistics, and Postal Personnel of the Comm. on the Post 
Office and Civil Service, 103d Cong. 93·101, 171-82, 229-39 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
15. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CENSUS REFORM: EARLY OUTREACH AND 
DECISIONS NEEDED ON THE RACE AND ETHNIC QUESTIONS 12-13 (1993). 
16. For a discussion of this proposal, see infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
17. Luther Wright, Jr., Note, Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualiz­
ing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 V AND. L. REv. 513, 
563 {1995). 
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rity. However, many scholars have misunderstood the way that this 
rule has shaped the Black experience in America, and this misun­
derstanding has distorted their proposals for a new multiracial cate­
gory on the census forms. As we examine the one drop rule and its 
importance in the current discourse, we should recall the famous 
exchange between Faust and Goethe's Devil: 
Faust: Say at least, who you are? 
Mephistopheles: I am part of that power which ever wills evil yet 
ever accomplishes good. is 
So it was with the one drop rule. The Devil fashioned it out of 
racism, malice, greed, lust, and ignorance, but in so doing he also 
accomplished good: His rule created the African-American race as 
we know it today, and while this race has its origins in the peoples 
of three continents and its members can look very different from 
one another, over the centuries the Devil's one drop rule united this 
race as a people in the fight against slavery, segregation, and racial 
injustice. 
However valid the multiracial viewpoint may be in some con­
texts, it has tended to overlook the good the Devil did in using the 
rule of hypodescent in order to forge a people. This paper there­
fore is intended to bring a more balanced view of the one drop rule 
to the discourse surrounding the proposed new multiracial category 
and to question the proposals to invent neat new racial classifica­
tions to replace the categories that the social history of the United 
States has created over the last four hundred years. This article 
concludes with a proposal for counting the new generations of bi­
racial Americans on the census in a way that will not ignore the 
social history of the African-American race. 
I noted above that the one drop rule has shaped countless lives, 
and as "place markers" in the discussion, here, I will use incidents 
from two such lives: those of my great uncles, one documented in 
the 1944 volume of the Pacific Reporter, the other chronicled in a 
1956 issue of Time Magazine. 
My Uncle Clarence Jones was a Los Angeles lawyer who prac­
ticed law in the days when Black lawyers could not join county bar 
associations or be considered for government employment but were 
18. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, Faust, in GoETIIES WERKE, Part I, Lines 1334-36 
(Erich Trunz ed., Hamburg, Christian Wegner Verlag 1949) (1808). I would like to thank 
Vera Pardee for her assistance with the English translation. The original German reads as 
follows: 
Faust: Nun gut, wer bist du denn? 
Mephistopheles: Ein Tei! von jener Kraft, 
Die stets das B1lse will und 
stets das Gute schafft. 
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limited to providing probate, family law, and real estate services to 
an exclusively Black clientele. Reversing the norm, Uncle Clarence 
worked as Black but his rather fair complexion allowed him and his 
family to live in a neighborhood without reference to their race. 
Despite the ambiguity of their light-brown skin, the Jones family -
in the eyes of their White neighbors - could not really have been 
Black: Uncle Clarence was a hardworking lawyer who had gradu­
ated from Ohio State Law School in the teens, his three daughters 
were all attending U.C.L.A., and his wife's skin was nearly white. 
So for years, he lived with his family in a home that he loved in a 
pretty neighborhood. 
The home, however, was subject to a restrictive covenant that 
prohibited occupancy by any "persons other than the Caucasian 
race."19 Refusing to acknowledge the validity of this racist restric­
tion, Uncle Clarence had ignored the covenant and moved his fam­
ily in. Some years later, when his eldest daughter married, she 
decided on a home wedding. And as the various guests arrived, the 
neighbors were forced to see what their social training had not let 
them see before - the Jones family was undeniably Black. A law­
suit was brought to enforce the restrictive covenant and to force the 
Jones family out of its home. 
When he received the summons, Uncle Clarence made two deci­
sions. First, he would fight this eviction to the highest court in the 
state. Second, he would not deny his identity; he would not claim 
that his light skin made him any less of a Negro - even if it cost 
him his home. He retained two of his colleagues to represent him, 
lawyers who are legends among Black lawyers in Los Angeles, 
Loren Miller and Willis 0. Tyler.20 
Miller and Tyler made all the right arguments to the Calif omia 
Superior Court and, quite predictably, lost. In affirming the trial 
court's decision to evict the family, the California Court of Appeal 
summarily rejected the constitutional challenge to the covenants21 
and refused to reach the question of whether it was appropriate to 
19. Stone v. Jones, 152 P.2d 19, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944). 
20. Loren Miller became a judge and leader of the civil rights movement. He was one of 
the counsel in Brown v. Board of Education and an author of a legal history on the racial 
struggle in the United States. See LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS (1966). Willis 0. Tyler, 
in addition to handling a wide variety of criminal and family law cases, was the first Black 
lawyer in Los Angeles to serve in any judicial capacity when he was appointed to serve as a 
judge pro tempore. See Telephone Interview with Katherine Bush Mason (May 10, 1996). 
21. See Stone, 152 P.2d at 22. The Court of Appeal held that "[t]he same proposition 
[that the enforcement of racial housing restrictions violated the U.S. Constitution] was 
presented in Burkhardt v. Lofton [146 P.2d 720 (1994)] and there held untenable; the discus­
sion is supported by abundant authority." Stone, 152 P.2d at 23. 
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restrict residency on the basis of race. Instead, the court considered 
· the case to "involve issues that are the direct product of a contrac­
tual relation,"22 and it held that the restrictive covenant was con­
tractually valid. After losing in the court of appeal, Uncle 
Clarence's attorneys filed a Petition for Hearing with the California 
Supreme Court. Of the seven justices, only Justice Roger J. 
Traynor voted to grant a hearing.23 
So in the end, the family was forced to move - under the 
twisted logic by which racism is reified into law, Uncle Clarence 
could own his house but he could not live in it. Still, as they relin­
quished their home, the family left with their heads held high and 
with no regrets. Just recently, when Uncle Clarence's daughters, 
now all in their seventies, visited my house, I passed around a copy 
of the old court of appeal opinion. "Makes you mad all over 
again," one of them commented, these fifty-two years later. Mad, 
but also proud that their family had fought the good fight when 
they were sure to lose. 
A decade later, in Detroit, a second uncle (my grandmother's 
brother on the other side of the family) faced a similar situation but 
chose a different path. According to family lore, my Uncle Jack 
"couldn't find work as a Black man" so he crossed the color line 
with his fair skinned wife.24 Across the decades, Uncle Jack now 
looks out at me from his photo in the April 26, 1956 edition of Time 
and with his pale white skin, snowy straight hair, and aquiline fea­
tures - he looks White. Time reports that in early April 1956, at 
age 69, Uncle Jack had decided to move to a new home "on De­
troit's comfortably middle class Robson Avenue."25 Shortly after 
he moved in, however, the neighbors discovered that he was a Ne­
gro, perhaps because his grandchild, who met the moving van, had 
darker skin and curlier hair. Soon the neighbors were throwing 
rocks through the windows and a delegation from the neighbor­
hood "improvement association" arrived at his door with the offer 
to purchase the home for $18,500, which was $2,000 more than Un­
cle Jack had paid for it. While these "sales discussions" were under-
22. 152 P.2d at 23. 
23. See 152 P.2d at 23. Four years later, Justice Traynor would write the landmark plural­
ity opinion in Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), the first judicial opinion overturning an 
antimiscegenation law as unconstitutional. Also four years after the Stone v. Jones decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that enforcement of such racially restrictive covenants to be 
unconstitutional. See Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
24. Interview with Izella Hickman Davenport Vincent, Dec. 1, 1995. Notes on file with 
Author. 
25. Buyer Beware, TIME, Apr. 16, 1956, at 24. 
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way, "a crowd of 500 milled outside," recruited to emphasize the 
consequences of any failure to sell.26 
In dealing with this appalling situation, Uncle Jack chose a dif­
ferent course than the one Uncle Clarence had taken: he implicitly 
denied that he was Black, telling the reporter from Time that he 
was "half Cherokee and half French Canadian," leaving out his 
African-American ancestry. But, Time reported, when he made 
this denial of his Black heritage, "nobody listened," and he was 
forced to move.21 
Of course, it would not be fair to find fault with Uncle Jack's 
denial. As Professor Karst notes, under circumstances such as these 
"it is hard to locate any authenticity in an individual's 'choice' to 
repudiate the disfavored label."28 In addition, Uncle Jack had 
fewer options available to him than did Uncle Clarence: Uncle Jack 
was not a lawyer; he was a retired bodyguard with a mob outside of 
his house. But still, these forty-two years later, we read the Time 
article with a touch of sadness and a twinge of disappointment, be­
cause Uncle Jack denied who he was, and the milling mob did not 
even listen. In a different way than Uncle Clarence, Uncle Jack lost 
his home. 
These two incidents are relevant to many of the topics I discuss 
in this article, and I will return to them from time to time. Part I of 
this article begins by discussing the origins of the American system 
of racial classification, which has roots that are deep and old. This 
Part then analyzes some of the earliest cases and legislation dealing 
with racial intennixture, which indicate that by deliberate design 
and by operation of law the African-American race was, from the 
beginning, constructed to include those of mixed African-Euro­
pean-Native American descent. After briefly sketching the classifi­
cation of African Americans through the ensuing centuries, I tum 
to an analysis of the previous attempt by the census to count mixed­
race people - "mulattoes" - from 1850 until the Census Bureau's 
formal adoption of the one drop rule in 1920. 
Part II critiques the discourse surrounding the proposed new ra­
cial categories. Section II.A examines how recent law review arti­
cles and essays by historians have misperceived the one drop rule. 
Because these commentators have focused on formal analysis of the 
rule and its "asymmetry," they have ignored how the rule worked in 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and 
Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 323 (1995). 
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practice, and they have not examined the African-American experi­
ence sufficiently to see the good that the Devil did. These commen­
tators overlook the way that this rule has forged a unified Black 
community that . has been an effective force in battling racism. 
More surprisingly, they assume that other classification systems 
would have been better, without ever comparing hypodescent to 
those other systems. I conclude this discussion by making such a 
comparison - with the system in South Africa - which is formally 
more pleasing and symmetrical than hypodescent. I argue that in 
South Africa, this symmetrical, White-Colored-Black classification 
system was more effective than the one drop rule in ensuring the 
subordination of Black South Africans. 
Section II.B analyzes the proposals found in recent law review 
comments for a broad multiracial category that would include any­
one with "mixed blood." While the proponents of such a category 
all correctly deny that there is any biological basis for race, the cate­
gory that they suggest would, ironically, "rebiologize" race, by 
drawing a line between those African Americans who have White 
"blood" and those who do not. Turning to an example of this rebio­
logization of race, I examine one critic's argument that the Harlem 
Renaissance was a form of "cultural suicide" because writers such 
as Langston Hughes and Zora Neale Hurston failed to embrace 
their mixed-race identity. Using incidents from Hurston's life as an 
example, I argue that Hurston's only tie to her "mixed race heri­
tage" was a biological one, and that history and a powerful sense of 
identity forged in actual experience made her - and the many 
other African Americans like her with White ancestry - Black. I 
conclude this discussion of the "rebiologization" of race by analyz­
ing certain old "racial credential cases." in which courts attempted 
to adjudicate "who is Black," as a reminder of our legal system's 
previous experience with treating race as biology. 
Section II.C turns to one of the consequences of the misunder­
standing of the one drop rule and the rebiologization of race - an 
effect known as "distancing" - which is the creation of unneces­
sary and pernicious distinctions between light-skinned and dark­
skinned African Americans. I identify several examples of this dis­
tancing in recent legal journals. 
Part III examines how the lessons from the one drop rule inform 
the debate over the nature of race itself. I begin by using the expe­
rience of mixed-race people in America to respond to philosopher 
Anthony Appiah's now-famous argument that there is no race. I 
conclude that the African-American experience shows that races do 
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exist; history creates races from people who share a common mor­
phology and genealogy. I then briefly critique recent suggestions in 
law reviews that race is a metaphor, a "metonym" for culture, or an 
essence. Finally, I tum to the issue that has the most relevance to 
the census (where Americans are asked to "self-identify"), namely, 
whether race is a choice. I note that for my uncles forty years ago, 
and for us now, race, at least African-American race, is not just a 
matter of choice and that the argument that we "choose" our race 
by our daily actions holds special dangers for African Americans. 
Finally, Part V argues that the 2000 Census should contain a 
multiracial inquiry directed at the growing number of Americans 
with parents from two different racial groups and that this inquiry 
should be on a line of its own and not part of the race question. To 
date, the proposals for adding a multiracial category to the census 
all have called for placing "Black" and "multiracial" in competition 
on the same line of the census form. Part V argues that this ar­
rangement would set up a no-win rivalry between racial and multi­
racial groups for the allegiance of Loving's children. Worse, it 
could lead to a profoundly inaccurate count of Americans with par­
ents from two different races, since it will falsely omit all biracial 
people who are identified strongly with the race of one parent 
(these people will check "Black," "White," "Asian," or "Native 
American" instead of "multiracial") and it will falsely include many 
members of traditional racial groups. Giving the multiracial inquiry 
its own line on the census form will avoid these conflicts and inaccu­
racies and lead to the first reliable count of the new generations of 
Americans who have parents from different racial groups. 
l. T REATMENT OF MIXED-RACE PEOPLE: THE EARLY LEGAL 
RECORD 
Race mixing between Whites and Blacks in America is not new. 
Rather, it began almost immediately after the first Africans arrived 
in the United States. As nineteenth-century historian Robert 
Shufeldt rather dramatically claimed, "[t]he crossing of the two 
races commenced at the very out-start of the vile slave trade that 
brought [African slaves] thither . . .  indeed in those days many a 
negress was landed upon our shores already impregnated by some­
one of the demoniac crew that brought her over."29 Winthrop 
29. R.W. SHUFELDT, THE NEGRO: A MENACE TO AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 60 (1907), 
quoted in JAMES HUGO JOHNSTON, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA AND MISCEGENATION IN 
THE SOUTH 1760-1860, at 165-66 (1970). 
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jordan writes that "it seems likely there was more [intermixture] 
during the eighteenth century than at any time since."30 
The unique American definition of "Black" has roots that are 
almost as old as race mixing on this continent. This Part will briefly 
illustrate how early legislatures and courts dealt with the presence 
of mixed race people and guided the formation of the African­
American race to include not only the recent African arrivals but 
also the offspring of any union between these arrivals and the 
White settlers. The legal record illustrates that from the beginning, 
by deliberate design and by operation of law, anyone with any sig­
nificant African ancestry was pulled toward the African-American 
race. In later Parts of this article, I will argue that the three 
hundred years of history that began with these early cases and stat­
utes created a strong and resilient African-American people and 
gave them the tools to fight slavery, segregation, and racism and 
that multiracial theorists tend to overlook this aspect of the Black 
experience in America. 
This Part concludes with a review of the previous attempt by the 
census to count "mulattoes" and how that effort ended in 1920 with 
the formal adoption of the one drop rule. 
A. The First African Americans and the First Race Mixing 
The roots of African Americans on this continent are deep and 
old. It was in 1619, a year before the Pilgrims landed on Plymouth 
Rock, that twenty "Negars" arriving on a Dutch man-of-war were 
sold to British colonists.31 Race mixing appears to have begun 
rather quickly. As early as 1632, a mere fourteen years after the 
first Blacks arrived in Jamestown, Captain Daniel Elfrye was repri­
manded by his employer for "too freely entertaining a mulatto."32 
The legal records are few and not a model of judicial explica­
tion, 33 but certain themes emerge from the early documents: inter­
racial mating began almost immediately and was officially 
30. WINTiiROP D. JORDAN, WmTE OVER BLACK 137 (1968). 
31. John Rolfe, who himself was intermarried to the Powhatan Pocahontas, was Secretary 
and Recorder of the Virginia colony. An apparent eyewitness, he recorded that at the end of 
August 1619 there came to Virginia "a dutch man of warre that sold us twenty Negars." Id. 
at 73 (quoting 2 TRAVELS AND WORKS OF CAPTAIN JoHN SMITH 541 (Edward Arber ed., 
1910)). The "Negars " probably were captured from Spaniards by whom they had been 
enslaved. 
32. Id. at 166. 
33. The fragmented record makes a definitive Black history of the period difficult. Helen 
Catterall has noted the difficulty: "To write the history of slavery of Virginia in the seven· 
teenth century is like . . .  reconstructing a Greek vase from a few shards." 1 HELEN CATIER· 
ALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 53 (1926), 
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disapproved; a mulatto was considered to be of lower status than 
her White parent and was excluded from the White race and ab­
sorbed into the Black race. Race mixing, especially between White 
men and Black women, persisted despite legal disapproval. 
While formal statutes prohibiting interracial mating would be 
introduced in Maryland as early as 1664,34 judicial and legislative 
commentary on race mixing began in the colonies almost immedi­
ately. Eleven years after the first "twenty Negars" arrived in Vir­
ginia, there is a reported opinion ordering punishment for 
fornication between a White and a Black person. Significantly, it is 
this interracial sex case that is the first reported judicial decision to 
allude to Blacks in any way. In this 1630 case, colonist Hugh Davis 
was sentenced to be soundly whipped "before an assembly of ne­
groes and others for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and 
shame of Christianity by defiling his body in lying with a negro."35 
From the sparse record available, it is unclear whether the grava­
men of Davis's offense was the act of fornication itself or the fact 
that the object of his affection was a "negro."36 However, the fact 
that the court deemed it necessary to specify the race of the "ne­
gro" and designate as a punishment that Davis be whipped before 
an assembly of Negroes suggests, at the very least, a consciousness 
of the racial differences and that such racial differences were rele­
vant enough to be noted in the legal record. 
A decade later, in 1640, Robert Sweat was required to do public 
penance for having "begotten with child a negro woman servant."37 
The "negro woman" is not only identified by race but is given a 
harsher punishment, that of being "whipt at the whipping post."38 
From the record, it is unclear whether the harsher sentence is due 
34. See DAVID FOWLER, NORTHERN ATI1TUDES TOWARD INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE 41 
{1987). 
35. In re Davis, Mcilwaine 479 (1630), reported in 1 CATIERALL, supra note 33, at 76. 
36. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATIER OF COLOR, RACE AND THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 23 {1978) (noting ambiguities due to 
limited record). 
37. In re Sweat, Mcilwaine {1640), reported in 1 CATIERALL, supra note 33, at 78. 
38. Id. 
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to race, gender, class, a combination of these factors,39 or other un­
reported circumstances.4o 
B. Mulattoes: Black by Law41 
The legal treatment of mulattoes as Blacks, with all of the at­
tached legal disabilities, may have begun as early as the seventeenth 
century. One of the earliest judicial uses of the term "mulatto" to 
describe a person of mixed Black-White descent, appears in the 
Virginia case of In Re Mulatto.42 The opinion was issued in 1656, 
just as race-based slavery was taking a firm hold.43 Although the 
opinion consists of a single sentence, and we know of no supporting 
record to ·illuminate the facts of the case, its logic constructs the 
American view of racial mixture between Black and White that has 
endured for over three hundred years. In re Mulatto in its entirety 
states: "Mulatto held to be a slave and appeal taken."44 
Without discussion or debate, the court thus apparently articu­
lated the first judicial expression of the rule of hypodescent.45 Im­
plicit in its opinion is the finding that the litigant was of both 
African and European descent, but the court found that the Euro­
pean ancestry made no legally significant difference at all, and the 
holding is likely to have severed whatever ties this racial hybrid had 
with his European ancestry. In fact, it was the African ancestry that 
both defined his status and determined his fate.46 
39. For an excellent discussion of legislative and judicial regulation of sexual behavior 
during slavery, see Karen A. Getman, Sexual Control in the Slaveholding South: The lmple· 
mentation and Maintenance of a Racial Caste System, 7 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 115 (1984). For 
a discussion of the intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, see Kimberl� Crenshaw, Map· 
ping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 
STAN. L REV. 1241 (1991). 
40. While the meaning of the punishment meted out in the cases of Hugh Davis and 
Robert Sweat may be ambiguous, the legislative intent in Virginia's 1662 fornication statute 
was clear. The statute doubles the nonnal fine for fornication if the partner was Negro, 
thereby enacting "the first clear-cut example of statutory racial discrimination in American 
history." GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY 101 (1981). 
41. For a discussion of the converse, see IAN F. HANEY LoPEZ, WHITE BY LAw: THE 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996). 
42. Mcilwaine 504 (1656), reported in 1 CATTERALL, supra note 33, at 78. 
43. There is evidence that planters had been categorizing their White servants and Black 
servants separately as early as 1644. Legal historian Paul Finkelman writes that by the 1650s, 
"blacks were more likely to be treated as slaves than as indentured servants." PAUL 
FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK 13 (1986). Legislation 
unambiguously linking slavery and race first appeared in Virginia in 1667. See infra note 46. 
44. Jn re Mulatto, Mcilwaine 504. 
45. For a definition of hypodescent, see supra note 3. 
46. The practice of race-based slavery was fonnalized by the Virginia legislature in 1667, 
when the Virginia legislature passed the following act in 1667: 
Whereas some doubts have risen whether children that are slaves by birth, and by the 
charity and piety of their owners made pertakers of the blessed sacrament of baptisme, 
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A statute passed by the Virginia legislature in 1662, less than a 
decade after In Re Mulatto and forty-three years after the first Afri­
cans arrived, shows the early importance of drawing broad bounda­
ries around the Negro race. Undoubtedly in recognition of the fact 
that most interracial fornication occurred between White men and 
Black women, the law provided: "[C]hildren got by an Englishman 
upon a negro woman . . .  shall be held bond or free only according 
to the condition of the mother .. . . ' 47 Significantly, this law broke 
with the traditional English common law rule that the children fol­
low the status of the father. 48 Instead it provided that children born 
of a Black mother and a White father would follow the common 
law applicable to farm animals 49 - the child would follow the sta­
tus of the mother. so 
Keeping "mulattoes " on the Black side of the color line s1 was 
both psychologically and economically important. Its psychological 
importance arose because, as Winthrop Jordan writes: "The social 
identification of children requires self-identification in the fa­
thers. "52 White fathers were thus excused from social responsibility 
for their children and in this way benefited from the classification of 
should be by vertue of their baptisme be made free; It is enacted .. . that the conferring 
of baptisme doth not alter the condition of the person as to his bondage or freedome. 
2 Hening 260 (1667), quoted in 1 CATIERALL, supra note 33, at 57. Catterall explains that 
"color became the 'sign' of slavery: black or graduated shades thereof." 1 CATIERALL, 
supra note 33, at 57. 
47. 1662 Act XII, II Hening 170 (1662), quoted in FINKELMAN, supra note 43, at 16. 
48. This doctrine was known as patrus sequitur patrem. See HIGGINBOmAM, supra note 
36, at 44, 194. 
49. Animal imagery persists in legal description of mixed-race people. For example, the 
term mulatto is from the Spanish mulatto, the diminutive of mulo, a mule. See EDWARD B. 
REUTER, RACE MlxruRE 12 (1931). A mule is the sterile offspring of a female horse and a 
male donkey. See WEBSTER'S '_l'HIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1484 (1986). 
50. This rule, partus sequitur ventrem, was defined by Blackstone to mean "[o]f all tame 
and domestic animals, the brood belongs to the owner of the dam or mother." 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *390. The point of the law is to ensure that the owner of a 
female animal retains ownership of the offspring, since the male animal who impregnated the 
animal is generally unknown. A further rationale is that since the dam is almost useless to 
the proprietor during her pregnancy, the proprietor is compensated by gaining ownership of 
the offspring. See id. 
51. There is evidence that "mulattoes" were treated as a buffer race in some parts of the 
country during certain historical periods. Eugene D. Genovese writes that "in Charleston, 
New Orleans, and Mobile some semblance of a three-caste system appeared and played an 
important role within the local Negro community." EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, 
ROLL 431 (1974). For a further discussion of the treatment of mulattoes in the lower South, 
see IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS (1974) (focusing on free blacks in general); 
DAVIS, supra note 3, at 34-37. For a thorough account of the history of the mulattoes of 
Louisiana, see VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN 
CREOLE LOUISIANA (1986). Discussion of the experiences of these mixed-race people is 
outside of the scope of this article. 
52. JoRDAN, supra note 30, at 167. 
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their illegitimate children as "Black." They escaped responsibility 
not only for including these children in their families but also for 
including them in their larger family of the White race.5 3 "If [the 
White father] could not restrain his sexual nature, he could at least 
reject its fruits and thus solace himself that he had done no 
harm. . . . By classifying the mulatto as Negro he was in effect 
denying that intermixture had occurred at all."5 4 
This classification scheme had several economic benefits for 
white settlers. It insulated White males from any responsibility for 
supporting their offspring by Black women slaves; these offspring 
became the property, and the responsibility, of the woman's master. 
Thus, the birth of mulattoes provided an economic advantage to 
both the father, in the form of freedom from parental responsibility, 
and to the mother's slaveholder, in the form of a new slave. This 
latter factor perhaps added another perverse incentive for the sex­
ual abuse of slave women:55 The birth of mulatto children to a 
Black mother increased the plantation's inventory as though the 
child were a lamb or a bale of cotton. The economic advantages of 
rearranging the lines of descent were thus significant. 
In addition to providing that biracial children took the status of 
their racially enslaved mothers, early statutes reinforced the point 
that mulattoes were not considered desirable offspring in any event. 
A 1691 statute, which provided for the banishment of Whites who 
intermarried with a Negro or mulatto, was enacted for the express 
purpose of thwarting the births of that "abominable mixture and 
spurious issue " - mulattoes.5 6 In fact, Carter Woodson argues that 
the underlying intent of miscegenation laws in the colonial period 
was not to prevent sexual relations but "to debase to a still lower 
53. James Baldwin's comments to a White southerner on such selective paternal denial 
are instructive: "You're not worried about me marrying your daughter . . . .  You're worried 
about me marrying your wife's daughter. I've been marrying your daughter ever since the 
days of slavery." GENOVESE, supra note 51, at 414. 
54. JORDAN, supra note 30, at 178. This double standard, of course, affected White 
women as well. Diarist Mary Boykin Chestnut laments: 
Like the patriarchs of old, our men live all in one house with their wives and their concu­
bines; and the mulattoes one sees in every family partly resemble the white children. 
Any lady is ready to tell you who is the father of all the mulatto children in everybody's 
household but her own. Those, she seems to think, drop from the clouds. My disgust 
sometimes is boiling over. 
GENOVESE, supra note 51, at 426. 
55. For example, a master theoretically could become a breeder of slaves, thereby in· 
creasing his slave holdings. 
56. Virginia, Act XVI, quoted in HmoINBOTIIAM, supra note 36, at 44. This same lan­
guage was used in a 1714 North Carolina statute. See JoHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE Frum 
NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA 1790-1860, at 35-37 (1943). 
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status the offspring of blacks ... [and] to leave women of color 
without protection against white men." 57 
While the majority of mulatto children were born to Black 
mothers and inherited their slave status, legislation was passed to 
ensure that the mulatto offspring of free White women did not go 
unpunished. The 1691 Virginia law mentioned above imposed a 
fine on a White woman who had a "bastard child by a Negro, " ad­
ded five years to her term if she were an indentured servant, and 
committed the mulatto children to slavery until the age of thirty 
regardless of the status of the White mother.58 This type of punish­
ment was not unusual.59 For a time, Maryland took even a stronger 
stand, enslaving White women who, "to the disgrace of our nation, " 
married Negroes, as well as enslaving their children.6 0 
In many of the colonies, then, interracial marriage was formally 
prohibited;6 1 those who engaged in interracial fornication paid a 
double :fine;6 2 those who intermarried were banished;6 3 those who 
performed marriages for mixed couples were punished;6 4 Whites 
who engaged in interracial marriages were enslaved;6 5 the offspring 
of such marriages followed the slave status of the mother if the 
57. CARTER G. WooDSON, FREE NEGRO HEADS OF FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 
1830 xv (1925). 
58. And it is further enacted, that if any English woman being free shall have a bastard 
child by a Negro she shall pay fifteen pounds to the church wardens, and in default of 
such payment, she shall be taken into possession by the church wardens and disposed of 
for five years and the amount she brings shall be paid one-third to their majesties for the 
support of the government, one-third to the parish where the offense is committed and 
the other third to the informer. The child shall be bound out by the church wardens 
until he is thirty years of age. In case the English woman that shall have a bastard is a 
servant she shall be sold by the church wardens (after her time is expired) for five years 
and the child serve as aforesaid. 
1691 Act (Act XVI), quoted in HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 36, at 45. 
59. Pennsylvania passed a similar statute. See JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCE­
GENATION AND MULATIOES IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1980). 
60. Id. at 10-11. 
61. Antimiscegenation statutes were enacted in many colonies: Maryland adopted a law 
in 1662, Massachusetts in 1705, North Carolina in 1715, Delaware in 1721, and Pennsylvania 
in 1725. See JOHNSTON, supra note 29, at 166. 
62. See 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF Vm­
GINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE Y EAR 1619 (William Waller 
Hening ed., New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823), quoted in JOHNSTON, supra note 29, at 
167. 
63. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
64. See Act of 1681 (Maryland). The Act imposed a fine of 10,000 pounds of tobacco on 
any priest who performed a marriage ceremony for a Negro slave and a White woman 
servant. 
65. White women who married Negro slaves in Maryland were required to serve their 
husband's masters during their husband's lifetime. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 10 & 
198 n.15 (citing ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS AND Acrs OF THE GENERAL AS­
SEMBLY OF MARYLAND, JANUARY, 1637/38 - SEPTEMBER, 1664 (William Hand Browne ed., 
Baltimore, Maryland Historical Society 1883)). 
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mother were Black66 and were enslaved anyway if the mother were 
White.67 Nevertheless, the law was an ineffective deterrent to inter­
racial relations. On the contrary, "[t]he greatest number of all the 
cases of the intermixture of the races were regarded as outside the 
province of the law and the courts, and the larger part of the mu­
latto population was, no doubt, due in colonial times and thereafter, 
to the exercise of passions by those who took no thought of mar­
riage, law, or consent of clergy."68 The law was powerless to stem 
the tide. One observer of the time described Virginia during the 
colonial period as "swarming with mulattoes."69 
As early as 1705, the Virginia legislature, in a statute prohibiting 
interracial marriage, provided an ancestrally based, biological, 
mathematical definition of who was Black, to include "the child, 
grand child or great grand child of a negro" meaning anyone who 
was one-eighth Black.70 During this period, North Carolina defined 
a mulatto as anyone who was one-sixteenth Black, which would 
mean that having a single great, great grandparent who was Black 
would demarcate an individual as mulatto rather than White.71 Of 
this time Jordan writes, "[T]here is no reason to suppose that these 
two colonies were atypical."72 
Beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, laws dealing with 
Negro slaves added the phrase "and mulattoes" to ensure that mu-
66. See supra note 46. 
67. See sources cited supra note 56. 
68. JOHNSTON, supra note 29, at 181. 
69. Id. at 161. 
70. H. Leon Higginbotham & Barbara Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in Co­
lonial and Antebellum Virginia, 11 GEO. LJ. 1967 (1989). 
71. See Winthrop D. Jordan, American Chiaroscuro: The Status and Definition of Mulat­
toes in the British Colonies, 19 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 183, 185 (1962). 
72. Id. at 185. This fractional, blood-borne approach would remain in some states until 
the twentieth century. At different times, 
Alabama and Arkansas defined anyone with one drop of "Negro" blood as Black; Flor­
ida had a one-eighth rule; Georgia referred to ascertainable non-White blood; Indiana 
used a one-eighth rule; Kentucky relied on a combination of any appreciable admixture 
of Black ancestry and a one-sixteenth rule; Louisiana did not statutorily define Black­
ness [but] did adopt via its Supreme Court an "appreciable mixture of negro blood" 
standard; Maryland used a "person of negro descent to the third generation" test[;] Mis­
sissippi combined an appreciable amount of Negro blood and a one-eighth rule; Missouri 
used a one-eighth test, as did Nebraska, North Carolina, and North Dakota; Oklahoma 
referred to "all persons of African descent" adding that the "term 'white race' shall 
include all other persons"; Oregon promulgated a one-fourth rule; South Carolina had a 
one-eighth standard; Tennessee defined Blacks in terms of "mulattoes, mestizos, and 
their descendants, having any blood of the African race in their veins"; Texas used an 
"all persons of mixed blood descended from negro ancestry" standard; Utah law re­
ferred to mulattoes, quadroons, or octoroons; and Virginia defined Blacks as those in 
whom there was "ascertainable any Negro blood" with not more than one-sixteenth Na­
tive American ancestry. 
LoPEZ, supra note 41, at 118-19. 
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lattoes were subject to the same restrictions as Negroes.73 "From 
the first, every English continental colony lumped mulattoes with 
Negroes in their slave codes and in statutes governing the conduct 
of free Negroes: the law was clear that mulattoes and Negroes were 
not to be distinguished for different treatment. "7 4  Thus, those colo­
nies that chose not to deal separately with mulattoes simply added 
the term "mulatto " to statutes that regulated and limited the rights 
of Negroes. As Eugene Genovese notes, "[f]or the South as a 
whole whites made little distinction between Blacks and 
mulattoes. "75 
By the beginning of the 1700s, the legal structure that would 
persist for well over two-hundred years was set in place. Individual 
rights of those who had any significant amount of Black ancestry 
were restricted severely by law. Negroes were presumed to be 
slaves in slave-holding states, and most mulattoes with a minimum 
amount of "Black blood " were treated the same as Negroes and 
presumed also to be slaves. 
For mulattoes and Negroes, all rights were rooted in the past, in 
remote African ancestry. Ancestry alone determined status, which 
was fixed. A Negro could not buy out of her assigned race; she 
could not marry out of it, nor were her children released from its 
taint. As historian Gilbert Stephenson bluntly stated, 
"[m]iscegenation has never been a bridge upon which one might 
cross from the Negro race to the Caucasian, though it has been a 
thoroughfare from the Caucasian to the Negro."7 6 
73. This practice extended to colonies outside of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland. 
Edward Reuter reports that 
[i]n New York, in 1706, twenty-two years after the first introduction of Negroes [in New 
York], mulattoes were sufficiently numerous to be made the subject of legislative enact­
ment. Connecticut began her black code in 1690 by passing a series of measures in 
which mulattoes were enumerated with Negroes and Indians. The first act of Rhode 
Island was one recognizing the manumitting or setting free of mulatto and Negro slaves. 
New Hampshire never legally established slavery, but as early as 1714 passed several 
laws regulating the conduct of "Indian, Negro and mulatto servants or slaves." The first 
legislation of Delaware in 1721 mentions mulattoes. North Carolina was settled from 
Virginia and as some of the settlers brought slaves with them into the new territory, 
there were probably mulattoes in the colony as soon as there were Negroes. The first 
statutory recognition of slavery was in an act against intermarriage passed in 1715. 
South carolina's first positive slave act, 1712, mentions . . .  mulattoes, Negroes and Indi­
ans . . • . In New Jersey the usual formula including Negro, Indian, and mulatto slaves 
appears in the legislation at least as early as 1714. 
EDWARD BYRON REUTER, THE MULA'ITO IN THE UNITED STATES 111 (1918). 
74. JORDAN, supra note 30, at 168. 
75. GENOVESE, supra note 51, at 431. 
76. GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 19 (1910). 
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C. A Study in Contrasts: Exclusion of Mulattoes from De 
Crevecoeur's "New Race of Men" 
While legislators kept busy discouraging or prohibiting sexual 
relations between Blacks and Whites and limiting the rights of their 
offspring, there were no bars to intermarriage between Whites of 
different ancestry. The union of two Whites, no matter how diverse 
their European background or economic class, was not the subject 
of legal comment. For judicial purposes, "[u]nions . . . of two white 
persons were never called mixtures of two kinds of blood. "77 
For White Americans, "the core of 'the American national char­
acter' [was] a denial of legitimacy and privilege based exclusively on 
descent. "78 
America was seen as a severing of roots, a liberation from the stifling 
past, an entry into a new life, an interweaving of separate ethnic 
strands into a new national design . . . .  "The bosom of America," 
Washington said, "is open . . .  to the oppressed and persecuted of all 
Nations . . . .  " [who] would be "assimilated to our customs, measures 
and laws: in a word soon become one people."79 
This spirit of amalgamation, of intermarriage between arrivals 
from different European countries, is celebrated in the famous 1782 
Letters from an American Farmer, written by immigrant J. Hector 
St. John de Crevecoeur: 
What then is the American, this new man? He is either an European, 
or the descendant of an European, hence that strange mixture of 
blood, which you will find in no other country. I could point out to 
you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was 
Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose present four 
sons have now four wives of different nations. He is an American, 
who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, re­
ceives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new 
government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He becomes an 
American by being received in the broad lap of our great Alma Ma­
ter. Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, 
whose labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the 
world.80 
But just as "White " Americans were leaving behind the "an­
cient prejudices, " intermarrying with other Europeans and "melt­
ing " into a new race of "men, " they were enacting into law new · 
77. JORDAN, supra note 30, at 166. 
78. WERNER SOLLORS, BEYOND ETHNICITY: CONSENT AND DESCENT IN AMERICAN 
CULTURE 4 (1986). 
79. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 23-25 (1992). 
80. SOI,LORS, supra note 78, at 75-76 (quoting J. HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CREVECOEUR, 
LETIERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 39 (London, Thomas & Lockyer Davies 1782)). 
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prejudices that prevented mulattoes from melting into this new 
race. In fact, for practical legal purposes, the mulatto was usually 
placed squarely in the same category as Blacks with all the legal 
disadvantages that accompanied it. In direct contrast to 
Crevecoeur's new, free spirit of amalgamation, laws directed at 
mixed-race Blacks restricted their rights in the smallest details. In 
Crevecouer's adopted home state, New York, for example, it was 
"not Lawfull for any Negro ... or Maletta Slave to Sell any Oysters 
in the City of New York, "8 1 and it was prohibited for any free "Ne­
gro, Indian or Mallatto " to "enjoy, hold or possess any Houses, 
Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments within this Colony."82 Slave 
or free, African ancestry, no matter how remote, was a one-way 
ticket toward the Black race, not to Crevecoeur's new race. 
Perhaps the most poignant illumination of the difference be­
tween the status of the offspring of intra-European marriage and 
Black-White unions can be found in another American letter sent 
to Europe, just two years after de Crevecoeur penned the letter 
quoted above. This second letter is from a Savannah merchant 
who, as executor of an estate, was left with the responsibility for 
two free mulatto children, perhaps the offspring of the decedent. 
He wrote, pleadingly, to a friend in Ireland: 
These young Foiles are very unfortunately situated in this Country . . .  
their descent places them in the most disadvantageous situations, as 
Free persons the Laws protect them - but they gain no rank in life 
.. . so many of their own Colour (say the mixt breed) being Slaves, 
they too naturally fall in with them.83 
The executor begs his Irish friend to accept the "rnixt breeds " as 
wards in Ireland noting that "this [leaving the United States and 
moving to Ireland] alone can save them."8 4 As the wards were mu­
latto, they were inexorably pulled toward the Black race and ex­
cluded from the vaunted privileges of White America described by 
de Crevecoeur. 
Hypodescent, thus, began at the beginning of the Black experi­
ence in America. While the Revolutionary War and the Civil War 
surely affected the status of Blacks, for the most part they did not 
alter the fact that, for all practical purposes, Blacks with significant 
81. An Act for Preserving of Oysters (1715), reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL LAws OF NEW 
YoRK 845 (Albany, James B. Lyon 1896). 
82. An Act for preventing Suppressing and punishing the Conspiracy and Insurrection of 
Negroes and other Slaves (1712), reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 761, 764 
(Albany, James B. Lyon 1896). 
83. JORDAN, supra note 30, at 170-71. 
84. Id. 
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White ancestry were included within the boundaries of the Black 
race. 
Of course, the social status of mulattoes vis-a-vis Blacks did not 
remain constant over the centuries. Williamson argues that in the 
lower South, an important number of mulattoes were born of prom­
inent fathers, and until 1850 they enjoyed a status "markedly ele­
vated above that of the black mass, slave and free."SS Similarly, Ira 
Berlin notes that "[t]he somatic similarities between whites and 
light-skinned freemen also encouraged whites to share their prized 
attributes with mixed-bloods."S 6 In the Carolinas, Mobile, and New 
Orleans, mulattoes approached but never quite reached the status 
of a buffer race, at least for a period of time.s7 Everywhere else in 
antebellum America, in the Upper South and the North, there were 
fewer social distinctions between Blacks and mulattoes, and after 
the Civil War whatever distinctions there were began to fade away 
as mulattoes everywhere were pushed more and more into the 
Black race. Williams argues that even in the deep South, the "ani­
mus against miscegenation and mulattoes seemed to reach a cres­
cendo " in about 1907. By 1920 mulattoes, even there, had become 
firmly part of the Black race, where they remain to this day.ss 
D. The Census and the Mulatto Category, 1850-1910 
As we debate the wisdom of categorizing African Americans 
separately from multiracial people, it is instructive to review the 
census's earlier attempt to do so. Although Whites and Blacks have 
been identified in every census since 1790,s9 the census began to 
distinguish between Blacks and mulattoes with the Seventh Census 
of 1850. 
The decision of the Bureau of the Census to count mixed-race 
Blacks separately from Blacks does not seem to have resulted from 
any policy aimed at changing the status of mulattoes from that of 
Blacks, creating a buffer race, or even assessing the extent of un-
85. WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 15: cf. PAUL R. SPICKARD, MIXED BLOOD 440 n.7 
(1989). 
86. BERLIN, supra note 51, at 196. 
87. See GENOVESE, supra note 51, at 431. 
88. This is not to suggest that there was no intra-racial prejudice between Blacks and 
mulattoes. For a full discussion of colorism within the African-American race, see BERTICE 
BERRY, BLACK-ON-BLACK DISCRIMINATION: THE PHENOMENON OF COLORISM AMONO 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS (UMI Dissertation Services 1988). See also KATIIY RussELL ET AL., 
THE COLOR COMPLEX (1992). 
89. See BUREAU OF TIIE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CFF No. 4, HISTORY & 
ORGANIZATION 4 {1988). 
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checked miscegenation. Rather, the attempt to count mulattoes in 
the census of 1850 was part of a widespread effort of the "infant 
statistical community ... to press for the creation of a more profes­
sional national statistical system."9° For the first time, responsibil­
ity for the census was placed in the hands of a congressionally 
created Census Board, which turned to statistical experts in deter­
mining the scope of the inquiry.91 The census was redesigned to 
collect individual-level data on everyone in the country.92 The deci­
sion to count mulattoes can be viewed as part .of a larger scheme of 
the census reform of 1850, which created a complex new structure 
for taking the census and "opened a new phase in the statistical 
history of the country. "9 3  
This is not to say that there was no political concern about the 
expansion of the scope of the census questions. Indeed, as the 
United States was poised on the brink of a sectional crisis in the 
slavery debate, Southern congressmen were concerned about how 
the data collected would affect the discourse on slavery.9 4  Expan­
sion of information on the characteristics of individual slaves would 
lead to analysis of the statistical differences between Whites and 
Blacks that could be used by the abolitionists.95 Thus, there was 
some controversy about the level of individual detail that should be 
required as to the slave population. Through congressional action, 
questions on the individual names of slaves,9 6 the number of chil-
90. MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 33 (1988). 
91. Congress created the Bureau of the Census and appointed as its head Joseph Camp 
Griffith Kennedy, a farmer and political supporter of Zachary Taylor. Kennedy, however, 
consulted with scholars and statisticians who pressed for substantial revision of the census 
process. Lemuel Shattuck of the American Statistical Association and Archibald Russell of 
the American Geographical and Statistical Society spearheaded the reform effort. For a dis­
cussion of the creation of the Bureau of the Census, see id. at 35-36. 
92. See id. at 36-37. Prior to 1850, the population census only named heads of household 
and simply gave anonymous statistics for household members. See BUREAU OF THE CENsus, 
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CFF No. 4, FACTFINDER FOR THE NATION 3 (1988). 
93. ANDERSON, supra note 90, at 34. 
94. See id. at 40-41. 
95. See id. 
96. In the Congressional debate on the census, Senator Borland urged that to require the 
census enumerators to take the names of the slaves would be too labor intensive. Senator 
Clemens noted, "[a]s to their names, [the master] would not know anything about that until 
the children had reached the age of twelve or fourteen." CoNG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 
673 (1850). 
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dren born to female slaves,97 and information on degree of an indi­
vidual's removal from White blood98 were deleted. 
As S.M. Lee notes, "[r]acial classifications can be usefully inter­
preted as reflections of prevailing ideologies . . .  the dominant ideas 
and beliefs of society."99 In the 1850 census, it does not appear that 
the decision to count mulattoes separately was based on a desire to 
elevate or recognize mulattoes as an intermediate status superior to 
Blacks and inferior to Whites. On the contrary, one basis for the 
decision appears to have been to test a scientific theory of mulatto 
physical inferiority. The Congressional Record contains commen­
tary suggesting that the decision to count mulattoes and ascertain 
their life span and fertility was to test the theory of polygenesis es­
poused by Southern physician Josiah Nott.mo According to Nott's 
theory, Blacks and Whites did not belong to the same species, and 
when Blacks and Whites mated, the resulting hybrids - mulattoes 
- would be physically inferior to either the White or the Black. 
The congressional testimony also suggested that "the power of en­
durance of plantation labor diminishes in proportion to the admix-
97. The rationale offered for this deletion was especially degrading to slave women. Sen-
ator King asserted: 
Now, sir, it is impossible to ascertain the number of children upon a plantation that any 
woman has had. The woman herself, in nine out of ten cases, when she has had ten or 
fifteen children, does not know how many she has actually had [A laugh.] . . .  Where is 
the advantage, then, of filling up considerable space with this item, and swelling the 
document without getting any information at last? 
Id. at 674. 
98. This inquiry was rejected on the grounds that information would be too difficult to 
ascertain. Senator Borland argued that this inquiry required the enumerators 
to go into the most delicate questions of physiology . . .  [requiring] the census taker to 
ascertain the degrees of removal between the white and the black races. Now, I respect· 
fully suggest that it will require a high degree of science, an acute discrimination, too 
determine anything of the sort. I am not aware that physiologists agree on these points; 
and to suppose that any young men whose service could be obtained for the paltry com­
pensation of the deputy marshal, would be qualified to determine, for the miserable 
compensation of two cents per individual, these delicate and important questions of 
physiology . . .  why, sir, it seems to be the most extraordinary proposition that I ever 
heard in my life. 
Id. at 674. 
99. Sharon M. Lee, Racial Classifications in the U.S. Census: 1890-1990 16 ETHNIC & 
RACIAL STUD. 75, 80 (1993). 
100. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 96, at 676-77. The proceedings refer to a "Southern 
physician," who apparently was Josiah Nott. His thesis of polygenesis held that there was a 
separate creation of each of the races so that Blacks and Whites were not considered to be of 
the same species. The human race descended from many original pairs, "placed by God in 
climates best suited to their organization." REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST 
DESTINY 130 (1981); see also BERLIN, supra note 51, at 197 (quoting Josiah C. Nott, The 
Mulatto as Hybrid - Probable Extermination of Two Races if the White and Blacks are Al· 
lowed to Intermarry, AM. J. OF THE MED. SCI. VI 254 (1843)); FOWLER, supra note 34, at 212· 
14. 
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ture of white blood; that the mulatto has, in a word, neither the 
better properties of the white man nor the negro."101 
The congressional testimony, however, shows that some held a 
different view of mulattoes, as better than Blacks. In arguing 
against the decision to count mulattoes, one representative argued 
that the census should not be in the business of gathering details to 
test philosophical theories of scientists, but noted, "I believe the 
general opinion is, that the mulatto exceeds the black both in intel­
ligence and pride."102 However, in the end, it appears that the main 
reason for the addition of the mulatto category was that statisticians 
were happy to have a new category to count. 
The "science" of distinguishing between Blacks, mulattoes, and 
Whites appears to have rested with the visual acuity of the "set of 
beardless boys,"103 the youthful census enumerators. The terms 
"Black" and "mulatto" were not defined in either the census of 
1850 or 1860. In 1850, the enumerators were simply instructed to 
write "B" for Black or "M" for mulatto and further admonished 
that "it is very desirable that these particulars be carefully re­
garded. "104 Unlike the modem census, the classifications were as­
certained by the enumerator; they were not self-ascribed.1os 
The census proceeded on the theory that physical appearance 
corresponded to some ratio of White "blood" to Black "blood." 
Enumerators in the census of 1870 still were required to differenti­
ate between "mulattoes" and "Negroes," but they were given a def­
inition of "mulatto" that included "quadroons, octoroons and all 
person having any perceptible trace of African blood. "106 
101. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 96, at 676. It was stated further that 
[t]he gentleman [who suggested that mulattoes be counted] in conversation with me said 
that he believed that a certain class of colored people had fewer children than a certain 
other class; and he believed that the average duration of the lives of the children of the 
darker class was longer than that of the children of the lighter colored class, or the 
mixed. And it was for the purpose of ascertaining the physiological fact, that he wanted 
the inquiry made. This was the motive for its insertion . . . .  
Id. at 676. 
102. Id. at 677. 
103. Id. at 674. 
104. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SEVENTii CENSUS OF TIIE 
UNITED STATES: 1850, at xxii (1853). 
105. The accuracy of this census, as well as every census in which mulattoes were 
counted, is highly questionable. See Spickard, supra note 85, at 433 n.27. In reviewing the 
19th century census records for my own family, I noted that a "W" had been crossed out and 
replaced with an "M," suggesting that my great, great grandparent may have gently corrected 
the mistaken impression of the beardless boy. 
106. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NEGRO POPULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1790-1915, at 207 (William Loren Katz ed., 1968) (hereinafter NEGRO 
POPULATION]. 
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By 1890,107 the enumerators were instructed to categorize, by 
visual inspection, among different artificially constructed categories 
of Black, and "octoroon" and "quadroon" joined mulatto as sepa­
rate classifications. How the enumerators were to make these dis­
tinctions was never - and could never have been - made clear. 
Rather, in the same way that an English speaker might speak more 
loudly to a non-English speaking person in the hopes that the vol­
ume would translate the language, the instructions kept getting 
more specialized by degree as though that would increase the likeli­
hood of an accurate result. The enumerators were admonished to 
[b]e particularly carefal to distinguish between blacks, mulattoes, qua­
droons, and octoroons. The word "black" should be used to describe 
those persons who have three-fourths or more black blood; "mu­
latto," those persons who have three-eighths to five-eighths black 
blood; "quadroon," those persons who have one-fourth black blood; 
and "octoroon," those persons who have one-eighth or any trace of 
black blood.10s 
The enumerators were instructed to become, in effect, clairvoyant 
gene counters.109 
Even the Census Bureau admitted that the data collected under 
this method was "of little value,"110 and, with an almost audible 
107. There is no data available for the census years 1890 and 1900. 
108. NEGRO POPULATION, supra note 106, at 207 (emphasis added). 
109. The impossibility of ascertaining the exact proportion is highlighted by the following 
analysis: 
If, for example, six individuals, in which the proportions of Negro blood are respectively 
precisely one-sixteenth, one-eighth, two-eighths, four-eighths, six-eighths, and eight­
eighths, be presumed to intermarry, the number of possible different proportions in their 
children are 14; and if the group be presumed to be segregated for several generations, 
the possible different proportions their great-grandchildren would be represented by ap­
proximately 70 fractions having 128 as a denominator and numbers ranging between 17 
to 100 as numerators. If the proportions of Negro blood in the original parents were not 
precisely represented by the fractions given above - as would almost certainly be the 
case in any group of individuals selected from the Negro population of mixed blood -
the number of possible different proportions in the children of third generation would be 
much greater. Under the assumption made, of complete segregation the extreme range 
of differences in the proportion of Negro blood would tend to become less from genera­
tion to generation, but the number of different proportions, owing to the finer gradation, 
would tend to increase indefinitely. The tendency would be for the group collectively to 
approach a uniform proportion, from which individual proportions would vary by grada­
tions becoming increasingly minute and various. In the hypothetical group supposed 
above, this limiting uniform proportion would slightly exceed seven-sixteenths Negro. 
In the mulatto population of the United States as a whole the number of proportions of 
interrnixture is exceedingly great, and there is no reason to suppose that these propor­
tions are concentrated in any considerable degree upon such simple fractions as one­
eighth or one-quarter, or one-half. In the Negro population at the present time, it is not 
mathematically improbable that any given union of a mulatto with either a black or a 
mulatto, will in its offspring represent a unique proportion of admixture of white blood. 
Id. at 208 n.1. 
110. Id. at 207 n.1 (quoting BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENSUS 
OF 1890, POPULATION, pt. I, at xciii). 
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sigh of relief, the Census Bureau stated that the data was especially 
misleading "as an indication of the extent to which the races have 
mingled."111 Presumably, this meant that the mulatto category in­
cluded the offspring of mulattoes who married each other. 
By the Fourteenth Census in 1920, when the color line had hard­
ened, the Census Bureau stopped counting "mulattoes" and for­
mally adopted the one drop rule: 
The term "white" as used in the census report refers to persons un­
derstood to be pure-blooded whites. A person of mixed blood is clas-
sified according to the nonwhite racial strain . . . .  [t]hus a person of 
mixed white . . .  and Negro . . .  is classified as . . .  a Negro . . .  regard-
less of the amount of white blood . . .  .112 
This formal adoption of the one drop rule appeared in legisla­
tive definitions as well. For example, in 1924, a Virginia Act for 
"Preservation of Racial Integrity" defined a White person as some­
one with "no trace whatsoever of any blood other than Cauca­
sian. "113 By 1930, Virginia defined as colored anyone "in whom 
there is ascertainable any negro blood."114 The one drop rule was 
enshrined in social practice as well. In 1944 in Los Angeles and in 
1956 in Detroit, it cost my uncles their homes. 
The rule of hypodescent thus had its origins with the arrival of 
European and African people on this continent. During the ensu­
ing three hundred years, hypodescent drew broad boundaries 
around the African-American race, including within these bounda­
ries the offspring of Europeans and Native Americans, and it bound 
this race firmly together as a people. 
II. PROPOSALS FOR A MULTIRACIAL CATEGORY: CRITIQUING 
THE DISCOURSE 
In this Part, I turn to the discourse regarding the one drop rule 
and the proposed addition of a multiracial category to the census 
forms. To date, this discourse has mainly followed one well worn 
path: Scholars and commentators recite and condemn the racist or­
igins of the one drop rule and, armed with this condemnation, they 
conclude that the effects of the rule are mainly evil and that the 
consequences of abandoning it will be mainly good. Their path 
therefore often leads them toward neat, symmetrical redefinitions 
111. Id. 
112. 3 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FOURTEENTii CENSUS OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 1920, at 10 (1923). 
113. 1924 VA. Acrs ch. 371, § 5. 
114. 1930 VA. Acrs ch. 85, § 67. 
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of the racial identities of most African Americans (and of most eve­
ryone else for that matter). But many of the participants in this 
discourse have set off on this path without (as Barbara Fields and 
Jayne Lee remind us we must always do) surveying the surrounding 
terrain.11s The purpose of this Part is to raise a caution sign on this 
path and to slow the travel so that we can examine this terrain, 
which has been formed by the Black experience in America. I be­
lieve that there are cliffs and chasms that have been overlooked and 
that we continue to overlook them at our peril. 
Section II.A discusses the common misperceptions of the effect 
of the one drop rule. Section II.B first examines certain proposals 
to redefine the African-American race and argues that these pro­
posals abandon the racial categories that have been created by the 
social history of this country in favor of neat, biological classifica­
tions. Section II.B concludes by looking back on cases where the 
courts used "biological" factors to adjudicate the race of litigants. 
Section II.C argues that the proposals to divide the African­
American race are evidence of a dangerous "distancing" between 
dark-skinned and light-skinned African Americans. 
A. The One Drop Rule: The Misapprehension of the 
Historical Context 
The recent discourse addressing the one drop rule has focused 
on formal analysis of the rule without examining how the rule actu­
ally functioned on the terrain where it did its work. However valid 
in other contexts, the discourse overstates the importance of the 
one drop rule and often overlooks the ways in which it became fun­
damental to the struggle against racism, a struggle that would have 
been fragmented had a more symmetrical classification system been 
in place. 
1. Misperceptions of the One Drop Rule: Gotanda's Theories of 
Racial Purity, Objectivity, and Subordination in 
Recognition 
An interesting example of this misapprehension of the hypo­
descent system is found in Professor Neil Gotanda's pathbreaking 
115. See Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of 
America, 181 NEw LEFT REv. 95, 100 (1990); Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topol­
ogy of Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747, 751 (1994) (reviewing Kw AME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY 
FATHER'S HOUSE (1992)). 
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article A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind. "116 In a sec­
tion of this article, Professor Gotanda compares hypodescent unfa­
vorably with other, more formally elaborate classification systems. 
In this discussion, Gotanda becomes ensnared in formal abstrac­
tions and overlooks not only the ways in which Black Americans 
have lived under hypodescent but also the lives of the South Afri­
cans who have lived under a more symmetrical racial classification 
system. 
Professor Gotanda's article critiques, among other things, the 
argument that American laws - even laws designed to protect mi­
nority rights - should be colorblind and race neutral. Gotanda 
correctly notes that the formal definition of the White and Black 
races in this country (hypodescent) is neither colorblind nor neu­
tral; to the contrary, this definition is based on "assumptions of 
white racial purity" (the one drop rule) and "white domination."117 
Gotanda argues that "[t]he hypodescent rule when combined with 
color-blind constitutionalism, conveys a complex and powerful ide­
ology that supports racial subordination."118 After comparing hy­
podescent with more "symmetrical" classification systems used in 
other countries, Gotanda concludes that the hypodescent system 
fosters subordination because (1) it creates a powerful metaphor of 
White racial purity; (2) it lacks a sense of objectivity or neutrality; 
and (3) it leads to "subordination in recognition."119 
As the following discussion demonstrates, Gotanda is unsuccess­
ful in showing that hypodescent, per se, is a significant force, either 
in enforcing subordination or validating White racial purity. In­
stead, it is racism itself - far more than any particular classification 
system - that is the cause of this subordination and validation, and 
classification systems that are facially more neutral and symmetrical 
than hypodescent can just as effectively further racist goals. 
a. Gotanda's Summary of Racial Classification Systems. Go­
tanda begins by concisely distilling the age-old American system of 
racial classification (hypodescent) into two rules: 
1) Rule of recognition: Any person whose Black-African ancestry is 
visible is Black. 
116. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 
(1991). 
117. See id. at 30-35. 
118. Id. at 26. 
119. See id. at 25-27. 
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2) Rule of descent: (a) Any person with a known trace of African 
ancestry is Black, notwithstanding that person's visual appearance; or, 
stated differently, (b) the offspring of a Black and a white is Black.120 
Gotanda then correctly observes that these two rules create a sys­
tem which is not "symmetrical." The White race includes only peo­
ple who are pure White, while the Black race includes everyone 
else with a known drop of Black "blood." As alternatives to hypo­
descent, Gotanda posits four historically documented examples of 
classification schemes that are "non-binary" and "logically 
symmetrical": 
1. Mulatto: All mixed offspring are called mulattoes, irrespective of 
the percentages or fractions of their Black or white ancestry. 
2. Named Fractions: Individuals are assigned labels according to the 
fractional composition of their racial ancestry. Thus, a mulatto is one­
half white and one-half Black. A quadroon is one-fourth Black and 
three-fourths white, a sambo one-fourth white and three-fourths 
Black, etc. 
3. Majoritarian: The higher percentage of either white or Black an­
cestry determines the white or Black label. 
4. Social Continuum: This is a variation on the Named Fractions 
scheme: Labels generally correspond to the proportion of white or 
Black ancestry, but social status is also an important factor in deter­
mining which label applies. The result is a much less rigid system of 
racial classification.121 
Analyzing these schemes,122 Gotanda observes that "[b ]ecause 
these schemes are symmetrical, nothing in them suggests inequality 
or subordination between races."123 
While Gotanda notes that the Named Fraction, Majoritarian, 
and Social Continuum systems have been used in various parts of 
the world, there have been no substantive proposals to import these 
schemes into the United States for use by the Bureau of the Census, 
and an analysis of these three classification systems is therefore be­
yond the scope of this article.124 The Mulatto system, in contrast, 
now has its proponents (who correctly prefer the term "biracial" or 
"multiracial" to "mulatto"). Accordingly, the following discussion 
will examine the way that Gotanda compares the Mulatto system 
120. Id. at 24. 
121. Id. at 25. 
122. Gotanda asserts that all four of these classification schemes are "non-binary," and 
this assertion appears to be correct with respect to the Mulatto, Named Fractions and Social 
Continuum systems. The Majoritarian system, however, does appear to be binary, because it 
splits people into two groups, Black and White: See id. at 125. 
123. Id. at 26. 
124. An exception is a proposal by Luther Wright, Jr. for a kind of hybrid between the 
Mulatto and Majoritarian systems. This proposal is critiqued infra section II.B.3. 
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with the hypodescent system when he makes his three-pronged cri­
tique of hypodescent. 
b. Racial Purity. Gotanda's analysis begins with the assertion 
that hypodescent validates White racial purity. He notes: 
The metaphor is one of purity and contamination: White is unblem­
ished and pure, so one drop of ancestral Black blood renders one 
Black. Black ancestry is a contaminant that overwhelms white ances­
try. Thus under the American system of racial classification, claiming 
a white racial identity is a declaration of racial purity and an implicit 
assertion of racial domination.125 
Here, Gotanda overstates the role of the classification system in val­
idating White racial purity, ignoring the fact that the more "sym­
metrical" systems that he praises have been able to accomplish this 
task effectively. Consider, for example, the racial classification sys­
tem that accompanied Apartheid in South Africa. There, a "mu­
latto" system of racial classification divided the population (more 
symmetrically) into "Whites," "coloreds,'' and "Blacks." Notwith­
standing this symmetry, when a South African claims to be White, 
this claim - as in the United States - is a declaration of White 
racial purity. In South Africa, as in the United States, "White" 
means "pure" White; people with any detectible African features 
are not White, and the purity of the White race is thus validated.126 
Moreover, the Mulatto system has its own version of the "one 
drop" rule, which reinforces the superiority of the White race in a 
way that is not found in the hypodescent system. Under this "one 
drop" rule, White blood is seen as so virtuous and superior that it 
elevates a Black person out of the Black race and into a formally 
distinct "colored" or "mulatto" race. Accordingly, when the Mu-
125. Gotanda, supra note 116, at 26-27. 
126. The Population Registration Act of 1950 thus defined a "White person" as follows: 
(xv) "white person" means a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is generally 
accepted as a white person, but does not include a person who, although in appearance 
obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a colored person. 
An Act to Make Provision for the Compilation of a Register of the Population of the Union, 
for the Issue of Identity Cards to Person Names or Included in the Register; and for Matters 
Incidental Thereto, No. 30, 5 (1950) (S. Afr.), cited in Christopher Ford, Administering Iden­
tity, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1277 n.231 (1994). Under this statute, the emphasis was on ap­
pearance, rather than blood or genealogy. Nevertheless, the statute clearly stated that in 
South Africa, as here, one may look White, but not "be" White. South Africa had formal 
legal procedures to deal with those who wished to be reclassified from African to Colored or 
from Colored to White. As one reporter noted, "Diligent apartheid bureaucrats once scruti­
nized faces and hair, took photographs and sent thick reports back to government headquar­
ters in Pretoria on each of the hundreds of blacks who applied annually to be reclassified as 
Colored - and the many more Coloreds who applied to become whites." Scott Kraft, Four 
Families in South Africa: Colored Family Finds Color Still Matters, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 
1992, at H2. In the case of Colored applicants, these bureaucrats would often run a pencil 
through the candidate's hair. 
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latto system is conceived and administered in a racist manner, it can 
validate White racial purity in even more ways than the hypo­
descent system. In fact, the salient feature of the Mulatto system 
makes it far more effective than hypodescent in promoting White 
racial domination: It formally divides the subordinated, not-pure­
White people into two groups - colored and Black. In South Af­
rica, this formal division of people of color was and continues to be 
an effective tool in their subordination, a tool that is not formally 
present in the system of hypodescent. 
c. Biological Objectivity. Gotanda's next observation arises 
from the symmetry of the mulatto system when compared to the 
imbalance of hypodescent. This observation is surprising because 
we find Gotanda - an incisive critic of those who defend racial 
classifications on the grounds that they are scientifically or biologi­
cally "objective" - apparently praising the Mulatto system because 
of its "objectivity." Gotanda states: "The symmetry of racial cate­
gorization systems other than hypodescent brings a sense of objec­
tivity and neutrality to these schemes, and a comparison of 
hypodescent to symmetrical systems exposes its nonneutral 
assumptions."127 
But what is the basis for the Mulatto system's vaunted sense of 
"objectivity" and "neutrality"? The answer is biology. The Mulatto 
system "objectively" and "neutrally" draws bright blood lines that 
separate "pure-blooded" Blacks, "pure-blooded" Whites, and 
"mixed-blooded" persons into their own biologically homogeneous 
groups. From a formal standpoint, the "objectivity" and "neutral­
ity" of the Mulatto system may be qualities to be admired, but in 
practice they merely reinforce the categorization of the races on 
biological grounds. As Gotanda himself recognizes, "the treatment 
of racial categories as functionally objective devalues the socioeco­
nomic and political history of those placed within them. "128 This is 
precisely what the Mulatto system does: It gives the imprimatur of 
biology to racial categories, and it makes these racial categories 
look so neat and logical that we forget the socioeconomic forces 
that have drawn the bright line between Whites on the one hand 
and all people of African descent on the other.129 
127. Gotanda, supra note 116, at 27 (footnote omitted). 
128. Id. at 26. 
129. The asymmetrical system of hypodescent, in contrast, undermines the biological ba­
sis for racial categorization, because, genetically speaking, the requisite "one drop" of Afri­
can blood cannot hold a race together. Instead, hypodescent finds its cohesive strength in 
historical forces that have created the African-American race. See generally Gotanda, supra 
note 116, at 30-35. 
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Thus while the Mulatto scheme may seem more elegant because 
it draws a symmetrical line between pure-blooded Blacks and 
mixed-blooded Blacks, this is a line based on blood that has little 
meaning except to biological racists, a line that would be better off 
not drawn at an.130 
d. Subordination in Recognition. Gotanda next argues that the 
"moment of racial recognition" bespeaks the racial hierarchy im­
posed by hypodescent: 
Under hypodescent, the moment of racial recognition is the mo­
ment in which is reproduced the inherent asymmetry of the metaphor 
of racial contamination and the implicit impossibility of racial equal­
ity. The situation which bares most fully the subordinating aspect of 
the moment of racial classification arises when a Black person is at 
first mistaken for white and then recognized as Black. 
Before the moment of recognition, white acquaintances may let 
down their guard, betraying attitudes consistent with racial subordina­
tion, but which whites have learned to hide in the presence of non­
whites. Their meeting and initial conversation were based on the 
unsubordinated equality of a white-white relationship, but at the mo­
ment of racial recognition, the exchange is transformed into a white­
Black relationship of subordination. In that moment of recognition 
lies the hidden assertion of white racial purity. The moment of racial 
recognition is thus characterized by an unconscious assertion of the 
racial hierarchy implied by hypodescent.131 
The fl.aw in this reasoning is that Gotanda again attributes to 
hypodescent a phenomenon (the "moment of racial recognition") 
that is, in truth, a function of racism. In fact, experience tells us that 
such "moments" do not depend on hypodescent. Jews, Arab 
Americans, and Iranian Americans experience these moments fre­
quently (and anti-Semites therefore find themselves saying: "You 
don't look Jewish"), even though the boundaries of their ethnic 
groups are not strictly defined by hypodescent.132 
With respect to African Americans, in order to test Gotanda's 
hypothesis that these moments of racial recognition are a function 
of the hypodescent system, imagine the two ways in which such mo­
ments could play out between a White person and a mixed-race 
person if a Mulatto system were in effect. 
First, the moment could play out in the very same way as under 
hypodescent: The White person assumes that the mixed-race per-
130. Of course, in South Africa this line now has social meaning because decades of 
apartheid have successfully separated the Colored and African peoples into separate social 
groups. See Kraft, supra note 126, at H2. 
131. See Gotanda, supra note 116, at 27 (footnotes omitted). 
132. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 13. 
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son with whom she is speaking is White. After the White person 
makes her slur, the mixed-race person makes his identity clear, and 
the same "hidden assertion of White racial purity" occurs. 
Second, something very different could happen. When the 
White person makes her slur regarding Black people, the mixed­
race person could declare his formal distance from the Black race 
("I'm biracial and you're right, those Blacks do need to get off wel­
fare") and agree with the slur, thus consciously asserting the racial 
hierarchy implied by the Mulatto category. In both of these situa­
tions "subordination in recognition" occurs with great effectiveness 
under the Mulatto system. 
Gotanda also overstates his case when he argues that "at the 
moment of racial recognition, the exchange is transformed into a 
white-Black relationship of subordination." In fact, "the moment 
of racial recognition" is a two-edged sword, cutting both ways. Un­
less the White person is an incorrigible racist, she suffers humilia­
tion and embarrassment as a result of these "moments" - and she 
may also learn something. While most African Americans can give 
a personal example of such a situation, a very instructive one is 
found in a story Professor Scales-Trent tells about an experience 
her Aunt Midge had during a bus ride in the newly-desegregated 
South: 
The bus was almost full, a few seats here and there, black and white 
scattered throughout the bus. And then, at one stop, a dark-skinned 
black woman got on, looked for a seat, and went over and sat down 
next to a white woman . . . .  [T]his white woman was outraged. How 
dare this colored woman come and sit down next to her without so 
much as a by-your-leave! The white woman noisily gathered up all 
her bags and packages, rolled her eyes, muttered under her breath, 
and flounced over to sit next to Aunt Midge - Aunt Midge, a black 
woman with porcelain skin and baby blue eyes. She settled in with a 
haughty glance at the other bus riders, a glance that said: "No, in­
deed! Some people may be willing to sit next to niggers, but I am not 
one of them." The other black riders, friends and neighbors of my 
aunt, tried to suppress a grin. But then Aunt Midge peered around 
this white woman and her packages, and smiled and waved at them, 
and they couldn't contain themselves any more. They exploded with 
laughter. They laughed until the tears rolled down their cheeks. They 
laughed until they had to hold their sides. They laughed until they 
were out of breath.133 
Imagine this "moment of racial recognition" under the Mulatto 
system, where Aunt Midge would have been formally assigned to a 
different race than many of the other Black passengers on the bus. 
133. JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN 42 (1995). 
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At worst, Aunt Midge and her White seat-mate would have tacitly 
agreed that the Blacks on the bus were the "Other" and that it was 
unacceptable to sit next to them. At best, the laughter would have 
been more muted and less heartfelt. Either way Aunt Midge's little 
victory against racial subordination would have been less 
pronounced. 
Scales-Trent gives a final (tongue-in-cheek) warning that shows 
that, under a hypodescent system, these "moments of racial recog­
nition" have for years been an effective stealth weapon that Afri­
can-Americans use to combat racism: 
So don't forget, white folks: we see you, we hear you, and we tell 
our stories. Was that you at a party joking about living in "Coon 
City"? Little did you know that one of those "coons" was at the party 
and is writing about you even now. Was it you at a bar talking about 
that "new nigger basketball player at the university," not knowing 
that the "nigger basketball player" was two chairs away? And when 
you were in surgery performing a brain shunt and said it was hard to 
cut through the skull of your patient because "Negro skulls are so 
thick," you never knew that the brilliant new resident you were work­
ing with was a "Negro." 
We tell our stories. 
And we are everywhere, white folks. 
Beware.134 
It is something deeper than the hypodescent scheme - some­
thing that transcends any classification system - that is doing 'ra­
cism's work. Comparing the history of the United States with that 
of South Africa, it becomes clear that, historically, the symmetrical 
Mulatto system has been just as pernicious as the asymmetrical one 
of hypodescent; under both systems there was a bright line between 
White people and people of African descent and a fainter line be­
tween mulattoes and Blacks.135 The bright line was drawn not by a 
formal classification system, but by centuries of racism, economic 
forces, and sexual mores, along with the superficial physical differ­
ences. In fact, had the more elegant, more symmetrical Mulatto sys­
tem been selected in this country, the line between White people 
and people of color might be much brighter than it is today. 
Gotanda discussed the one drop rule obliquely in the context of 
colorblind constitutionalism, but other commentators who focus 
specifically on multiracial issues have fallen into the same traps. In 
the next two sections, I discuss how such commentators overlook 
the effects of the racial classification system in South Africa and the 
134. Id. at 44. 
135. See infra notes 140·61 and accompanying text. 
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good Mephistopheles did when he designed the one drop rule in 
America. 
2. The One Drop Rule and "Buying into the System of Racial 
Domination" 
Even historian Paul Spickard, who has written the definitive his­
tory of twentieth-century mixed-race Americans, is sometimes too 
quick to denounce the work of the one drop rule. Spickard for ex­
ample argues: 
The function of the one-drop rule was to solidify the barrier between 
Black and White, to make sure that no one who might possibly be 
identified as Black also became identified as White. For a mixed per­
son, then, acceptance of the one-drop rule means internalizing the op­
pression of the dominant group, buying into the system of racial 
domination.136 
I agree that for a biracial person - a person who feels loyalty to 
parents of two different races - accepting the one drop rule will in 
some (but certainly not all) cases lead to the painful internalization 
of societal racism. However, I do not agree that accepting this rule 
constitutes "buying into the system of racial domination." History, 
in fact shows us that the opposite is true: Often, those who fought 
the one drop rule were the ones who "bought into" the system of 
racial domination, and those who accepted this rule fought racial 
domination. Consider the slave narrative quoted at the beginning 
of this article: "[S]o you see I han't got but one-eighth of the blood. 
Now, admitting it's right to make a slave of a full black nigger, I 
want to ask gentlemen acquainted with business, whether because I 
owe a shilling, I ought to be made to pay a dollar?"137 The slave 
gives a cunning critique of the one drop rule but prefaces his cri­
tique with the words: "it's right to make a slave of a full black nig­
ger." He rejects the one drop rule, but accepts the system of racial 
domination. Similarly, in the article Time Magazine wrote on my 
Uncle Jack after the racists' bricks came flying through his window, 
he was not quoted as denouncing the system of racial domination; 
instead he implied that the bricks should not have been aimed at his 
window, because he was not Black.138 
136. Paul R. Spickard, The Illogic of American Racial Categories, in RACIALLY MIXED 
PEOPLE IN AMERICA 19 (Maria P.P. Root ed., 1992). This observation is cited with approval 
in Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Note, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong?: Racial Classification in 
America and Its Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 542 
(1994). In other writings, Spickard does acknowledge the positive works of the one drop 
rule. See Spickard, supra note 85, at 323. 
137. BLASSINGAME, supra note 1, at 52. 
138. See TIME, supra note 25, at 24. 
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Compare these rejections of the one drop rule with the actions 
of my Uncle Clarence when the neighbors sued to have him ejected 
from his home because of his race. Uncle Clarence accepted the 
one drop rule, stipulated on the record that he was Black, and then 
argued at every level of the Calif omia court system that in this 
country nobody should be evicted from their home because of their 
race.139 These three real situations, which undoubtedly have been 
played out repeatedly throughout American history, cast doubt on 
the conclusion that "acceptance of the one drop rule means . . . 
buying into the system of racial domination." Who was it, after all, 
who "bought into" the system of racial domination? Was it the op­
ponents of the one drop rule, who said "you can't do that to me -
I'm not Black"? Or was it the person who accepted the one drop 
rule, and said "you can't do that to anyone"? 
3. Lessons from the South African Experience 
Speaking of classification systems for race and sexual orienta­
tion, Professor Karst observes that "[w]hen a binary classification of 
personal identity is written into law, it is a better-than-even bet that 
the law was written by members of the dominant group."140 Other 
scholars who have contributed to the discourse also have assumed 
that the most efficient way for one racial group to maintain its dom­
inance is by imposing a binary system of racial classification, such as 
the Black-White hypodescent system in the United States.141 This, 
however, is not necessarily so. What has led the discourse astray is 
the assumption that the architects of the Jim Crow system chose the 
most efficient means of ensuring racial domination. History, how­
ever, presents no shortage of tyrants who were neither shrewd nor 
smart, and simply because the tyrants who fathered Jim Crow chose 
the one drop rule does not mean that this rule was the most effi­
cient means of maintaining dominance over the Black population. 
In fact, this dominance might have been far more efficiently and 
permanently enforced if the architects of Jim Crow had fashioned a 
more symmetrical, trinary, White-mulatto-Black classification sys­
tem. By building a wall between light and dark African Americans 
and then making a few concessions to those on the light side of this 
wall, the designers of Jim Crow America might have extended the 
life of their loathsome system for another generation. 
139. See Stone v. Jones, 152 P.2d 19, 19 {Cal. Ct. App. 1944). 
140. Karst, supra note 28, at 293. 
141. See Maria P.P. Root, From Shortcuts to Solutions in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN 
AMERICA, supra note 136, at 343. 
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Indeed, many American racists realized this and proposed draw­
ing such a line.142 In addition, as Higginbotham and Kopytoff note 
when speaking of a Virginia statute that treated mulattoes in the 
same way as Blacks: "What the white Virginians seemed not to re­
alize was that they had greatly increased the danger of alliance by 
classifying most mixed race individuals with blacks rather than with 
whites in terms of their legal rights."143 They also observe that, 
Whites in pre-Civil War Virginia paid a strategic price to maintain 
their ideal of white racial purity. Had they declared, for example, that 
anyone with more than fifty percent white blood was legally white, 
they would have had less to fear from an alliance of free mulattoes 
and slaves.144 
Of course, we can never know how American history might be 
different if the architects of Jim Crow had divided the Black race 
into two races - a pure African race and a mulatto buffer race. 
But as we evaluate the Devil's work in creating hypodescent here, 
we should compare it to the work he did some years later in South 
Africa, where he created an elegant, symmetrical, nonbinary classi­
fication system. As we make this comparison, we should ask where 
the Devil did more evil and where he did more good. Interestingly, 
the recent discourse regarding the multiracial category and the one 
drop rule has all but ignored the experience in South Africa.145 
There, the racial classification system was one of the bedrock ele­
ments of apartheid. Unlike hypodescent, it had an official interme­
diate "colored" category, which contained the descendants of the 
early White settlers, of the native inhabitants of South Africa (the 
Khoikhoi), and of the Malay, Indian, and Chinese immigrants.146 
142. For example, after observing race relations in Latin America and the Caribbean 
where he believed that the mulatto category was a more "distinct third caste in-between the 
white minority and the black majority," the conservative racist Alfred Holt Stone argued that 
mulattoes be accorded a separate "caste" status, and that they be exempted from some of the 
more discriminatory state laws. JOHN G. MENCKE. MULATTOES AND RACE MIXTURE 124-31, 
139 n.122 (1979). 
143. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 70, at 1996-97. 
144. Id. at 1981. 
145. The discourse includes several works on the subject of mixed race, hypodescent and 
the one drop rule which barely mention South Africa or its racial classification system. See, 
e.g., NAOMI ZACK, RACE AND MIXED RACE 74 (1993); Gotanda, supra note 116; Lythcott· 
Haims, supra note 136. Spickard puts a positive spin on the South African classification 
system, noting, "Even South Africa's starkly divided society has had room for an interrnedi· 
ate category • • . .  " Spickard, supra note 136, at 331. 
146. George Frederickson notes that: 
The initial constituent elements were the progeny of unions between whites and slaves 
or ex-slaves of Asian or East African origin . • •  and the offspring of white-Khoikhoi or 
slave-Khoikhoi interrnixture. Eventually the unmixed slaves freed in 1838 and a large 
proportion of the remaining full-blooded Khoikhoi intermarried with these original 
Coloreds, thus increasing their nonwhite inheritance. But the white genetic contribution 
to this population group did not cease with the abolition of slavery; for white men con· 
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The effects of this categorization system are metaphorically 
summed up by President Mandela in his description of the alloca­
tion of food at one of the segregated prisons where he was incarcer­
ated: "[W]hite prisoners received white sugar and white bread, 
while Coloured and Indian prisoners were given brown sugar and 
brown bread." Black prisoners, Mandela notes, received no sugar 
and no bread.147 This division of bread and sugar signalled the way 
that all of South Africa's wealth and privilege was allocated under 
the old regime. In Cape Town, for example, Whites lived in nice 
houses, many in seaside neighborhoods, that were lavish in compar­
ison to the brick bungalows where the colored population lived, 
which, in turn, were luxurious in comparison to the shacks where 
the African population was forced to reside.148 Mean income for 
the colored population was only one third that of Whites but it was 
twice that of Blacks. Similarly, educational spending on colored 
children was only half that spent on White children but twice that 
spent on Black students.149 The New Republic noted that 
"[t]hrough a labor system that gave them preference over blacks, 
coloreds were encouraged to feel superior to and distinct from 
them."150 Formal housing segregation further isolated the colored 
population from Black people. In many ways, Black and colored 
South Africa were separate societies, with colored people often 
called the "stepchildren" of White society.151 
Prior to 1948, many colored voters had the franchise in South 
Africa. When the National Party's D.F. Malan defeated Jan 
Smuts's United Party in the 1948 elections, the National Party be­
gan to build the formal system of Apartheid and, within eight years 
of taking power, it had disenfranchised the colored electorate and 
segregated the colored population.152 In an infamous episode in 
tinued to marry or cohabit with Colored women, and most of their children now became 
part of the mother's racial group. 
GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN 
AND SoUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 132 (1981). For the gene counters, Frederickson notes: '"the 
Cape Coloured population in Cape Town . . .  are constituted by approximately equal propor­
tions of European, Asian and Southern African genes."' Id. at 255 {alteration in original) 
(quoting M.C. Botha & Judith Prichard, Blood Group Gene Frequencies: An Indication of 
the Genetic Constitution of Population Samples in Cape Town, S. AFR. MED. J., Apr. 1, 1972, 
at 20). 
147. See NELSON MANDELA, LoNG WALK TO FREEDOM 212 {1994). 
148. See Jonathan Steele, ANC Faces Suspicion from Mixed-Race Voters, THE GUARD­
IAN, Apr. 8, 1994, at 122. 
149. See Kraft, supra note 126, at 2. 
150. Peter Beinart, United Coloreds: How Mandela Lost the Mixed Race Vote, NEW RE­
PUBUC, Feb. 28, 1994, at 16, 17. 
151. See Id. 
152. See FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY, supra note 40, at 279, 254. 
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the Western Cape Province, approximately 60,000 colored residents 
were forcibly removed from their homes in District Six in Cape 
Town; these homes were razed so that a White neighborhood could 
be built on the spot.153 
Decades later, as 1994 brought the first free elections to South 
Africa, this same Nationalist party sought to win the votes of the 
colored people it had disenfranchised, segregated, and relocated, 
and it began this task by emphasizing the line it had drawn between 
the mixed race and Black populations. Professor Lawrence summa­
rizes one campaign tactic employed by the National Party in order 
to lure colored votes in the Western Cape: 
The National Party's campaign comic book depicted a typical Miller's 
Plain Coloured family: a mother, a father, three children, and a dog. 
Each strip told a tale of how, if elected, Mandela and the ANC would 
allow the Africans to take everything the Coloured family had 
worked so hard to get. The depictions in the comic of both Coloureds 
and Africans employed blatantly racist stereotypes. In one strip, an 
unkempt African rings the doorbell. The mother goes to the door and 
asks what he wants. "I've come to look at the house that Mandela is 
giving me after the elections," he says.154 
A review of newspaper accounts of events leading up to the 
1994 campaign shows how effective the South African govern­
ment's efforts to draw a line through the African race had been. 
For example, the Daily Telegraph quotes one colored voter as say­
ing "[s]ure the National Party did terrible things to us, but the white 
men governed us all these years. They know how to rule. Black 
men can't rule the world."155 Similarly, the Los Angeles Times 
quotes a Colored man observing that "[m]ost of the so-called 
Colored people would go for the National Party because of their 
inherent fear of the black man . . . .  They don't understand the black 
man. Coloreds have been taught that he's the uneducated one who 
steals without asking. "156 And shortly before the election, the Fi­
nancial Times reported the following from a Cape Town election 
rally: 
153. See Paul Taylor, Coloreds: Oppressed Like Blacks, But Voting Like Whites, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 25, 1994, at Al3. After razing this vibrant and Bohemian neighborhood, the 
government was unable to fulfill its plans and the land remained vacant for years. See 
Brendan Boyle, South Africa's Notorious Apanheid Wasteland to be Redeveloped, REUTERS 
LIBRARY REPORT, Aug. 26, 1991. 
154. Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism and the Jurisprudence of 
Transformation to Symposium, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
819, 832 (1995). For a press account of these tactics, see Steele, supra note 148. 
155. Alec Russel, ANC Paints Itself White to Woo the Coloureds, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Sept. 18, 1993, at 15. 
156. Kraft, supra note 126, at H2. 
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But Mr Andre Hofmeister, a coloured [man] whose name underlines 
his half-European ancestry, pointed to a crowd of [African National 
Congress] supporters dancing with posters of Mandela and said: 
"These people are too stupid to realise that, if a black man rules this 
country, it will be run into the ground."157 
When the election came, the colored electorate in the Western 
Cape gave the majority of its votes to the National Party, the same 
party that had oppressed it for forty-six years, thereby electing, as 
premier of the Western Cape, Remus Kriel, the man who had 
served the Apartheid regime in Pretoria as its last Minister of Law 
and Order158 and who, one newspaper noted, had "opposed Presi­
dent F W de Klerk's reforms until the last moment."159 
Fortunately for us, the designers of Jim Crow segregation in the 
United States were not quite as shrewd as D.F. Malan. Today, we 
can only speculate as to how this country would have been different 
if the architects of American racial classifications had designed 
things slightly differently, walling off mulattoes in a separate racial 
category; officially reserving for them slightly better jobs and neigh­
borhoods, schools and water fountains; and poisoning them with ra­
cist propaganda touting their superiority over the "pure-blooded" 
African Americans. In his essay Paths to Belonging, Professor 
Karst persuasively reminds us that it is not difficult to pit one disad­
vantaged minority group against another; Professor Lawrence notes 
that in 1966 even some of California's Latino voters supported 
Proposition 14, the initiative that would have repealed fair housing 
laws.160 If a separate "mulatto" race had been formally created 
here, would its voters - afraid of having "Blacks" as neighbors -
have supported this law? Would this separate category of Ameri­
cans, like the South African coloured electorate, have voted for seg­
regationists? With three racial categories instead of two, just how 
differently would the struggle against racism have evolved? Of 
course, we cannot answer these questions with certainty, but we 
must at least consider them as we survey the terrain. 
157. Brendan Boyle, South African Elections: Mixed-Race Voters Ensure Nats Triumph in 
the Cape, FIN. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at 4. 
158. See id. 
159. Raymond Whitaker, Ominous Signs as Nats Claim Western Cape, THE INDEPEND­
ENT, May 2, 1994, at 12. 
160. See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 
N.C. L. REv. 303 (1986). For the ironic story of one such voter, see Lawrence, supra note 
154, at 834. Given the existence of colorism within the African-American community, see 
sources cited supra note 88, it is easy to imagine how a formal legal division of the African­
American race could have splintered and slowed the struggle for racial equality. 
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As we examine the African-American experience more closely 
and compare it with the experience in South Africa, we come away 
with a more realistic view of the workings of hypodescent and the 
one drop rule. As noted at the outset of this article, when Mephis­
topheles was asked to "self-identify," he responded that he was 
"part of that power that ever wills evil and ever accomplishes 
good."161 So it is with the one drop rule. It was begotten of racism, 
hatred, and ignorance, but it also created a people and united that 
people in the fight against those evils. 
B. Rebiologizing Race 
With the one drop rule placed in a more balanced light, I now 
turn to the arguments for a radical redefinition of American racial 
categories. Among those who promote a multiracial category, one 
group urges such broad boundaries for that category that it would 
swallow up a great percentage of Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, Native 
Americans, and Filipinos. In this section, I argue that these com­
mentators, in a quest for new biologically symmetrical racial classi­
fications, have overlooked much of the social and historical context 
that has created the African-American race. They have, for exam­
ple, forgotten that even the Devil is bound by the laws of motion, 
which declare that actions and reactions are proportional, and thus 
when the Devil made the White race exclusive, the necessary con­
verse was that the African-American race became inclusive. Doro­
thy E. Roberts is thus correct when she observes: 
Sharing genetic traits seems less critical to Black identity than to 
white identity. The notion of racial purity is foreign to Black folk. 
Our communities, neighborhoods, and families are a rich mixture of 
languages, accents, and traditions, as well as features, colors, and tex­
tures . . . . There is often a melange of physical features - skin and 
eye color, hair texture, sizes and shapes - within a single family. We 
are used to "throwbacks" - a pale, blond child born into a dark­
skinned family, who inherited stray genes from a distant white ances­
tor. My children play with a set of twins who look very different from 
each other. The boy has light skin, green eyes, and "kinky" sandy­
colored hair; the girl has dark skin, brown eyes, and long, black, wavy 
hair.162 
Because the commentators discussed below have overlooked this 
social reality, their classification systems would return us to notions 
of racial purity; they would reduce racial categorization to a matter 
of biology and blood. 
161. GOE.THE, supra note 18, at Part I, Lines 1335-36. 
162. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 209, 237 (1995). 
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1. The Collapse of Biological Race 
Many anthropologists now reject the concept of physical race. 
Of course, they do not deny that morphological differences exist 
between population groups; rather, they deny that these differences 
have much deeper genetic significance.163 These anthropologists 
note that the genetic differences that do exist among peoples do not 
track the traditional racial groups. In fact, there are huge genetic 
variations among people in the same racial group, and there are 
significant genetic similarities among people of different racial 
groups. For example, in inventorying the genetic makeup of vari­
ous population clusters, researchers have found that the largest ge­
netic difference exists between two groups of black skinned people 
- the West Africans and the Australian aborigines.164 
While the rejection of the genetic significance of racial catego­
ries is by no means unanimous,165 it has reached the point of con­
sensus among the participants in the discourse that I address here. 
All of these participants recognize race as a social rather than a 
biological category.166 Ironically, however, these same commenta­
tors now propose to breathe new life into the biological construc­
tion of race that they unanimously reject. 
2. Proposals for a Broad Genetically Based Multiracial Category 
Some commentators and advocacy groups have recently sug­
gested that the census should include a broad "multiracial" cate­
gory that would be "inclusive of all racially mixed persons."161 The 
163. See Robert Lee Hotz, ls Concept of Race a Relic?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1995, at Al. 
For a compelling exposition of this view, see Kw AME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FAnraR's 
HOUSE 36-38 (1992); see also STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981). 
164. See Hotz, supra note 163. Genetic traits that correlate with population groups often 
do not correlate with the traditional racial groups. For example, if races were formed on the 
basis of the ability to retain lactase, the enzyme needed to digest milk, one race would in­
clude some African Blacks, East Asians, Native Americans, Southern Europeans, and Aus­
tralian Aborigines; the other race would consist of West Africans, Arabs, and Northern 
Europeans. Id. Similarly, the sickle cell trait appears "wherever people had to cope with 
prolonged exposure to malaria. It is as prevalent in parts of Greece and south Asia as in 
central Africa." Id. 
165. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE - INTELLI­
GENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). 
166. See NAOMI ZACK, RACE AND MIXED RACE 13-17 (1993); Gotanda, supra note 116, 
at 23; Cynthia L. Nakashima, An Invisible Monster: The Creation and Denial of Mixed-Race 
People in America, in RACIALLY MuraD PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 162; 
Spickard, supra note 136, at 18; Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 536; Wright, supra note 
17, at 513. 
167. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 532 n.7. Similarly, Project RACE proposes a 
census category that would define "multiracial" as a "person whose parents have origins in 
two or more of the above racial categories [namely, American Indian or Alaska Native, 
Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, Hispanic or White]." Hearings, supra note 14, at 113. Pay-
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intellectual momentum for this category is drawn, in large part, 
from the rejection of the one drop rule. For example, in a thought­
ful recent Note focused on the issue of transracial adoption, Julie 
Lythcott-Haims forcefully rejects the one drop rule16s and proposes 
a broad multiracial category. Her discussion of the "Black is Beau­
tiful" movement provides insight into the theoretical basis for this 
broad, new category: 
The "one drop" rule is so ingrained in the American psyche that 
Blacks and Whites do not think twice about it. For example, part­
Black people of all hues joined Blacks in embracing the "Black is 
Beautiful" slogan advanced in the late 1960s, finally taking pride in 
their skin color, their hair and other aspects of their black ancestry.169 
Here, Lythcott-Haims acknowledges that the "psyche" of American 
Blacks was such that they never "thought twice" about the fact that 
they were Black. As I have argued above, this self definition arose 
from the social history that solidified African Americans into a sin­
gle racial group. But notwithstanding African Americans' self­
definition and social history, the broad category which Lythcott­
Haims and others propose would draw a line between Blacks who 
have White blood ("part-Black people of all hues") and those who 
do not ("Blacks"). In doing so, this category could establish a one 
drop rule of its own: one drop of White blood would transform a 
"Black" person into a "part-Black person of all hues."170 In fact, 
this new one drop rule could transform 75 to 80% of African Amer­
icans into multiracial persons: 
It is now believed that Multiracial Americans are more common than 
many Americans recognize: "It has been estimated, for example, that 
between three-quarters and four-fifths of all so-called Negroes in the 
United States have some White ancestry. How many so-called Whites 
in the United States have Negro blood is unknown, but it must run 
into the hundreds of thousands. if not millions."171 
son correctly observes that "if multiracial is defined as having parents with origins in two or 
more groups, most African-American and Hispanic persons, and even a significant propor­
tion of white persons in this country would fall under the multiracial category." Kenneth E. 
Payson, Comment, Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of 
Mixed-Race People, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1280 (1996). 
168. See Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 533. 
169. Id. at 539 (emphasis added). 
170. It is important to remember that the proponents of this category have the noblest of 
intentions. Lythcott-Haims, for example, states: "In no way do I suggest that being Black is 
undesirable and that Multiracial people should be given the opportunity to break free of the 
'Black' label. . . .  I implore that recognizing and accepting the fullness of one's ancestry is 
critical to developing a healthy identity." Id. at 541. 
171. Id. at 539-40 (quoting CARL N. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: SLAVERY 
AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES 185 (1986)). 
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At bottom, this broad multiracial category is based on a biological 
view of race, specifically, that the multiracial box should be made 
available for all those African Americans with some admixture of 
White blood in their "ancestry." This biological recategorization is 
not confined to the Black race. The purpose is apparently to draw a 
racial dividing line, with those Americans who are pure blooded 
(pure Whites, pure Blacks, pure Native Americans) on one side, 
and those who have mixed blood on the other. In accomplishing 
this task, blood lines may be followed endlessly to their source, and 
the histories of peoples may be ignored. Lythcott-Haims, for exam­
ple, adopts Maria P.P. Root's observation that "virtually all Latinos 
and Filipinos are [m]ultiracial."172 In this cosmology, then, it is the 
fact of the mixture that is important; what is mixed pales in compar­
ison. Consequently, all Filipinos can consider themselves as "multi­
racials" due to genetic mixing that occurred centuries ago and an 
ocean away. In fact in her discussion of the wording of the census 
forms, Lythcott-Haims emphasizes Root's practically limitless defi­
nition of the "multiracial" category: 
[I]t is estimated that 30-70% of African-Americans by multigenera­
tional history are [M]ultiracial; virtually all Latinos and Filipinos are 
[M]ultiracial, as are the majority of American Indians and Native 
Hawaiians. Even a significant proportion of White-identified persons 
are of [M]ultiracial origin. The way in which the Census Bureau 
records data on race makes it very difficult to estimate the number of 
biracial people, let alone [M]ultiracial persons, in the United States. 
And estimates that have been made are conservative.173 
With "multiracial" defined in this way, the Census Bureau 
would need to forsake any accurate count of the racial groups cre­
ated by the social history of this and other countries, so that it could 
add a category that can accommodate anyone whose "multigenera­
tional history" shows some genetic admixture. 
As discussed in section IV.B below, the entire census could be 
rendered meaningless by the addition of a category that can be read 
to include some Whites, most Blacks, most Native Americans, all 
Latinos, all Filipinos, and all native Hawaiians. More importantly, 
while such a proposal would be a victory for those who want the 
census to validate their genetic history, the inevitable cost of this 
victory would be to make the census an assessment of genetic con­
tent rather than a measure of the racial groups that have been cre­
ated by the social history of our country. 
172. Id. at 544. 
173. Id. at 44 (quoting Maria P.P. Root, Within, Between, and Beyond Race, in RACIALLY 
MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 9). 
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3. The Proposal for a Majoritarian Classification System 
On a more abstract level, another proposal for the complete re­
writing of American racial categories is made by Luther Wright, 
Jr.174 At the end of a Note that offers an insightful and persuasive 
analysis of some of the aspects of the American racial classification 
system, Wright briefly proposes a scheme that would use elements 
of both the mulatto and majoritarian systems in order to realign 
racial definitions in this country. For example, he would define Af­
rican Americans and European Americans as follows: 
African Americans - All natural born citizens having the majority of 
their origins in the original peoples of sub-Saharan Africa. 
European Americans - All natural born citizens having the majority 
of their origins in the original peoples of Europe.11s 
Under a majoritarian system such as this one, people would count 
their ancestors in order to determine their race. Thus, a person 
with seven Black and nine White great grandparents would be 
White.176 It is interesting to imagine which famous African Ameri­
cans would be transformed into White people under this system. 
For example, would Thurgood Marshall, Lena Horne, and Colin 
Powell be White or Black? Moreover, what if records that racially 
identify one's ancestors are lost? Would the determination then 
turn on skin color, hair texture, or facial features? 
In addition, Wright proposes a biracial category to be defined as 
follows: 
Biracial Americans - All natural born citizens who have origins in 
two or more racial groups or have the majority of their origins in the 
original peoples of Northern Africa and the Middle East.177 
174. See Wright, supra note 17, at 513. 
175. Id. at 563. 
176. Wright suggests a return to the practice of including race on birth certificates. Once 
this is done, he claims, "there would be no need . • •  to delve into an individual's ancestry 
beyond [what is indicated on his or her parents' birth certificates]." Id. at 567. But Wright 
does not suggest how, for example, a Black father who is filling out his daughter's birth 
certificate is to determine whether a "majority" of his own "origins [are] in the original peo­
ples of sub-Saharan Africa." Id. at 563. Perhaps the father can look at his own parents' birth 
certificates but these documents may be silent as to race altogether, and they certainly will 
not tell him whether a "majority of [his] origins [are] in the original peoples of sub-Saharan 
Africa" or Europe. Id. To answer that question, the father may have to look back over ten 
or fifteen generations. 
177. Id. at 563. As Wright defines his African-American and biracial categories, there is 
a great deal of overlap, and he does not fully explain how he would draw a line between the 
two. See id. at 567 & n.346. He suggests, however, that the biracial category is meant only 
for those people with an even split in their ancestral origins. A person with one Black grand­
parent and three White grandparents would be White, not biracial. See id. ("When only one 
parent is biracial the designation of the child should be the race that predominates."). 
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Wright's placement of Arabs, Iranians, and Israelis in this cate­
gory is based partially on the assumption that this is where they fit 
genetically. He notes, for example, that: 
[T]he common perception that physical appearances change gradually 
from northern Europe to southern Africa leaves northern Africa and 
the Middle East as the regions on the Old World Continuum where 
people would "appear" to be in the middle of the two extremes . . . .  
The very essence of the Biracial category is the perception that the 
individual so classified is thought to be in the center of two 
extremes.178 
Of course, only a spectrum of skin colors places Middle Easterners, 
as a people, at the center of two extremes. Using other more mean­
ingful measures, they are no more likely to be in the center, or at 
the extremes, than any other people. While Wright's categorization 
systeµ:i is suffused with such neat, genetic redefinitions of racial 
identities, what is most interesting is his mistaken perception that 
his categories "seem to reflect more accurately America's socio­
political notions of race."179 In fact, he makes the following surpris­
ing claim for his system: "By adopting a sociopolitical definition of 
race based on a majority rule, biological notions of white 
supremacy give way to cultural, historical, and perceptional notions 
of race."180 Like so many other scholars who have joined this dis­
course, Wright simply does not realize that his redefinition of race 
is based on biology rather than on the "sociopolitical" history of 
this country. To illustrate, consider two famous Black Americans, 
Thurgood Marshall and Colin Powell. Under the "cultural, histori­
cal and perceptional notions of race" in this country, both of these 
men are Black. Under a majoritarian system, Justice Marshall and 
General Powell could become White or biracial. Why? Because of 
their White blood. 
The flaw in Wright's analysis is that, for good or for ill, the social 
and political history of this country has defined the Black race using 
the rule of hypodescent. Those who view race as a sociopolitical 
construct must view Marshall, Powell, and the thousands of others 
like them as Black people, even though a "majority of their origins" 
may have been White. On the other hand, those who wish to create 
neater, more symmetrical contours for the Black race will have to 
base these contours on something other than the social and political 
178. Id. at 564 n.336. 
179. Id. at 564. 
180. Id. at 566. 
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history of this country. Usually they choose blood. Often the 
choice is' unwitting.181 
4. Biological Passing for Black 
Another, more subtle, suggestion for reemphasizing biology in 
racial classification systems comes in an essay by Cynthia L. 
Nakashima.182 In the beginning of her piece, Nakashima argues 
that "social scientists agree that race is a socially constructed, as 
opposed to a biologically concrete, concept."183 Nakashima, how­
ever, gives social forces little room to draw the line between races. 
For example, in a discussion of "passing," she reveals a completely 
biological understanding of race. Speaking of someone who passes 
for White, she argues: "In reality if the character who passed as 
White had instead chosen to live in the Black community as a Black 
person, this would be just another version of passing. "184 
In order to evaluate this assertion, let us step back and ask who 
were the people who passed for White? Biologically they had more 
"White genes" than Black. But as race is socially constructed in this 
country, they were Black. And since they were Black, we cannot 
say that they would be passing for Black if they had chosen to re­
main in the Black community. That is, we cannot say this unless we 
think that race is simply a function of biology. 
I see the fallacy of Nakashima's argument as I look over the old 
photos of generations of my forebears. When I do this, I see some 
ancestors who look more White than Black, but I do not see any 
White people; society defined all these faces, from the 1890s to the 
1990s, as members of the "Black" or "Negro" or "Colored" race. If 
any of them had chosen to pass (and a few did), that meant that 
they left their socially defined race, hid their Negro background, 
and pretended to be White. Nakashima's suggestion that all my 
lighter ancestors who stayed in their race were "passing for Black" 
is thus wrong, because, legally and socially, they were Black. 
181. This trend toward rebiologization of race is seen in Ruth Colker's recent article Bi: 
Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1995). There, Colker 
considers the suggestion that "light skinned blacks . . .  could more accurately be considered 
to be a subcategory of multiracial individuals." Id. at 9 n.36. She suggests that, in moving 
toward a "spectrum of race . . .  we begin by truly investigating our racial heritage. The 
assumption would be that each of us is of mixed racial heritage, and the challenge would be 
to fully discover our family trees." Id. at 28. 
182. Nakashima, supra note 166, at 162. 
183. Id. at 163. 
184. Id. at 176. For a similar view, see Spickard, supra note 136, at 17. For different view, 
see F. JAMES DAVIS, supra note 3, at 14. 
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Of course, if Nakashima were to ignore the laws and social real­
ity in which my family and many like it have lived (for example, the 
fact that until this generation, all the parents, spouses and children 
shown in these family pictures are Black) and if she were to look at 
race as only a matter of biology, then maybe she could say that 
some of the lighter ancestors in these photos were White and that 
they were passing for Black. But this would be a gene counter's 
conclusion; it would ignore the fact that social forces created a 
Black race in this country and put all these ancestors - light and 
dark - into it. Since Nakashima views race as a social construct, 
she cannot logically argue that people who are socially defined as 
Black are "passing for Black."185 
5. The Harlem Renaissance and Cultural Suicide 
In the last sections, I have reviewed proposals for bringing no­
tions of biology back to our racial classification system and I have 
suggested that these proposals are based on a misunderstanding of 
the Black experience. I now tum to the work of philosopher Naomi 
Zack, who has used the example of the Harlem Renaissance to 
raise similar biological notions of race. I suggest that her proposals, 
likewise, are tainted by a misunderstanding of the African­
American experience. 
Zack's book, Race and Mixed Race,186 offers a fascinating cri­
tique of the hypodescent system and of race itself. In focussing on 
hypodescent, Zack offers a unique hypothesis. She argues that if 
the artists of the Harlem Renaissance had declared that they were 
mixed race instead of Black, White racism would have been so con­
fused that it would have fallen. Zack laments that these artists re­
jected their multiracial heritage in favor of their Blackness, thus 
committing "cultural suicide."187 
I see Zack's work as a telling example of the tunnel vision that 
afflicts even the most perceptive proponents of a broad separate 
185. The literature now contains several serious articles and books on the subject of 
White-skinned Black people. Perhaps the most elegant, trenchant and personal discussion of 
the issue is Adrian Piper's Passing for White; Passing for Black, 58 TRANsmoN 4 (1992). 
Professor Cheryl Harris provides a moving account of the experience of her Grandmother 
who, like countless other light-skinned African Americans of her day, worked as White and 
came home as Black. Harris uses her Grandmother's experience as the touchstone for her 
examination of "Whiteness as property." Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1707, 1710-12 (1993). Three books on the subject each make compelling reading: 
SHIRLEY HAIZUP, THE SWEETER THE JUICE (1994); SCALES-TRENT, supra note 133; GREG­
ORY H. WILUAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE (1995). 
186. ZACK, supra note 166, at 74. 
187. See id. at 95-111. 
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category for multiracial persons. While her analysis is full of origi­
nal insights, Zack falls into the same traps that ensnared the multi­
racial theorists discussed above. First, she sees racial injustice in the 
drawing of the boundaries around the Black race rather than in ra­
cism itself. Second, after the de rigueur denunciation of "race as 
biology," she embraces, perhaps unwittingly, a purely biological 
view of race. Thus, she criticizes DuBois, Hughes, and Hurston for 
viewing their own racial identity in sociohistorical terms rather than 
biologically,188 and she discusses a vast biological redefinition of the 
Black race that would remove from its numbers the 21% to 75% of 
African Americans who are not biologically pure Black.189 Finally, 
she never slows down to consider the practical consequences of her 
major proposal: How would White Americans have reacted if the 
great leaders of the Harlem Renaissance had taken her suggestion 
and renounced their negritude by making a joint, impassioned claim 
that they were mixed race? 
a. Zack's View of the Hypodescent Schema. Zack begins her 
analysis by carefully describing the "schema" of the one drop rule 
and its moral failing: "This schema unjustly excludes people with 
black forebears from white designation."190 She thus states at the 
outset that the focus of her concern is with those Blacks who are 
"unjustly excluded" from the "white designation." She then devel­
ops the following proof, which is intended to establish that hypo­
descent is unjust: 
More precisely, the injustice of the kinship schema can be presented 
this way, if we suppose that Alpha could be anyone: 
(1) If Alpha has a black ancestor, Alpha is black. 
(2) If Alpha is black, Alpha is treated unjustly. 
(3) If Alpha has a black ancestor, Alpha is treated unjustly. 
( 4) Therefore, it is unjust to say that Alpha is black if Alpha has a 
black ancestor.191 
To which, in my view, we could logically add: 
(5) Every Black person has a Black ancestor. 
( 6) Therefore, it is unjust to say that any Black person is Black. 
This illustrates the difficulty that philosophers such as Zack face 
when they try to prove that hypodescent is unjust. From the stand­
point of justice, if people who are called Black are treated unjustly, 
there are two solutions: (1) Stop treating Black people unjustly; or 
188. See id. at 105-11. 
189. See id. at 75, 95. 
190. Id. at 9 (footnote omitted). 
191. Id. 
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(2) stop calling any of them Black.192 Either way, tinkering with the 
boundaries of the category is not going to stop the injustice. My 
disagreement with Zack, therefore, is that in focusing on her fourth 
assumption ("it is unjust to say that Alpha is black"), she forgets 
that it is her second assumption ("If Alpha is black, Alpha is 
treated unjustly") that houses the injustice. 
b. Zack's View of the Harlem Renaissance. Zack's most provoc­
ative and original contribution to the discourse on hypodescent is 
her suggestion that the Harlem Renaissance was a form of cultural 
suicide. She begins by acknowledging that the Harlem Renaissance 
was a "magnificent enterprise,"193 and she admits that her criticism 
of it is "theoretical," colored by choices "available later in his­
tory. "194 But she concludes that if Hurston, Hughes, and the other 
leaders of this movement had renounced the one drop rule and de­
clared themselves persons of mixed race, this declaration would 
have been a weapon "against American racial designations, which is 
to say, against the core of American racism."195 She argues: 
During the Harlem Renaissance, the people who were designated 
non-white in the sense of black, by white America. all took up their 
black designation on the premise of a democracy among themselves. 
This was a magnificent enterprise: Much was gained in black pride, 
culture, and achievement, and nothing of substance, of immediate 
practical value, was lost. What was lost was the concept of mixed race 
as a theoretical wedge against racism and against the concept of phys­
ical race - the new combined black community threw away any ef­
fective intellectual weapon against American racial designations, 
which is to say, against the core of American racism. It lost all means 
of challenging the asymmetrical kinship schema of racial inheritance 
and the attendant oppressive biracial system. Designated American 
blackness, as a cultural force capable of defeating American racism, 
thereby cut off its own head during the Harlem Renaissance.196 
Zack then goes on to explain how this joint proclamation of mixed­
race identity would have undermined American racism: 
If it is possible for people to be of mixed race, based on their genetic 
endowment alone, then race is not an essential or even an important 
division between human beings, either naturally or culturally. If race 
were a natural division, individuals of mixed race would simply not 
exist. . . .  Furthermore, if individuals of mixed race are granted a sepa­
rate racial identity, then all of the myths of racial purity and stability 
192. For a powerfully written and eye.opening variant of this latter suggestion, see Fields, 
supra note 115, at 117-18. 
193. See ZAcK, supra note 166, at 97. 
194. Id. at 99. 
195. Id. at 97. 
196. Id. 
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break down because there is then such a large universe of possible 
race that the historical contingency of any group's racial identity be­
comes transparent.191 
In my view, Zack's theoretical rethinking of the Harlem Renais­
sance suffers from several fatal flaws. First, it assumes that "Ameri­
can racial designations" (how the line around the Black race is 
drawn), rather than anti-Black prejudice itself, is "the core of 
American racism." As argued above, however, these designations 
were not the core of American racism; this racism could have flour­
ished just as well, if not better, under any of the other systems of 
"racial designation," and the designations provided by hypodescent, 
in practice, often provided powerful tools against racism. 
But even if we leave that argument aside, Zack never fully ex­
amines how such a joint declaration of mixed-race identity would 
have worked as a wedge against racism and against the concept of 
physical race. She merely assumes that such a statement would 
have highlighted the existence of mixed-race people, and that their 
very existence would have shown that "race is not an essential or 
even an important division between human beings" and "all of the 
myths of racial purity and stability would [therefore] break 
down."198 
I doubt the walls would have fallen so easily. Certainly a few 
White Americans, on hearing some of the Negro literati claim that 
they were multiracial, might have taken the lesson that race was not 
so important after all. But most White Americans were already 
well aware that mixed-race people existed - they did not need 
Zora Neale Hurston or Langston Hughes to tell them so - and this 
knowledge did not end their belief in races.199 
More importantly, Zack mispredicts entirely how the White lis­
tener - trapped in the racism of the times - would have reacted 
when the icons of the Harlem Renaissance declared that they were 
not Black after all and jointly laid claim to their White blood. 
White America would have taken this as an admission that White 
blood is better; it would have attributed the successes of the Harlem 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. A review of the racist literature shows not only an awareness that mixed-race people 
existed, but a tremendous fear that miscegenation would create more mulattoes. For exam­
ple, in 1905, William Benjamin Smith argued: 
If we sit with Negroes at our tables, if we entertain them as our guests and social equals, 
if we disregard the colour line in all other relations, is it possible to maintain it fixedly in 
the sexual relation, in the marriage of our sons and daughters, in the propagation of our 
species? 
Quoted in JOHN G. MENCKE, MULA'ITOES AND RACE MIXTURE 130 (1979). 
March 1997] One Drop Rule 1213 
Renaissance to its leaders' White ancestry; it would have concluded 
that White blood earned DuBois his "A"s on his Philosophy papers 
for William James at Harvard;200 that White blood gave Langston 
Hughes his gift of language; that White blood is why Hurston was 
an anthropologist; when she later worked as a domestic, that was 
because of one of those "tricks of blood that always betray" Ne­
groes.201 Neither the Klan nor Philip Bruce could have done any­
thing that would better have reinforced the absurd but common 
White view of the times: that race was based on blood and Negro 
"blood" was inferior.202 
While I believe the above discussion states compelling reasons 
why the leaders of the Harlem Renaissance did not do as Zack 
wishes they had done, I do not believe that these were their central 
motivating considerations. The main reason they did not deny be­
ing Black is that they were Black, as Black was defined by the 
sociopolitical history of this country. Zack, however, tries to claim 
them posthumously as mixed race, primarily on the basis of the 
"natural facts of their ancestry," that is, biology. For example, as to 
DuBois, she notes: "He knew that he was both black and white, 
according to the natural facts of his ancestry. But he did not use a 
mixed-race designation for himself, based either on his ancestry or 
his early participation in white culture. "203 
But her most stunning and telling claim is for Zora Neale 
Hurston. Zack argues that Hurston was mixed race and implies 
that she had no "logical" basis for considering herself Black.204 As 
the basis for this claim, Zack seizes on the following passage in 
Hurston's autobiography: 
I saw no benefit in excusing my looks by claiming to be half Indian. 
In fact, I boast that I am the only Negro in the United States whose 
grandfather on the mother's side was not an Indian chief. Neither did 
200. See DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DuBms, BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 95 (I.993) 
(reporting that DuBois earned a grade of A from James). 
201. Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, 58 TRANsmoN 4, 8 (1992) (quot­
ing FRANCES E.W. HARPER, loLA LEROY, OR SHADOWS UPLIFTED 229 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1988) (1893)). 
202. See MENCKE, supra note 199, at 128·29. Mencke notes that "Indeed, whites for the 
most part were convinced that the only Negroes who had ever[ ] evidenced particular ability 
or intelligence were of mixed blood." Id. at 128. " 'So far,' Philip Alexander Bruce noted in 
1889, 'the only persons of unusual capacity whom the Negro race has produced have been 
men who were sprung, either directly or indirectly, from white ancestry."' Id. (quoting 
PHILIP A. BRUCE, THE PLANTATION NEGRO AS A FREEMAN: OBSERVATIONS ON HIS CHAR· 
ACTER, CoNDmON, AND PROSPECTS IN VIRGINIA 244 (New York & London, G.P. Putnam's 
Sons 1889)). 
203. ZACK, supra note 166, at 105. 
204. See id. at 105·07, 14647. 
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I descend from George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, or any Gover­
nor of a Southern state. I see no need to manufacture me a legend to 
beat the facts. I do not coyly admit to a touch of the tarbrush to my 
Indian and white ancestry. You can consider me an Old Tar-Brush in 
person if you want to. I am a mixed blood, it is true, but I differ from 
the party line in that I neither consider it an honor nor a shame. 
I maintain that I have been a Negro three times - a Negro baby, 
a Negro girl and a Negro woman.2os 
In reading this, Zack passes over the metaphors206 and clear state­
ments that Hurston is Black, proud of it, and not making any ex­
cuses for it, and concentrates on the fact that Hurston has mixed 
blood: 
But Hurston does not explain how, if she sees herself as mixed race, 
she can logically identify herself as a Negro. To be sure, Hurston de­
scribes herself with charm; she not only has a folk identity but is a folk 
heroine. No philosophical analysis or excursion into racial theory can 
belittle her identity as a designated black person who is loyal to other 
designated black people. But Hurston illustrates all too well how 
morally good American identities of mixed race collapse into black 
racial identities.201 
How could Hurston "logically" identify herself as a Negro?2os 
Hurston's life provides a clear and easy answer to this question, and 
I will now take a brief detour to review this life up to the time of the 
Harlem Renaissance, not only because it shows that Hurston was 
"logically" Black, but because it gives some insight into the "logic" 
of Zack and other multiracial theorists who have posthumously de-
205. ZoRA NEALE HURSTON, DuST TRACKS ON A ROAD 171-72 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. 
ed., Harper-Perennial 1991) (1942). 
206. Hurston used this same metaphor of "excuse" or "extenuation" in her famous essay, 
"How It Feels to Be Colored Me." There, she wrote: 
I am colored but I offer nothing in the way of extenuating circumstances except the fact 
that I am the only Negro in the United States whose grandfather on the mother's side 
was not an Indian Chief. 
Zora Neale Hurston, How It Feels to Be Colored Me, in NEW NORTON AN1HOLOOY OF AFRI· 
CAN AMERICAN LITERATURE 1008, 1008 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. & Nellie Y. McKay eds., 
1997). In both passages, being Black is metaphorically seen as an infraction that could be 
excused on a showing of extenuating circumstances; but Hurston was not about to admit that 
her identity was a crime, nor would she offer a plea. As Barbara Johnson notes: 
(Hurston] implies that among the stories Negroes tell about themselves the story of In­
dian blood is a common extenuation, dilution, and hence effacement of the crime of 
being colored . . . .  Hurston is saying in effect, "I am colored but I am different from 
other members of my race in that I am not different from my race." 
Barbara Johnson, Thresholds of Difference: Structures of Address in Zora Neale Hurston, in 
"RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 317, 319 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1986). 
207. ZACK, supra note 166, at 146-47. 
208. Hurston, of course, did not say that she saw herself as "mixed race." She said she 
was "a mixed blood," but her race was Negro and that she was not making any apologies 
about it. Trying to find logic here, Zack sloughs off Hurston's Blackness as an expression of 
loyalty or folk identity by a folk heroine. 
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termined that Hurston's true "mixed-race" identity "collapse[ d] 
into black racial identit[y]."209 
c. Zora Neale Hurston. Zora Neale Hurston was born Black to 
Black parents and grew up in an all Black town. In her autobiogra­
phy, Dust Tracks on a Road, she describes her mother as "dark 
brown Lucy Ann Potts";210 her father, John Hurston is pictured as a 
"tall, heavy muscled mulatto," a "bee-stung yaller nigger" and as 
"one of dem niggers from over de creek."211 In one passage, 
Hurston sketches her father's light features and then immediately 
concedes their lack of importance: He had "gray-green eyes and 
light skin [which] stood out sharply from the black-skinned, black­
eyed crowd he was in. Then too, he had a build on him that made 
you look. A stud-looking buck like that would have brought a big 
price in slavery time."212 John Hurston inherited his light features 
from his father (Zora's grandfather) who, apparently, was a White 
man.213 Zora never names her White grandfather in her autobiog­
raphy, and while she admits she is a "mixed blood," it appears she 
never knew any of her White or Native American ancestors.214 
Hurston describes Eatonville, Florida, where she grew up, as a 
"pure Negro town."215 According to her biographer, "Eatonville, 
Florida, existed not as the 'black backside' of a white city, but a 
self-governing, all-black town, proud and independent, living refu­
tation of white claims that black inability necessitated Jim 
Crow."216 Hurston's father was elected mayor three times; he 
wrote all the laws.217 
209. Zack also emphasizes Hurston's "non-Negro" attributes: 
Hurston herself was middle-class, educated, and light in complexion. (She looked like a 
Native American; the great love of her life, "A.W.P.," said that she reminded him "of 
the Indian on the Skookum Apples.") 
ZACK, supra note 166, at 106. A look a Hurston's pictures, however, shows a woman who 
most people would easily identify as Black. Moreover, being "middle class" and "educated" 
did not deprive Hurston of her Black racial identity. 
210. HURSTON, supra note 205, at 7. 
211. Id. at 7-8. 
212. Id. at 8. 
213. See ROBERT E. HEMENWAY, ZORA NEALE HURSTON, A LITERARY BIOGRAPHY 190 
(1980). 
214. In Dust Tracks on a Road, Hurston quickly breezes by her father's White ancestry, 
noting: "Folks said he was a certain white man's son." HURSTON, supra note 205, at 8-9. She 
reports that her maternal grandmother always called her father "dat yaller bastard." Id. 
215. HURSTON, supra note 205, at 1. 
216. HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 11-12. 
217. See id. at 14; cf. MELVIN DIXON, RIDE OUT THE WILDERNESS: GEOGRAPHY AND 
IDENTITY IN AFRO-AMERICAN LITERATURE 85 (1987). 
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Young Zora learned Negro folk culture on the steps of Joe 
Clarke's Eatonville General Store. There, the men of the village 
"sat around . . .  on boxes and benches and passed this world and the 
next one through their mouths";218 they held their lying sessions 
and told their stories of "God, Devil, Brer Rabbit, Brer Fox, Sis 
Cat, Brer Bear, Lion, Tiger, Buzzard and all the wood folk."219 Not 
allowed to sit on the steps and tell tales with the men, Zora would 
walk the steps slowly and "h[a]ng around and listen[ ]" as long as 
she could.220 
The village folklore was seared into Zora's nine-year-old soul as 
she stood at her mother's deathbed. The folkways required certain 
measures in the moments before death: The pillow must be re­
moved from beneath the dying person's head, so that death would 
come easily and the escaping spirit would refrain from haunting the 
survivors; the mirror needed to be covered so that it would not per­
manently capture the image of the dying person; and the clock had 
to be draped with cloth lest it stop forever when the spirit, on escap­
ing the body, looked on its face.221 In her last hour, Zora's mother 
apparently rejected these folk ways; she called Zora and gave her 
"certain instructions. I was not to let them take the pillow from 
under her head until she was dead. The clock was not to be cov­
ered, nor the looking-glass. She trusted me to see to it that these 
things were not done. I promised her as solemnly as nine years 
could do, that I would see to it."222 
Of course, nine-year-old Zora had neither the power nor the 
persuasion to set her "will against my father, the village dames and 
village custom. "223 As her father held her tight, the elders covered 
the clock and the mirror and removed the pillow from under her 
mother's head. Just then, Death "with big soft feet and square toes 
. . .  finished his prowling through the house . . .  and entered the 
room. He bowed to Mama in his way, and she made her manners 
and left us to act out our ceremonies over unimportant things. "224 
Zora spent years thinking she had failed her mother: "[S]he looked 
218. HuRSroN, supra note 205, at 45. 
219. Id. at 47. 
220. Id. at 47. 
221. See HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 16-17; HuRSroN, supra note 205, at 62. 
222. HuRSroN, supra note 205, at 62. 
223. Id. at 63. 
224. Id. at 63-64. 
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at me, or so I felt, to speak for her. She depended on me for a 
voice. "225 
Because of Hurston's experiences in the heart of the African­
American folklore tradition, her biographer notes: "She had lived 
African-American folklore before she knew that such a thing ex­
isted as a scientific concept or had special value as evidence of the 
adaptive creativity of a unique subculture. "226 
For her formal education, Hurston travelled north, first to How­
ard, then to study under Franz Boaz at Barnard, where she was the 
only Negro in the college (its "sacred black cow").227 In these stud­
ies, she realized the importance of chronicling the Negro folklore 
she had lived as a child, and she realized that although the White 
world had reported this folklore to some extent, "often the collec­
tions carried interpretations twisting the material beyond recogni­
tion";228 even in the stories of Joel Chandler Harris, it was reduced 
to "a childish pastime."229 More ominous for Hurston, tl}is folk cul­
ture was simply fading away.230 She therefore came "to think of 
herself as a woman with a mission": she would become the tradi­
tion bearer.231 The voice that Hurston had been unable to give to 
her dying mother, she would give to the folk literature and folk 
ways of her people: "she would demonstrate that 'the greatest cul­
tural wealth of the continent' lay in the Eatonvilles and Polk Coun­
ties of the black South."232 And she was uniquely suited for the 
task. When she started, "only one other member of her race . . .  
had equivalent professional training and knowledge."233 Hurston 
understood her material because she had lived it; unlike White 
transcribers, there was little danger that she would make racist or 
unwitting changes in the oral texts she was to elicit and preserve. 
Moreover, because she was Black, because she had the "map of 
Florida on her tongue," her informants came to trust her.234 After 
225. Id. at 63. 
226. HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 22. 
227. See id. at 21-22. 
228. Id. at 87. 
229. Id. 
230. See id. at 82, 113. 
231. See id. at 87, 113. 
232. Id. at 113. For an analysis of this metaphor of "voice," see Henry Louis Gates, 
Afterword, Zora Neale Hurston: "A Negro Way of Saying," in HURSTON, supra note 205, at 
260-67. 
233. HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 87. 
234. See id. at 9, 90, 110-15. 
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an initial failed trip, years of field work and witing resulted in her 
famous volume of African-American folklore, Mules and Men.23s 
Hurston's interests were not limited to folk tales but spread to 
every aspect of Negro art. Her "memory was overflowing with the 
acquired narrative legacy of her race, and . . .  this was something 
she brought to the Renaissance."236 She rejected the propagandistic 
aspect of the bourgeois Negro literary philosophy, which stated that 
"black art should avoid reinforcing racist stereotypes by refusing to 
portray the lowest elements of the race";237 she wanted to be an 
authentic, not a bowdlerized, Negro voice. She rejected Howard 
students' characterization of Negro spirituals as "low and degrading 
. . .  product[s] of . . .  slavery" and "not good grammar."238 She had 
lived the value of the spirituals. She rejected the portrayals of 
Black themes in the dramas of the day; White playwrights - even 
O'Neill - failed to get it quite right.239 So she created to take the 
place of what she rejected. Of these creations, Saturday Review 
said: "No one had ever reported the speech of Negroes with a more 
accurate ear."240 Her riveting novel, Their Eyes Were Watching 
God, painted a world only a Black woman could paint. Speaking of 
"resistance" literature in Africa, Appiah has commented: 
A proper comparison in the New World is . . .  with the world that 
Zora Neale Hurston records and reflects, both in her more ethno­
graphic writings and in her brilliant novel, Their Eyes Were Watching 
God - a black world on which the white American world impinged 
in ways that were culturally marginal even though formally politically 
overwhelming.241 
When a producer noted that "practically all the plays [about 
Blacks] . . .  were serious problem dramas" or minstrel shows, and 
there were no comedies, she teamed up with Langston Hughes to 
write a Negro comedy, Mule Bone.242 While the partnership dis­
solved in bitterness, Hurston's biographer notes: "Yet in a sense 
[Mule Bone] was written by neither Hurston nor Hughes. Much of 
the language in the play belonged to the race itself, making the ar­
gument over its ownership even more ironic."243 In fact, Hurston 
235. See id. at 160. 
236. Id. at 79-80. 
237. Id. at 41. 
238. Id. at 52. 
239. See id. at 115. 
240. George Stevens, Negroes by Themselves, SATURDAY REV., Sept. 18, 1937, at 3, 
quoted in HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 5. 
241. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 9. 
242. See HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at 137. 
243. Id. at 156. 
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alone among the great Harlem artists could tell the old story that 
"she was once arrested for crossing against a red light but escaped 
punishment by explaining that she had seen the white folks pass on 
green and therefore assumed the red was for her," and make it 
sound like it had really happened to her.244 Hurston's self confi­
dence in her racial identity, her wit, her style, and her talent made 
her a fixture of the Harlem Renaissance. She called herself the 
"Queen of the Niggerati."24s 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has commented that Hurston summed 
up her philosophy in bringing what she did to the Harlem Renais­
sance when she observed: 
Roll your eyes in ecstacy and ape his every move, but until we have 
placed something upon his street corner that is our own, we are right 
back where we were when they filed our iron collar off.246 
d. The "Logical" Basis for Zora Neale Hurston's Race. This 
brings us back to Zack's suggestion that Hurston could not logically 
identify herself as a Negro. By "logic," Zack must mean biology, 
blood, and genetics. By these measures, Hurston was not a pure 
Negro, and Zack can therefore claim her as a mixed-race person. 
But if one believes that race is a social construd based on some­
thing more than mere biology, then Hurston's brief for identifying 
herself as a Negro is compelling: her parents were Black. Africa 
predominated in her face. She had White and Native American an­
cestors, but she never met them and they warranted no mention in 
her autobiography. She grew up in an all Black town where she 
lived, laughed, and grieved Black culture and Black folklore, and 
then went on to become the only Black student in her class at Bar­
nard. She saw White writers misperceive and misrepresent Black 
folk and high culture and made it her mission to preserve and prop­
agate the folk culture and to add a few masterpieces to the high 
culture. When she went south, she spoke with the voice of her peo­
ple, and so they took her in and told her their tales, and she heard 
them with such a keen ear that national magazines raved. In New 
York, she styled herself the Queen of the Niggerati, a term that 
even in the 1930s would not have found its way from her mouth 
into respectable print if she had been anything other than Black. 
Her metaphors, from Jim Crow traffic lights to slave collars, are 
those of a Black woman. 
244. Id. at 78. 
245. Id. at 44. 
246. Gates, supra note 232, at 267. 
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Of course, multiracial theorists, such as Zack, are free to claim 
Hurston as one of their own, but when they do so they are staking a 
genetic claim; when they decry the "collapse" of Hurston's mixed 
race identity "into black racial identity"247 and lament Hurston's 
failure to see her own true essence, essence is defined biologically. 
Under any other definition, Zora Neale Hurston was Black.248 
e. An Abstract Category vs. a People. As argued above, I be­
lieve that Zack and other theorists have set off on the path toward 
redefining "Black" without first pausing to survey the terrain. 
From their path, "Black" looks like a "category" that can easily be 
repackaged or redefined. A closer look, however, shows that Black 
is more than a category and far more difficult to redefine. 
For example, looking back on the lives of the heroes of the Har­
lem Renaissance, Zack suggests that they could have used their 
White blood - their ties to White ancestors whom they had, by and 
large, never met - to declare that they were members of "a racial 
category distinct from the black race": 
Neither the leaders of the Harlem Renaissance nor [Historian Joel] 
Williamson, writing 60 years later, could free themselves from the in­
tellectual tyranny of the one drop rule. They did not and perhaps 
could not conceptualize a category of mixed black and white race as a 
racial category distinct from the black race, in the same way that 
black race has always been distinct from the white race.249 
Perhaps they could have, perhaps they did, conceptualize such a 
"category," but in writing the following passage, Hurston clearly ex­
plains why such a category would be irrelevant: "There is no The 
Negro here. Our lives are so diversified, internal attitudes so va­
ried, appearances and capabilities so different, that there is no pos­
sible classification so catholic that it will cover us all, except My 
people! My people! "250 Hurston saw herself as part of a people, 
not a category. 
The work of Langston Hughes contains strikingly similar senti­
ments. Zack uses the metaphor of "rules for acceptable behavior at 
a party" to minimize Hughes's identity and to explain his failure to 
embrace a multiracial category: 
247. ZACK, supra note 166, at 147. 
248. In infra Part III.D, I argue that socio-historical forces made people like Hurston 
Black and they had little choice in the matter. For the argument that Hurston's racial iden­
tity was "constructed," see Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 
42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 615 (1990). Using either yardstick, Hurston was Black. 
249. ZACK, supra note 166, at 103. 
250. HURSTON, supra note 205, at 172 (emphasis in the original). 
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Hughes describes the surfaces of black culture so smoothly that there 
is no way the reader can raise a question of mixed race to Hughes, the 
writer, without violating the unspoken rules of politeness in his rhe­
torical space. It is an exquisite and elaborate kind of politeness that 
allows people to enjoy their lives with grace under pressures that are 
totally lacking in grace. Hughes's rhetorical rules are very like the 
unspoken rules for acceptable behavior at a party!251 
But it was not rules of "politeness" or "acceptable party behavior" 
that made Hughes Black. It was centuries of American history that 
made him morphologically and culturally part of the African­
American race. Consequently, though he and Hurston had a bitter 
parting of the ways, he, like Hurston, thought of the Black race as a 
"people," not a "category"; a people whose faces, he wrote, held 
the beauty of the night: 
The night is beautiful 
So the faces of my people 
The stars are beautiful 
So the eyes of my people 
Beautiful, also is the sun 
Beautiful, also are the souls of my people.2s2 
And he saw his own face among those of his people: 
To fling my arms wide 
In the face of the sun 
Dance! Whirl! Whirl! 
Till the quick day is done. 
Rest at pale evening . . . 
A tall slim tree . . . 
Night coming tenderly 
Black like me.253 
If one views race as a matter of genetics, as Zack apparently 
does, these verses require some immediate explanation; after all 
Hughes was brown, not black, and his face favored twilight more 
than the night. So Zack suggests that we cannot ask Hughes about 
his racial identity without violating "rules for acceptable behavior 
at a party." But no such consultation with Emily Post is necessary. 
Hughes has already told us about his real identity, which transcends 
genetics: He is part of a people, and this people includes many, 
many other Black men and women like him, with White blood and 
White ancestors. 
251. ZACK, supra note 166, at 109. 
252. LANGSTON HUGHES, My People, in SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 13 
(1974). 
253. HUGHES, Dream Variations, in SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES, supra note 
252, at 14. 
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This is something that Alice Walker understands. After Walker 
paid to place a monument on Zora Hurston's unmarked grave in a 
pauper's cemetery in Florida, she wrote: "We are a people. A peo­
ple do not throw their geniuses away. If they do, it is our duty as 
witnesses for the future to collect them again for the sake of our 
children. If necessary, bone by bone."254 Where Zack and others 
see a racial category, Hurston, Hughes, DuBois, and Walker see a 
people. While Zack is nonplussed because they "did not and per­
haps could not conceptualize a category of mixed black and white 
race as a racial category distinct from black race,"255 it was - in 
fact - not a "category" that they were looking for. They were part 
of a people, and it takes more than a gene pool to create a people. 
6. Race, Biology, and the Law: The Racial Credential Cases 
I now tum to history to illuminate the dangers of "neat" biologi­
cal redefinitions of American racial categories. I examine the racial 
credential cases (the cases that adjudicated whether someone was 
Black) as a reminder of how things work when race is seen as a 
function of biology and when people count their great grandfathers 
to determine their racial identity.256 
As racial mixing continued largely unchecked by the laws that 
purported to prohibit it, the result was children. As intermixture 
continued through the generations, many children became light­
skinned, even White-skinned. While in most statutes mulattoes 
were classified with Blacks, "logic required . . . some demarcation 
between [mulattoes] and white men"257 in order to establish a clear 
way of distinguishing someone White from someone who would not 
be considered White. 
Without a bright line to distinguish White from mulatto, the effi­
cient administration of American society, in which substantial legal 
rights were based on being White, would have been impossible. 
Guarding the port of entry to White status was essential to the pro­
tection of the delicate social order of a racial caste system, and the 
persistence and extent of illegitimate race mixing made this an issue 
of both importance and some delicacy. On the one hand, families 
254. Alice Walker, Foreword to HEMENWAY, supra note 213, at xviii (emphasis omitted). 
255. ZACK, supra note 166, at 103. 
256. The cases used as illustrations here have been taken from a review of the following 
compilations: HELEN CATIERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND 
THE NEGRO (1926); CHARLES MAGNUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO {1940); 
THOMAS MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW 1619-1860 {1996). 
257. See JORDAN, supra note 30, at 168. 
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considered White for generations had to be protected, from the so­
cial consequences of an unknown dalliance by a distant ancestor. 
"To have pushed the definition [of black] any further would have 
embarrassed too many prominent 'white' families."258 As the court 
noted in State v. Davis, "[i]t would be dangerous and cruel to sub­
ject to this disqualification [being regarded as someone in the de­
graded class] persons bearing all the feature of a white on account 
of some remote admixture of negro blood."259 On the other hand, 
steps had to be taken to curb "[t]he constant tendency of this 
[mixed-race] class to assimilate to the white, and the desire of eleva­
tion, [that] present frequent cases of embarrassment and diffi­
culty."260 Finally, maintaining the color line, however ethereal, was 
important as a matter of social etiquette. As Chief Justice Lumpkin 
lamented in Bryan v. Walton: "Which one of us has not narrowly 
escaped petting one of the pretty little mulattoes belonging to our 
neighbors as one of the family?"261 
The cases are perhaps most instructive, however, in giving his­
torical context to the movement to create a multiracial census cate­
gory that would be available to all Americans with mixed blood in 
their multigenerational ancestry. A chief concern expressed by the 
proponents of such a category is that the current racial configura­
tion of Black and White is "inaccurate." They argue that the lim­
ited number of racial choices now available on the census forms 
force "the multi-racial/multi-ethnic family to signify a factually false 
identity for their child."262 A multiracial category is necessary "if 
accurate data is what we want. "263 Like the Courts in the racial 
certification cases, the more radical proponents of a broad multi­
racial category often state their goals in terms of biological accuracy 
when, in fact, no such accuracy is possible. 
258. GENOVESE, supra note 51, at 420. 
259. State v. Davis, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 558, 559 (1831), quoted in 2 HELEN CATIERALL, 
JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 346 (1929). 
260. White v. Tax Collector of Kershaw District, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 136, 139 (1846). 
261. See Bryan v. Walton, Suppl. to 33 Ga. 11, 24 (1864), quoted in 3 HELEN CATIERALL, 
JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 87 (1932). 
262. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel, 103d 
Cong. 126 (1993) (statement of Carlos A. Fernandez, President of the Assoc. of MultiEthnic 
Americans). Similar concerns were made in the Testimony of Susan R. Graham, Executive 
Director of Project RACE (Reclassify All Children Equally) and reprinted as an article. See 
Susan R. Graham, Grassroots Advocacy, in AMERICAN MlxEo RACE, THE CULTURE OF 
MICRODIVERSl.TY 185 (Naomi Zack ed., 1995). 
263. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel, 103d 
Cong. 107 (1993) (statement of Susan Graham, Executive Director of Project RACE). 
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While the litigants in the racial credential cases attempted to 
draw a line between Black and White, the radical wing of the multi­
racial movement can be viewed as promoting a variation of the 
same game - they are simply changing the place where the line is 
drawn. Just as the racial credential cases used biological factors to 
draw a line between Black and White, the proponents of the broad 
multiracial category draw a biological line between "Multiracial" 
and "Black." Just as the following cases define race in terms of the 
degree of White ancestry, so do those who now wish to rebiologize 
race, effectively embracing the view of "race as blood," as they ar­
gue that any White blood converts a Black person into a multiracial 
or a White person. The advocates of the broad multiracial category 
thus stand not as a repudiation of the methodology of racial certifi­
cation cases but as an extension of them. In fact, this wing of the 
multiracial movement, rather than exploding the "myth" of race or 
rebutting the stereotypes of what it is to be Black by including 
multiracial people within its definition, distance� itself from the 
"full black nigger[ s ] ,  "264 unwittingly relying on the ideal that race is 
biological, ancestral, and blood-borne. Rather than challenge the 
notion of race, this branch of multiracial theory merely attempts to 
reset the margins established in the racial credential cases discussed 
below. 
Finally, the racial credential cases foreshadow the difficulties 
that lie ahead, if the current system of racial classification is further 
muddled by the addition of a broad, biologically based multiracial 
category. As the cases below reveal, turning the clock back to biol­
ogy compounds the difficulties of fighting group race-based 
discrimination. 
a. Adjudicating Fractions of Blood. In one type of racial cre­
dential case, courts were asked to determine whether a litigant had 
a sufficient fraction of Black blood to be considered Black. As ex­
plained in section II.B.6 above, many states had laws that specifi­
cally set forth the fraction of Negro blood necessary to make a 
person Black. Over the years, this fraction ranged from one-quar­
ter to one drop. 
The statutory standards thus imply that race was determined by 
the "scientific" notion of quantifiable "blood in the veins" and that 
the blood could be measured with some sort of scientific accuracy, 
ascertained by visual inspection and that all of this could be done by 
264. BLASSINGAME, supra note 1, at 152 (quoting fugitive slave Lewis Clarke). 
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the court.265 By virtue of judicial wisdom, a litigant could enter a 
courtroom Black and leave White by adjustment of a fraction, the 
verdict received like a note from the Internal Revenue Service in­
forming the litigant that it has made an error in her favor. 
The concept of "pure blood," based as it was on pure conjec­
ture, proved difficult both to litigate and adjudicate. Even though 
fractional definitions of race gave the appearance of judicial objec­
tivity, fairness, and consistency, the rational for the decisions 
switched fairly quickly from a pseudo-scientific basis to the com­
mon social meaning of race. In the end, the cases may say more 
about the nature of adjudication, the rules of civil procedure, the 
political sentiments of the judiciary, and the personal sensitivity of 
the particular judge, than about the nature of race and mixed race. 
b. Racial Adjudication Prior to Fractional Statutes. We begin 
our analysis of these cases with State v. Thurman,266 an Alabama 
case in which the stakes based on racial classification were highest 
- life or death, and in which there was not a statute defining 
White, Negro, or mulatto. The question presented to the court was 
whether the defendant Thurman, who was convicted of rape or at­
tempted rape of a White woman, would be executed or impris­
oned.267 If he were a Negro or mulatto, the law provided for his 
execution. If he were neither Negro nor mulatto, he would not be 
executed. The opinion does not specify whether the conviction was 
for rape or attempted rape, and while this may have been of some 
concern to the victim, to the court the sole focus was whether the 
defendant was a mulatto or "White." While the court noted that 
the fact the defendant had "kinky hair and yellow skin" would 
"tend to prove that he was a mulatto," it was not conclusive enough 
to prove that he was mulatto, rather than someone closer to a 
White person. The court's anguish was over the lack of "clear lan­
guage" from the legislature in defining who was mulatto. "If the 
statute against mulattoes is by construction to include quadroons, 
then where are we to stop? . . .  This discretion belongs to the Legis-
265. The idea of race as being transmitted by blood has been a persistent theme in Amer­
ican racial history. For an excellent discussion of the significance of the misuse of this idea in 
the context of miscegenation law, see Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, RARITAN, 
Fall 1988, at 39. 
266. 18 Ala. 276 (1850). 
267. Every state that adopted statutes to deal with rape by a slave or free person of color 
limited its victims to White women. There were no statutes prohibiting the rape of Black 
slave women by White men. See MORRIS, supra note 256, at 305. Indeed, it appears that 
there was neither a legal nor a moral taint to White male relations with Black women. As de 
Toqueville noted, "To debauch a Negro girl hardly injures an American's reputation; to 
marry her dishonors him." See Saks, supra note 265, at 43. 
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lature."268 Uncomfortable with having Thurman's fate rest on such 
an imprecise standard, the court spared Thurman's life due to the 
inability of the prosecution to sustain its burden of proving that the 
defendant was a mulatto. Thereafter, the Alabama legislature 
passed a definition of race, which, like so many other states, defined 
race using racial fractions.269 
c. Counting by Fractions. The apparent mathematical clarity of 
the fractional statutes gave the appearance of objectivity and ra­
tionality,210 and while a few cases attempted to apply this fractional 
268. Thurman, 18 Ala. at 279. 
269. After this decision, the Alabama legislature apparently moved quickly to include 
quadroons in the boundaries of the Black race. See Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and 
the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 1860's-1960's, 70 CH1.-KENT L. REV. 371, 374 
(1994). In the twentieth century, Alabama adopted the one drop rule providing that a Negro 
was a person "descended on the part of the father or mother from negro ancestors, without 
reference to or limit of time or number of generations removed." Id. at 407. 
270. Indeed, in explaining the operation of the statute one legal scholar writing in 1910 
offered to "clarify" the statutory definitions as follows: 
The following diagram will probably clarify these definitions: 
G.G.F. G.G.M G.G.F. G.G.M. G.G.F. G.G.M G.G.F. G.G.M. 
lll v v v v 
n G.F. G.M G.F, G.M. 
� /J � /L 
� /� x 
Suppose it is desired to ascertain whether son X is a white person or a Negro. The 
first generation above him is that of his parents, M and N. If either of them is white and 
the other a Negro, X has one-half Negro blood and would be considered a Negro every­
where. The second generation is that of his grandparents, I, J, K, and L. If any one of 
them is a Negro and the other three white, X has one-fourth Negro blood, and would be 
considered a Negro in every State except possibly Ohio. The third generation is that of 
his great-grandparents, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H. If any one of these eight great­
grandparents is a Negro, X has one-eighth Negro blood and would be considered a Ne­
gro in every State which defines a person of color as one who has one-eighth Negro 
blood or is descended from a Negro to the third generation inclusive. Suppose, for in­
stance, the great-grandfather A was a Negro and all the rest of the great-grandparents 
were white. The grandfather I would be half Negro; the father M would be one-fourth 
Negro; and X would be one-eighth Negro. Thus, though of the fourteen progenitors of 
X only three had Negro blood, X would nevertheless be considered a Negro. 
In the above illustrations only one of the progenitors has been a Negro and his blood 
has been the only Negro blood introduced into the line. 
GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 18-19 (1910). 
After this structural analysis, the author understandably concludes, "It is safe to say that 
in practice one is a Negro or is classed with that race if he has the least visible trace of Negro 
blood in his veins, or even if it is known that there was Negro blood in any one of his progeni­
tors." Id. at 19. 
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approach, it too proved difficult to litigate for the party who bore 
the burden of proof. Thus, in criminal cases, when race was an ele­
ment of the offense, convictions were difficult to obtain when the 
physical appearance of the defendant made him appear racially am­
biguous. The party bearing the burden of proof had to undertake a 
kind of human title search,271 by either tracing the defendant's an­
cestors for several generations and proving their race or relying on 
physical characteristics as a precise indicator of the fraction of 
Black ancestry. 
In such cases, the prosecution often lost for failure to sustain a 
difficult burden of proving the fractions. For example, in the 1885 
Virginia case of Jones v. Commonwealth, 212 Isaac Jones appealed 
his two year and nine month sentence imposed for the felony of 
marrying a White woman "against the peace and dignity of the 
commonwealth" in the face of a statute that defined a Negro as "a 
person who had one-fourth or more negro blood in him." Jones's 
defense was that his blood was not one-quarter Black273 within the 
meaning of the statute. Although the court found that Jones was a 
"mulatto of brown skin" and that his mother was a "yellow 
woman." the conviction failed due to the prosecution's failure to 
sustain their burden of proving "the quantum of negro blood in his 
veins" exceeded one-fourth. 
The difficulty of this human title search is further illustrated by 
the case of Ferrall v. Ferralf274 in which the petitioner-husband 
wished to have his marriage declared void on the grounds that his 
wife "was and is of negro descent within the third generation." The 
issue in the divorce case, which would determine the husband's re­
sponsibility for spousal and child support, was whether his wife's 
271. In the context of discussing miscegenation cases Eva Saks wrote: 
Tracing the defendant's genealogy became the equivalent of a title search, the search 
for an authoritative legal representation of race. However, it also led to the same prob­
lem besetting any title search: how did title originate? In the context of race, this meta­
phorical title to blood, if traced back far enough, revealed the actual, historical fact of 
legal title: the "title in a Negro" which could be sold, deeded, or bequeathed to another 
white person, in the transfer of ownership that was "chief of all property rights." Blood 
therefore revealed itself as part of a social rather than biological pattern. While this 
historical origin explained the social status of blacks, it absolutely challenged the legal 
and "scientific" myth that the boundary between the races was natural, ahistorical, and 
biological. It was like other property boundaries, like the legal family itself, the positive 
creation of the law. Blood was merely law's representation, one that tried to render 
natural and scientific that which was instead legal and metaphorical. 
Saks, supra note 265, at 52-53. 
272. Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 18 (1885). 
273. Of course, none of his blood was Black as blood cannot be typed according to race. 
For a discussion of this topic, see SPENCIE LOVE, ONE Bwoo 155-57 (1996). 
274. 69 S.E. 60 (N.C. 1910). 
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great grandfather was a "real negro," that is, one who did not have 
any White blood in him, so that the fractional requirement could be 
met. In rejecting the notion that the racial origin of the great 
grandparent should be ascertained by the general consensus of the 
community, the court strictly construed the statute and found that 
since the husband could not prove that the great grandfather was a 
real Negro of unmixed blood, his wife could not be shown to be 
one-eighth Negro as required by statute. 
Similarly, the court strictly construed the fractional require­
ments in the later case of Moon v. Children's Home Society.21s In 
that case, two children were removed from their White mother on 
the grounds that their stepfather had Negro blood in his veins. It 
was irrelevant that their natural father had died leaving the family 
penniless and that the stepfather had provided for them comforta­
bly - the inquiry was one of fractions. The children were returned 
to their mother, however, based on the unrefuted testimony of the 
step-grandmother that she was only one-eighth Black, that her hus­
band was White, and therefore her son, the children's stepfather, 
was only one-sixteenth Black, less than the fraction required.276 
The children's mother won because there was no way that the court 
could check the math. 
Where the fractions could be "objectively" substantiated, how­
ever, the fractional requirements were strictly construed. For ex­
ample, in Peavey v. Robbins, 277 plaintiff sued the voting inspectors 
for not allowing him to vote. He testified that both his mother and 
grandmother were White and that his father was a "dark colored 
man with straight hair" and that his grandfather was a "dark red­
faced mulatto, with dark straight hair." The court simply did the 
ancestral mathematics and concluded that if the plaintiff's grand­
father were a mulatto, that is, half White and half Black, "the plain­
tiff would be within the fourth degree" and therefore ineligible to 
vote.278 
d. Expert Testimony. When the difficulty of the ancestral title 
search became apparent, the court sometimes resorted to the use of 
"scientific experts" who could divine quantum of blood by visual 
inspection. Two Arkansas cases illustrate the limits of the use of 
275. 72 S.E. 707 (Va. 1911). 
276. See 72 S.E. at 708. 
277. 48 N.C. (3 Jones Law) 339 (1856), cited in 2 CATIERALL, supra note 259, at 198. 
278. Another example of the court strictly construing the fractional statutes is Van Camp 
v. Board of Education, 9 Ohio St. 407 {1859) (noting that children who were admittedly 
three-eighths African and five-eighths White were forbidden from attending "White" 
schools). 
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"experts" to determine race. In Daniel v. Guy,279 the petitioner and 
her four minor children sued for freedom based on their allegation 
that they were not Black within the meaning of the law. The court 
allowed the jury to consider the interpretation of lay testimony by 
two "expert" physicians "skilled in the natural history of the races 
of men." A lay witness testified that, while the p�titioner's mother 
had the complexion of a dark White person and had dark straight 
hair, she had a telltale "curl on the side of her head." One expert 
testifying on behalf of the plaintiff then opined that "the hair never 
becomes straight until after the third descent from the negro. . . . 
The fiat nose remains observable for several descents. "280 
In Gary v. Stevenson,281 another suit for freedom, the "expert" t' 
witnesses disagreed. One testified that upon visual inspection, "he 
could discover no trace of the negro blood in [the plaintiff's] eyes, 
nose, mouth or jaws - his hair is smooth and of the sandy complex­
ion, perfectly straight and fiat, with no indication of the crisp or 
negro curl; his eyes blue, his jaws thin, his nose slim and long."282 
The "expert" concluded that it would take "at least twenty genera­
tions from the black blood to be as white as complainant.''283 A 
second expert disagreed, judging the complainant as having "a 
small amount of negro blood; not more than a sixteenth, perhaps 
not so much . . . .  [his] upper lip rather thicker than in the white race 
- temperament sanguine."284 The thick lip and pleasant tempera­
ment was "scientific" evidence of the Black blood. 
Sometimes, the certified "experts" allowed to testify before the 
jury did not pretend to have scientific training at all. In State v. 
Jacobs,285 the court's expert was certified on the grounds that "he 
was a planter, an owner and manager of slaves . . .  more than twelve 
years, that he . . .  had had much observation of the effects of the 
intermixture of the negro . . .  blood. "286 The court affirmed both his 
expertise and his opinion, stating: 
it would often require an eye rendered keen, by observation and prac­
tice, to detect, with any approach to certainty, the existence of any 
thing less than one-fourth of African blood . . . .  A free negro . . .  may 
. . .  be a person who . . .  has only a sixteenth. The ability to discover 
279. 19 Ark. 122 (1857). 
280. 19 Ark. at 127. 
281. 19 Ark. 580 (1858). 
282. 19 Ark. at 583. 
283. 19 Ark. at 583. 
284. 19 Ark. at 584. 
285. 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 284 (1859), quoted in 2 CATIERALL, supra note 259, at 226. 
286. 51 N.C. at 284. 
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the infusion of so small a quantity of negro blood . . .  must be a matter 
of science . . . admitting of the testimony of an expert [such as] 
Pritchett.287 
With experts of this caliber, it was not a quantum leap for the 
court to allow such "scientific" expertise to give way to lay opinion 
of the witnesses on the theory that racial identification was a matter 
of common knowledge. Thus, in an 1892 North Carolina case, lay 
testimony was competent to show that a litigant was of "mixed 
blood": "It was not necessary that the witness should be an expert 
to testify to a matter which is simply one of common observa­
tion."288 Similarly in an 1829 case, a jury awarded freedom to a 
litigant announcing, "We of the jury . . .  find, from inspection, that 
the said plaintiff . . .  is a white woman."289 Finally, in State v. Hayes, 
a criminal defendant urged that she was White because her mother 
was White. In rejecting her contention, the court stated, "I was sat­
isfied from inspection that she was a mulatto . . . .  The African taint 
reduced her to the same degraded state, as if she were a free 
negro."290 
e. Litigating Biological Race. With race defined as a function of 
biology and blood, the courts thus struggled with fractions, experts, 
relatives, and visual observation in order to draw the line between 
Black and White. As ridiculous as these racial classification cases 
seem to the modem reader, I include them here because they have 
some relevance to today's proposals for redefining the racial iden­
tity of an African American with any White blood or with a major­
ity of White blood. If, as some argue, many Blacks are in fact 
multiracial due to miscegenation that occurred generations ago, 
how are we to determine where we each belong?291 And if, as some 
commentators suggest292 entitlements are appended to one cate-
287. 51 N.C. at 284. 
288. Hopkins v. Bowers 111 N.C. 175, 178 (1892). 
289. 1 CATIERALL, supra note 33, at 121 (quoting Hook v. Pagee, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 379 
(1811)). 
290. 2 CATIERALL, supra note 259, at 339 (quoting State v. Hayes, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 275 
(1829)). 
291. For a thorough discussion of this problem of people who might falsely claim to be 
Black, see Wright, supra note 17, at 559-61. For a persuasive, common-sense approach to this 
problem, see Karst, supra note 28, at 322-52. 
292. For some such suggestions, see Colker, supra note 181, at 12-23. In this article, I 
have not discussed "affirmative action" because I believe that it has limited relevance in 
defining the African-American race. The boundaries of our race were drawn long before 
affirmative action was conceived, and affirmative action can have only a limited effect on the 
identity of people within those boundaries; affirmative action will not turn Black women into 
White men. For thought provoking suggestions on varying the degree of affirmative action 
available within and between minority groups, see Colker, supra note 181; Deborah Ramirez, 
Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. Rav. 957 
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gory and not the other, will racial "authenticity" be determined in a 
fashion so different than these cases suggest? 
C. The Dangers of Redefining Black: Distancing 
In the previous two sections of this Part, I have raised caution 
signs on the road toward the re-biologization of racial categories. 
Section IT.A discussed the good that the one drop rule did in unit­
ing African Americans in the fight against racism, and it compared 
the Devil's work in promulgating the one drop rule in the United 
States, with his creation in South Africa, where a more symmetrical 
classification system was very effective in ensuring racial subordina­
tion. Section Il.B argued that the one drop rule created a people 
and that it would be difficult and wrong to biologically recategorize 
a people. These sections thus looked backwards over the African­
American experience. With this experience in mind, section Il.C 
will look forward to examine how the recategorization of the 
African-American race may move us closer to the South African 
system, where the evil the Devil did outweighed the good. 
This section, then, addresses the phenomenon of "distancing," 
which is the creation of unnecessary and pernicious distinctions be­
tween light-skinned and dark-skinned African Americans. I discuss 
two kinds of distancing: (1) addressing problems that face all Afri­
can Americans with solutions that benefit only the lighter part of 
the race; and (2) shying away from legitimate criticism of racism. 
1. Finding Solutions for the Lighter Part of the Race 
In one species of distancing, we find proponents of the multi­
racial category drawing a line through the African-American race 
and then finding solutions to 'social problems for only those persons 
on the multiracial side of the line. In contemporary discourse, the 
field of transracial adoptions provides the clearest examples of this 
type of distancing. The National Association of Black Social Work­
ers (NABSW) has repeatedly stated its opposition to allowing 
White families to adopt Black children, and, in his recent law re­
view article, Kenneth Karst carefully examines this issue. Karst 
thoughtfully discusses the applicable constitutional and ethical prin­
ciples and the factual studies of children who have been adopted 
transracially, and he concludes with a nuanced but compelling state-
(1995). For the views of an opponent of affirmative action who believes that an accurate 
census count of African Americans is crucial, see Nathan Glazer, Race for the Cure, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 1996, at 29. 
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ment of support for transracial adoptions, noting that the alterna­
tive is usually a foster home or an orphanage.293 
In this discussion, Karst reports a proposal that would let multi­
racial children be adopted by anyone but would leave Black chil­
dren to languish in their foster homes. He notes that "[s]till other 
positions might be considered. For example, a general preference 
for black parents might be put aside in adoption of biracial children 
- the children of parents who self-identify with different races."294 
In a classic example of distancing, this proposal takes a problem 
that affects all Black children awaiting adoption and solves it only 
for those who have known White ancestry. 
Another example of distancing involves private adoptions. In 
some states, a huge percentage of adoptions are now handled pri­
vately through attorneys, facilitators, and private agencies without 
much involvement from the state and county bureaucracies that his­
torically have been responsible for race matching. These private 
adoption professionals report that there is not a sufficient demand 
for Black babies.295 Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that Blacks 
have fallen behind those with physical limitations in the competi­
tion for acceptance by White families. Some White families who 
are caring and committed enough to accept children without limbs 
or with other physical disabilities check "No" on the form when 
asked if they will accept a Black child.296 Against this background, 
skeptics could be forgiven if they see the "Multiracial" category in 
this context as a sort of marketing tool, a Tiffany box in which light 
Black children can be placed to get them through the doorways of 
White homes - doorways that might be quickly closed· to children 
293. See Karst, supra note 28, at 347-52. Likewise, Lythcott·Haims paints a compelling 
portrait of African-American children languishing in foster homes while qualified White 
adoptive parents are turned away due to the policy of "race matching." Lythcott-Haims, 
supra note 136, at 553-56. 
294. Karst, supra note 28, at 348. Lythcott-Haims describes a broader "compromise" pro-
posal that would apply to any child with mixed ancestry. 
A different approach, such as permitting Multiracial children to be adopted by parents 
who represent at least one of the heritages in the child's ancestry, would create many 
more parental options for Multiracial children. Instead, Multiracial children wait in the 
current race-matching scheme. 
Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136. at 553 (citation omitted). 
295. Dorothy Roberts observes that "[i]n the American market, a Black child is indispu­
tably an inferior product." Roberts, supra note 162, at 246. Similarly, one private adoption 
attorney reports that his firm cannot find enough Americans of any race interested in adopt­
ing Black infants, although economic considerations may play a role. "The problem is so 
pronounced he [the adoption lawyer] had to go all the way to Holland and Switzerland to 
find homes for a bi-racial and a black child." Kathleen Schuckel, Black Couples Face Delays 
for Babies Too, INDIANAPous STAR, June 30, 1996, at J2. 
296. See Interview with J. Potter at Silver Spoon Adoption Agency in Temecula, Califor­
nia (Nov. 1995). 
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labeled as "Black" or "African. "297 Of course, such categories are 
of limited effect in the world of private adoption, where prospective 
parents scrutinize the skin color and virtually every other known 
attribute of the birth parents and the child. For the government to 
give its blessing to such a use of the multiracial category, however, 
would be another form of distancing. 
Karst convincingly explains how the NABSW has used the one 
drop rule in its misguided fight to keep all Black adoptable children 
in the race.298 But if we take time to examine fully the use of the 
one drop rule in the adoption controversy, we again see Mephis­
topheles doing his good works. Thus, the one drop rule insists that 
if "race matching" is wrong; we should right this wrong for all Black 
children, not just for the ones with White blood. The rule also de­
mands that if White Americans are wary of adopting African­
American children, we should not address this problem by wrap­
ping the lighter ones in the official bunting of a multiracial category, 
leaving the darker babies unadaptable. 
All this brings us back to Uncle Clarence's decision not to argue 
that he was too light to fall under the restrictive covenant as he 
fought to save his home. Arguments that solve problems only for 
the lighter half of the race are self-defeating and morally flawed.299 
2. Sanitizing our Attacks on Racism 
A second example of distancing is seen when multiracial advo­
cates shy away from legitimate criticism of racism because this criti­
cism breaches their loyalty to their White ancestry. In her recent 
Note, Lythcott-Haims provides an example of this distancing when 
she critiques an African-American satire of the one drop rule. The 
Note makes the historical observation that some African Ameri­
cans "refuted the conclusion of the 'one drop' rule by deducing that 
if one drop of 'Black blood' makes a person Black, the blood must 
be powerful, strong,[ ] and superior."300 As an example of such a 
297. I emphasize that neither Karst nor Lythcott-Haims has made (or even mentioned) 
any such proposal to use the Multiracial label to make certain Black children more attractive 
to White adopting families. 
298. See Karst, supra note 28, at 351. 
299. Similarly, the lawyers for Homer Plessy, who was only one-eighth Black, ultimately 
downplayed the argument that Plessy was too light to be effectively categorized as a Negro. 
See CHARLES A. LoFGREN, THE PLESsY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 55 
(1987); cf. Colker, supra note 181, at 7 (arguing that the case reflected a challenge to the 
arbitrary nature of racial categories). 
300. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 539. 
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"deduction," the Note quotes the mid-twentieth century movie star, 
Herb Jeffries: 
I'd always heard that if you had any Negro blood you were a Negro 
and that was that . . . . Then it can't be such inferior blood, can it? If 
you had a [B]lack paint that was so powerful that two drops of it 
would color a bucket of [W]hite, that'd be the most potent paint in 
the world, wouldn't it? So if Negro blood is as strong as all that it 
must be pretty good - maybe I'd better find out where I can get 
some more of it.301 
In response to Jeffries's satire of the one drop rule, the Note draws 
a line between the "Black community" and the "Multiracial": 
[W]hile these exercises seem self-empowering and may have done 
wonders for the collective psyche of the Black community, they did 
nothing to help the plight of the Multiracial, for the Multiracial per­
son can hardly advocate the superiority or inferiority of one race 
without touching off a potentially damaging identity struggle within 
herself.302 
Here, the Note exemplifies two aspects of "distancing." First, it 
distances multiracial people from the criticism of racism. The quo­
tation from Herb Jeffries is in itself instructive. Jeffries was a light­
skinned Black actor who refused his agents' suggestions that he 
"pass" as a South American or Latino, even though doing so would 
have greatly enhanced his career.303 In the quoted passage, he 
playfully but effectively satirizes the illogic of racism without dis­
playing any anti-White racial venom or dislike of White people. 
Nonetheless, the Note finds even this mild satire painful enough to 
touch off a "damaging identity struggle." Of course, if the author of 
the Note had wanted words that could legitimately be said to cause 
anguish, she could have chosen the famous words of Malcolm X: 
I was among the millions of Negroes who were insane enough to feel 
that it was some kind of status symbol to be light-complexioned -
that one was actually fortunate to be born thus. But, still later, I 
learned to hate every drop of the white rapist's blood that is in me.304 
Instead, the Note focuses on the humor of Herb Jeffries. The net 
effect is the suggestion that Blacks must be careful even when they 
playfully poke fun at racism, lest they offend multiracials' White 
side. 
Second, in its discussion of Jeffries, the Note conveys the sugges­
tion that multiracials do not benefit from the fight against anti-
301. Id. at 539 n.47 {alterations in original). 
302. Id. at 539. 
303. See Spickard, supra note 136, at 332. 
304. MALCOLM x, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM x, at 2 (New York, 1965), quoted in 
Spickard, supra note 136, at 323. 
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Black racism. Specifically, the Note concludes that "exercises" such 
as Jeffries's satire "did nothing to help the plight of the multi­
racial."305 I believe that the contrary is true, that it was decades of 
such (often subtle) attacks on racism that led to Brown and Loving 
and the downfall of Jim Crow. While many of these attacks may 
have been painful to some White ears, without them many multi­
racial people would not even exist, and the ones who did find their 
way into the world past racist antimiscegenation laws would cer­
tainly face a far less friendly society. While it is the fight against 
racism that has brought them this far, some multiracial voices seem 
prepared to distance themselves from this fight and to replace it 
with a fight for distance from the Black race. The Note, for exam­
ple, suggests that benign satire must be removed from the arsenal of 
antiracist weapons, lest it offend; instead it concentrates on more 
"accurate" redefinitions of American racial categories. 
I believe that this combination of strategies is self-defeating. To 
the eyes of most Americans, children of Black-White unions are 
inextricably identified with the Black community, and while these 
biracial children certainly have the right to define and enjoy their 
own unique identity, what will "help [their] plight" the most will be 
the end of anti-Black racism. 
3. Conclusion 
This Part has been intended to place caution and destination 
signs on the path toward the adoption of a new multiracial census 
category. These signs remind us of the good the one drop rule did 
in creating a people and uniting it in the struggle against racism. 
They also warn us that this path may lead us toward the adoption of 
racial categories that ignore American social history and, instead, 
find their bases in blood and biology. Finally, the signs tell us of 
dangers posed by these new categories: They may formally divide 
the Black race into two races, one light and one dark; and they may 
create a distance between those two new races that ultimately re­
sults in different treatment for each group. 
III. FROM THE ONE DROP RULE TO THE DISCOURSE ON RACE 
I now tum to the larger discourse on race itself. Here, all of the 
considerations that I discussed in the previous Part form only a 
small, but nonetheless important, part of the terrain. The construc­
tion of the boundaries around the African-American race informs 
305. Lythcott-Hairns, supra note 136, at 539. 
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the debate over the nature and definition of "race" itself; the an­
swers drawn from this debate will, in turn, be answers to the ques­
tions regarding the identity of multiracial Americans. 
In section III.A, I address the question whether there is such a 
thing as "race," and I conclude that the African-American experi­
ence proves that race does exist. In sections III.B and III.C, I argue 
that race is something sui generis - that it is not simply a metaphor 
and that it is more than culture but less than essence. In section 
III.D, I criticize recent arguments that race is volitional. I conclude 
by focusing on the argument that we chose our race by our daily 
actions, and I discuss how this argument can become suffocating for 
African Americans. 
A. There is Race 
No one has made a greater impact on the philosophy of race in 
the last decade than K wame Anthony Appiah, who, among other 
things, has advanced the now-famous argument that there is no 
race.306 In the preceding sections, I discussed the abstract compari­
sons that certain commentators have made between hypodescent 
and more "symmetrical" classification systems and how these com­
parisons ignored the reality of the African-American experience. 
In concluding that there is no race, Appiah operates at the other 
end of the spectrum and engages in a similarly unsatisfactory ab­
straction - an abstraction that is again disproved by the African­
American experience. Just as the Black experience in America 
shows that hypodescent was - in practice - no worse than the 
symmetrical South African system, so African-American history 
shows that there is such a thing as race. 
Appiah begins his argument by demolishing the biological basis 
for race.307 From biology he turns to history, and he considers 
DuBois's argument that races are bound together by a "common 
history":308 "The issue now is whether a common history is some­
thing that could be a criterion that distinguishes one group of 
human beings - extended in time - from another."309 Appiah 
306. See APPIAH, supra note 163, at 31-32. 
307. See id. at 35-38. 
308. DuBois's definition of race, which inspired Appiah's analysis, is: "What then is a 
race? It is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always 
of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striv­
ing together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life." 
\V.E. BURGHARDT DuBOIS, DUSK OF DAWN! AN ESSAY TOWARD AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
A RACE CONCEPT 75-76 (1940), quoted in APPIAH, supra note 163, at 29. 
309. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 31. 
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concludes that a common history, such as the African-American 
history of slavery and segregation, cannot create a group. He ar­
gues that it is tautological to claim that a group shares a common 
history; in the end, he concludes, notions of "shared history" bring 
us back to biological notions of race: 
To put it more simply: sharing a common group history cannot be a 
criterion for being members of the same group, for we would have to 
be able to identify the group in order to identify its history. Someone 
in the fourteenth century could share a common history with me 
through our membership in a historically extended race only if some­
thing accounts for their membership in the race in the fourteenth cen­
tury and mine in the twentieth. That something cannot, on pain of 
circularity, be the history of the race. 
Whatever holds DuBois's races conceptually together, then, it can-
not be common history.310 
Appiah thus believes there must always be something besides 
shared history that identifies the group, and in the case of race, this 
"something" is simply false notions of biology. Having eliminated 
any historical or biological grounds for grouping people into races, 
he concludes that there is no race. 
I disagree with this portion of Appiah's argument, at least as it 
applies to the African-American race. As argued in the previous 
sections, history not only created the African-American race (draw­
ing its boundaries to include the issue of Europeans and Native 
Americans), it also imposed on this race a tumultuous shared expe­
rience that has made the race what it is today. But before I discuss 
the African-American experience further, let me give a clearer ex­
ample that undermines Appiah's argument that "shared history" 
cannot create a group. 
This example is the Buraku caste that has existed in Japan from 
the Tokagawa period to the present.311 This caste - whose mem­
bers are morphologically and genetically indistinguishable from the 
general population of Japan312 - has its origins in ancestors who 
chose to work with leather in Medieval Japan. (Because leather 
was associated with death, leatherwork was considered an "un­
clean" occupation. )313 During the Middle Ages, the boundaries of 
310. Id. at 32. 
311. See IAN NEARY, PoLmCAL PROTEST AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN PRE-WAR JAPAN: 
THE ORIGINS OF BURAKU LIBERATION (1989); see also J. SUGINOHARA, THE STATUS DIS­
CRIMINATION IN JAPAN (1982). 
312. See David Sanger, A Japanese Group Disrupts the Sale of a Book, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
14, 1990, at 4. 
313. See NEARY, supra note 311, at 13. 
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this caste were not hardened, and the "[c]onnection with the leather 
trade was not yet the basis for defining a social group. If a family 
severed its links with the [unclean] trade they would lose all traces 
of defilement."314 
During the ensuing Tokagawa period, however, history worked 
to permanently define these leather workers and their descendants 
as members of a rigid, inescapable, outcast social group. Over the 
years from 1700 to 1840, for example, an increasingly restrictive 
"series of regulations . . .  insisted they adopt specific styles of cloth­
ing and behaviour which prevented normal social contact with the 
surrounding communities," thus confirming "existing beliefs that 
they were different. "315 These regulations dictated not only the 
"type of clothing and hairstyles which were to be worn" but also 
prohibited the Buraku people "from crossing the threshold of a 
[non-Buraku] peasant's home."316 As Ian Neary notes: "These 
measures firmly established a line which separated the majority 
from the minority outcast group and the measures enacted in subse­
quent years confirmed this division in society and widened the gap 
between the two sections of it."317 In fact, the gap became so wide 
that today the Burakumin remain an underclass, earning salaries 
well below the mean salaries for the remainder of the Japanese 
population, living in segregated communities, and suffering socially 
imposed limitations on their interaction with their fellow Japanese. 
Even now, "Japanese private investigators still do a huge business 
tracing the family roots of job applicants, future spouses and others 
to determine if they have any burakumin blood."318 
314. Id. at 14. Neary notes that at the time: 
Working with leather was still an occupation which caused the pollution of the 
worker, but the period of defilement was finite and it did not necessarily affect the other 
members of his family. A document dated 1558 warned: 
To witness the death of a cow or horse and then to dispose of the carcass brings one days 
pollution. To skin the hide of the carcass brings five days pollution • • . .  
Id. at 14 (quoting W.L. Brooks, Outcaste Society in Early Modern Japan (1976) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University)). 
315. Id. at 25. 
316. Id. at 18. 
317. Id. at 21. This division was quite useful to the ruling interests. Neary notes that 
restrictions on Buraku clothing and hairstyle, on intercourse between Buraku persons and 
peasants, and searches of large cities to find and return runaway Buraku were made partially 
because the "government feared the emergence of the united action of the poorer urban 
dwellers and discontented peasants." Id. at 18. "It seems to have been thought that the 
rebelliousness of the peasants and urban dwellers would be reduced with the reminder that 
there was a group which was even worse off than they were. On the other hand, by further 
dividing the [Burakumin] from the rest of society, they became reliable as soldiers to be used 
to suppress the peasant riots." Id. at 18. 
318. Sanger, supra note 312, at 4. 
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The history of the Buraku people thus establishes not only that 
common history can form a group, but that history can take a clus­
ter of people who had nothing more in common than their ances­
tors' choice - possibly made as long ago as the year 1500 - to 
work with leather, and turn this people and their descendants into a 
caste, a caste that functions very similarly to the way that races 
function in the United States and South Africa.319 
Thus, Appiah overstates his case when he argues that, because 
we cannot identify groups by their common history, our only basis 
for racial groupings is the false and discredited notion of biology. 
History can form groups. As Haney Lopez notes: 
I argue that races are peoples created by history. Before slavery 
Blacks did not exist as the race we recognize now in this country. 
Instead, slavery created a single group in North America defined by 
the common disaster that befell the disparate peoples of Africa 
brought to these shores. Slavery oppressed a group of people marked 
in comparison with their oppressors by a common morphology. Afri­
can Americans remain linked by the legacy of that oppression and its 
current incarnation, which is the very systems of meaning that today 
attach to Black morphology and ancestry.320 
As emphasized in the previous sections of this article, history cre­
ated this group not simply from the disparate peoples of Africa, but 
also from the Native American and European peoples that inter­
mixed with them. 
Of course, race is different from caste, partly because notions of 
biology did play a larger causative role in the formation of races. In 
addition, any dynastic group, be it a race, a caste, or a group such as 
the Daughters of the American Revolution, is bound together by 
the "genetic tie" that connects ancestor to descendant. But none of 
this means - as Appiah would have it - that discredited notions 
of biology and genetics are the only possible building blocks for the 
African-American race. The "genetic tie" between Walter White, 
my Uncle Jack, Zora Neale Hurston, and Marcus Garvey was not, 
by itself, strong enough to create a people, let alone hold it to-
319. The Buraku people show most of the salient markers of race: segregation, economic 
deprivation, the strictly enforced taboo on out-marriage, and the absence of any feeling of 
solidarity with people across caste lines even when those people have identical economic 
interests. 
320. Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illu­
sion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994). In making this con­
vincing argument, Haney Lopez unsuccessfully attempts to avoid disagreeing with Appiah. 
He observes: "I do not argue that races are peoples who share a history; I argue that races 
are peoples who are created by history." Id. But if a group is created by history, does it not 
also share a common history? And is it not the shared history that gives the racial grouping 
all of its importance? 
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gether. History did that work. History drew the boundaries that 
labelled all of these people "Black" and gave that label an overrid­
ing importance in their lives, to the point where "Black," as Karst 
notes, becomes "a label so powerful that it can seem to be the per­
son. "321 There is nothing in the African-American morphology or 
gene pool that dictated this result. History created this race and 
gave it its significance. 
B. Race as a Metaphor 
While Appiah has been largely unsuccessful in persuading other 
scholars that there is no race, he has succeeded in knocking race 
down a peg. For example, scholars such as Henry Louis Gates and 
Kenneth Karst agree that race has no biological basis, but being 
reluctant to go so far as to say that there is no race, they call race a 
"trope,"322 a "metonym,"323 a "metaphor," or a "myth."324 In my 
view, however, we can fairly and accurately use the term race with­
out resorting to tropes, metaphors, or metonymy. My inspiration 
comes from an unrelated footnote in Karst's article, Myths of Iden­
tity, in which he humorously discusses his affiliation with the Auto 
Club without ever examining whether the Auto Club is a myth, 
metaphor, trope, or metonym.325 As I read this footnote and com­
pared the ways in which the Auto Club and race have affected our 
lives, I concluded that there is something odd about a theory that 
counts the Auto Club as real and race as a myth or metaphor.326 
321. Karst, supra note 28, at 286. After Arthur Ashe was diagnosed with AIDS, a re­
porter asked him if that illness was "the heaviest burden [he had] ever had to bear." He 
replied, to the reporter's surprise: "You're not going to believe this . . •  but being black is the 
greatest burden I've had to bear . . . .  Race has always been my biggest burden. Having to live 
as a minority in America. Even now it continues to feel like an extra weight around me." 
Reflecting on this answer later, he noted: "I can still recall the surprise and perhaps even the 
hurt on [the reporter's] face. I may even have surprised myself, because I simply had never 
thought of comparing the two conditions before. However, I stand by my remark. Race is 
for me a more onerous burden than AIDS." AR1HUR AsHE & ARNOLD RAMPERSAD, DAYS 
OF GRACE 126 (1993) (internal quotation marks deleted). 
322. A "trope" is "any literary or rhetorical device, as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, 
and irony, that consists in the use of words in other than their literal sense." RANDOM 
HousE. WEBSTER'S COLLEGE D1cnoNARY 1429 (1991). 
323. A "metonym" is a "word used in metonymy" which, in tum, is "the use of one object 
or concept for that of another to which it is related or of which it is a part, as 'scepter' for 
'sovereignty."' Id. at 853. 
324. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Editor's Introduction: Writing "Race" and the Difference 
It Makes, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 206, at 4-5; Karst, supra note 
28, at 284, 288; see also Houston A. Baker, Jr., Caliban's Triple Play, in "RACE," WRITING, 
AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 206, at 383. 
325. See Karst, supra note 28, at 283 n.76. 
326. Here, I do not mean to slight the complexity of Professor Karst's analysis. While he 
refers to race as "myth" and racial groups as "metaphors," he recognizes that these myths 
and metaphors have become part of our "made world," id. at 312, 316, and he never down-
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Reflecting further on my own family history, I felt that it was a safe 
assumption that neither the Los Angeles neighbors who sued to 
have my Uncle Clarence ejected from his home, nor the Detroit 
neighbors who rioted in order to cleanse their neighborhood of my 
Uncle Jack, knew the meaning of the word "trope." Nevertheless, 
they could all define the word "Negro" with sufficient precision that 
they took time out of their daily affairs in order to drive my ances­
tors out of their homes. 
The problem that drives these scholars to metaphor is that 
"race" was originally defined by biology, but science no longer sup­
ports that original, biological definition. So these commentators 
now say that race is a "metaphor," a "metonym," or a "trope," and 
they thus suggest that race is some ineffable, barely existing concept 
that can be described only with figures of speech. In making this 
suggestion, however, they overlook the function of metaphor: If we 
say that race is a metaphor, we mean that race is something but we 
are calling it something else. We are admitting that race exists but 
we are, as they say, calling it outside of its name. However, if we 
can describe the Auto Club and AT&T and the Los Angeles Lakers 
without resorting to the use of metaphors and other tropes, we can 
do the same for race. As Appiah notes, "Wittgenstein used to 
quote Bishop Butler's remark that 'everything is what it is and not 
another thing.' There is a piece of Akan wordplay with the same 
moral 'Esono esono, na esono sosono,' . . . which being translated 
reads 'The elephant is one thing and the worm another."'327 So it is 
with race. It is (at least) one thing and we should call it that: not 
false biological classifications, but the groups that history has con­
structed from the morphological differences among human beings. 
In the previous sections, I have discussed the ways in which his­
tory defined the African-American race by drawing broad bounda­
ries based on morphology and ancestry. With this in mind, I believe 
that Professor Haney Lopez has stated it best: "In this Article I 
define a 'race' as a vast group of people loosely bound together by 
historically contingent, socially significant elements of their mor­
phology and/or ancestry."328 I believe that instead of denying the 
plays the quite concrete effects that race can have on people's lives. On the contrary, he 
carefully and realistically analyzes not only these effects but also the· need to ameliorate 
them. See id. at 324-38. 
327. APPIAH, supra note 163, at xi. The trend is now to reject any single meaning of race, 
and to recognize that race can be defined in many different ways simultaneously. See Lee, 
supra note 115, at 778-79. While there is truth in this observation, it does not follow that all 
definitions of race are necessarily correct. In the next pages, I will argue that some such 
definitions are wrong and others are suffocating. 
328. Lopez, supra note 320, at 7. 
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existence of something as palpable as the nose on our face, we 
should use Haney Lopez's definition - or something close to it -
in order to redefine race as what it is. 
C. Essential vs. Cultural Concepts of Race 
The history of the boundaries of the African-American race also 
helps us to navigate between two competing notions of race: cul­
ture and essence. Some scholars argue that race is a metonym for 
culture. Appiah, for example, argues: "For, where race works - in 
places where 'gross differences' of morphology are correlated with 
'subtle differences' of temperament, belief and intention - it works 
as an attempt at metonym for culture, and it does so only at the 
price of biologizing what is culture, ideology."329 But Haney Lopez 
is correct when he comments: "I agree that there is a significant 
overlap between race and culture . . . .  Nevertheless, I am con­
vinced that there is something else 'out there,' some central dy­
namic of race that , is not captured by notions of culture or 
community."330 Much of that "something else" is morphology and 
genealogy. In the African-American case, history created a race 
from these factors, and this race runs broader and deeper than cul­
ture; this race, which extends out to boundaries defined by appear­
ance and known descent, provides the anchor for culture. In other 
words, a person with Black morphology or known Black ancestry is 
part of the race, even if he has "lost" the culture. As Walter Benn 
Michael notes: 
Thus, for example, the idea that people can lose their culture depends 
upon there being a connection between people and their culture than 
runs deeper than their actual beliefs and practices, which is why, when 
they stop doing one thing and start doing another, they can be de­
scribed as having lost rather than changed their culture.331 
I do not, however, argue that there is any racial essence.332 Tak­
ing Benn Michael's metaphor, we also say that we "lose" our reli­
gion, but this does not suggest that people are "essentially" 
329. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 45. 
330. Lopez, supra note 320, at 18. 
331. Walter Benn Michaels, The No-Drop Rule, in IDENTITIES 401 (Kwame Anthony Ap­
piah & Henry Louis Gates, Jr. eds., Chicago, 1995). 
332. Lee defines racial essence as "the real, true essence of things, the invariable and 
fixed properties which define the 'whatness' of a given entity." Lee, supra note 115, at 766 
n.91 (quoting DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE, at 
xi (1989)). Similarly, Omi and Winant define racial essence as some "real, true human es­
sences, existing outside or impervious to social and historical context." MICHAEL OMI & 
How ARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN nm UNITED STATES 181 n.6 (2d ed. 1994) (citing 
Fuss, supra, at xi). 
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Episcopalian or Shi'ite, or even Christian or Muslim. Similarly, we 
do not need to be essentially Black in order to be able to "lose" our 
Black culture. 
One defender of a certain amount of racial essentialism is Jayne 
Lee, who suggests that essentialist concepts of race may be politi­
cally useful.333 Her analysis is driven by a post-structuralist aver­
sion to binarisms: She argues that our acceptance of socio­
historical definitions of race should not preclude other definitions, 
including essential definitions. She therefore concludes that any 
definition of race that furthers the struggle against racism is 
justified. 334 
My objection to essentialist definitions of race, however, is not 
based on the feeling that the social definition of race that I asserted 
above has preempted the field, but on the lack of evidence to sup­
port the essentialist definitions. Appiah, for example, has master­
fully demolished any meaningful argument for essential race among 
Africans, and since African Americans are even more diverse in 
their origins than Africans, a fortiori, there are no essential charac­
teristics of the African-American race either335 - unless, of course, 
those essential characteristics have been acquired during our time 
on this continent, but that would be, to quote Barbara Fields, just a 
"latter-day version of Lamarckism."336 
333. See Lee, supra note 115, at 778-79. 
334. See id. 
335. For a discussion of African diversity, see APPIAH, supra note 163, at 25, 174. Appiah 
argues that the peoples of Africa are so diverse that it is hard to think of any generalization 
which applies to all of them. Accordingly it cannot be any essence inherited from our Afri­
can ancestors that makes African Americans what they are. On the contrary, I, and many 
other African Americans, can testify that the Blackest people we have known have had light 
skin and straight hair. 
336. Fields, supra note 115, at 101. Put simply, Lamarckism is the theory that acquired 
characteristics can be inherited and passed on to one's offspring. 
Lee herself implicitly rejects essentialism when she takes sides in the great debate as to 
which came first, slavery or race. Commentators are divided on this issue: Some think that 
the African workers who came to Virginia in the seventeenth century looked and sounded so 
different from the English colonists that they were immediately seen as a separate "race." 
See Carl N. Degler, Slavery and the Genesis of American Race Prejudice, in RACE PREJUDICE 
AND THE ORIGINS OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA 44-45 (Raymond Starr & Robert Detweiler eds., 
1975). Others believe that these Africans were reduced to slavery first, and the concept of 
race was developed later, as a justification that a liberal society needed for holding a part of 
its population in permanent bondage. See LoPEz, supra note 41, at 12-13; Fields, supra note 
115, at 101, 104. Lee takes the latter position, arguing that subordination came well before 
race. Speaking of the history of early colonial Virginia, she concludes "that historically, it 
was not the members of other races who were subordinated, but rather the subordinated 
people who became members of other races." Lee, supra note 115, at 761 n.64. 
This view, however, is inconsistent with Lee's defense of racial essentialism. For to define 
race essentially is to admit that these first African arrivals in Virginia had some "real, true 
human, essences, existing outside or impervious to social and historical context." OMI & 
WINANT, supra note 332, at 181 n.6. And if these African immigrants had these racial "es-
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Nor will theories of a racial essence further the struggle against 
racism. The argument that "they" are "Ice Men" and "we" are 
"Sun People" is destined to fail; worse, in its long, painful death, 
this argument will close for us all of the doors that society opens 
only for Ice People.337 In addition, we must reject these theories 
because they deprive us of choice in a more horrifying way that Jim 
Crow and George Wallace ever did. They do so by telling us that 
there is something in our essence - something neither we nor our 
oppressors can change - that steers us as a people toward certain 
results and away from others. 
D. Race as a Choice 
This brings us to the issue of choice. Drawing on the experience 
of Black Americans like my Uncles who chose different paths in 
response to White racism, scholars have recently seized on the no­
tion that people can choose their race; that what matters most in 
questions of racial identity is self-identification; and that we each -
to some extent - select our race though the life decisions we make 
every day. In this section, I analyze this discourse from the stand­
point of the African-American experience that I have described in 
the previous sections, and I raise a few more caution signs on the 
path. 
1. Appiah, Lee, and the Choice of Our Racial Identity 
In In My Father's House and "An Uncompleted Argument," 
Appiah uses the "multiracial" heritage of W.E.B. DuBois as the 
touchstone for his argument that racial identity is something that 
we can choose.338 In her influential review essay, Navigating the 
Topology of Race, Jayne Lee analyzes Appiah's argument and 
echoes the portion of it that asserts the voluntary nature of race.339 
In my view, Appiah and Lee give too much importance to individ­
ual choice in defining race and too little importance to history. Ap-
sences" before they ever saw any White Virginia planter, then race came before subordina­
tion, and Lee's claim that subordination created race necessarily fails. 
It is interesting that Lee, in spite of her poststructuralist rejection of binarisms, views this 
as a binary "either-or" debate: She concludes that either race came first or subjugation came 
first, ruling out the view they arose at the same time, building on each other. See Winthrop 
D. Jordan, Modern Tensions and the Origins of American Slavery, in RACE, PREJUDICE AND 
THE ORIGINS OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA, supra, at 72. 
337. This "theory" is attributed to Leonard Jeffries. See Jack E. White, The Black Brain 
Trust, TIME, Feb. 26, 1996, at 58; A Rebuff for a Racist, THE RECORD, Apr. 6, 1995 at B6. 
338. See APPIAH, supra note 163; Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: DuBois 
and the Illusion of Race, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 206, at 21. 
339. See Lee, supra note 115, at 765. 
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piah gets off on the wrong foot at the beginning of his discussion 
when he takes the example of the royal lineage of the Queen of 
England. He notes that "[i]f there were no overlaps in [the] family 
tree, there would be more than fifty thousand billion" lines of de­
scent from William the Conqueror to the present generation. He 
concludes: "We chose one line, even though most of the population 
of England is probably descended from William the Conqueror by 
some uncharted route. "340 In summarizing Appiah, Lee moves the 
choice into the present tense: "No single line can establish descent. 
Instead, we must choose the determinative line. "341 
But "we" have not chosen the royal line of descent, nor can we. 
If on a visit to England we were to pursue this example and 
"choose" the British Sovereign by saying "good morning your maj­
esty" to any of the millions of people who are descended through 
fifty thousand billion lines from William the Conqueror, we would 
probably be regarded as harmless lunatics; we would not be choos­
ing the Queen. And, while Appiah notes that there are millions of 
people who are biologically qualified to become Queen thanks to 
their descent from William the Conqueror, none of these people 
can "choose" to become the Queen either, because the Queen's 
identity has been dictated by history. Which is not to say that this is 
the only choice history could have dictated - if the Armada had 
not failed, if Charles II had fathered a "legitimate" child, if Henry 
VIII had been faithful to his first wife - someone else would be 
Queen. But it is history - long, complex, and irrevocable history 
- and not "we" that has made the choice. 
Having suggested that we can choose the Queen, Appiah fo­
cuses on the experience of DuBois, an African American with 
White ancestry, and makes the equally flawed argument that we can 
"choose" our race: "Consider, for example, Du Bois himself. As 
the descendant of Dutch ancestors, why does not the history of Hol­
land in the fourteenth century (which he shares with all people of 
Dutch descent) make him a member of the Teutonic race?"342 
Appiah concludes that the answer to the question - and the basis 
for DuBois's self-identification as a Negro - is fatally circular: 
The answer is straightforward: the Dutch were not Negroes, Du Bois 
is. But it follows from this that the history of Africa is part of the 
common history of African-Americans not simply because African­
Americans are descended from various peoples who played a part in 
340. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 31. 
341. Lee, supra note 115, at 765. 
342. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 32. 
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African history but because African history is the history of people of 
the same race.343 
Appiah concludes: "History may have made us what we are, but 
the choice of a slice of the past in a period before your birth as your 
own history is always exactly that: a choice."344 And Lee 
comments: 
Ultimately, it was not a common history that determined DuBois' 
race; DuBois had many common histories that might have led to any 
number of racial affiliations. Rather, it was DuBois' choice to iden­
tify with a certain race that determined which common history out of 
the many possible ones would be defining.345 
In other contexts, this argument might be more successful. For 
example, an American of DuBois's generation whose ancestry was 
half Dutch and half French would have faced few constraints in 
choosing either nationality as "defining" his identity. But, applied 
to DuBois, the argument that "it was DuBois' choice to identify 
with a certain race" collapses into irrelevance. Its basic flaw is that 
it ignores the substance of the "many possible histories" from 
which, according to Appiah, DuBois could have chosen. It forgets 
that one of DuBois's "common histories" - the African-American 
one - eclipsed the others. It overlooks the fact that history treated 
African arrivals in this country in strikingly different ways than it 
treated Dutch settlers, and history dealt with people like DuBois, 
who were part African, in a way that it reserved fc. no other racial 
or ethnic intermixture.346 
Thus, history acted in three ways to prevent DuBois from 
"choosing" to identify with his Dutch side. First, for DuBois, any 
meaningful outward manifestation of a Dutch "identity" would 
have been illegal and dangerous. DuBois grew up in Great Bar­
rington, Massachusetts, where he notes that "[t]he color line was 
manifest and yet not absolutely drawn."347 Nevertheless, it was 
with the quintessentially American ritual of exchanging Valentine 
greetings that he learned that any choice to identify with his Dutch 
ancestors faced severe practical constraints: 
I remember well when the shadow swept across me. I was a little 
thing, away up 'in the hills of New England, where the dark Housa­
tonic winds between Hoosac and Taghkanic to the sea. In a wee 
wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the boys' and girls' heads 
343. Id. 
344. Id. 
345. Lee, supra note 115, at 765. 
346. See supra Part I. 
347. DuBois, supra note 308, at 10. 
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to buy gorgeous visiting cards - ten cents a package - and ex­
change. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, re­
fused my card - refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it 
dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from 
the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out 
from their world by a vast veil.348 
As DuBois moved south for his education, history placed far 
greater restrictions on DuBois's ability to choose to identify with 
his Dutch side. In Tennessee, for example, history dictated that if 
DuBois entered a Dutch club, he would have been ejected; that if 
he had married a Dutch woman, the marriage could have been an­
nulled and he could have been jailed as a felon;349 and that if he had 
made unwelcome romantic overtures toward a Dutch woman, he 
would have placed himself in danger of being beaten, castrated, or 
lynched.350 Thus, if DuBois had "chosen" to identify with his 
Dutch ancestors, he would have needed to enjoy this choice as a 
closet Dutchman. Everywhere else the choice would have been in­
effective, somewhat like "our" choice of the Queen.351 
Second, history has given most American Blacks little reason, 
except biological lineage, to identify with their White ancestors. 
While Appiah decries biology as a basis for racial identity, his sug­
gestion that DuBois could have chosen to be Dutch gives supreme 
importance to DuBois's biological makeup, for what would have 
been the basis for this choice? The primary answer is biology, more 
specifically, the genetic link that connected DuBois with Dutch 
forebears two generations removed that he had never met. History 
had cut all the other lines that usually connect a person to his or her 
348. W.E.B. DuBOIS, THE SouLS OF BLACK FOLK 2 (Bantam Books 1989) (1903). For a 
riveting account of this scene replayed in the 1950s and 1960s, see WILLIAMS, supra note 185, 
at 46, 219, 269. 
349. See TENN. CoNsT. OF 1870, art. XI, § 14, quoted in STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND 
COLOR 427 (Pauli Murray ed., 1950). The Tennessee Code, section 8409, provided that "[t]he 
intermarriage of white persons with negroes, mulattoes, or persons of mixed blood de­
scended from a negro, to the third generation inclusive, or their living together as man and 
wife in this state, is prohibited." TENN. CODE ANN. § 8409 (Williams 1934), quoted in 
STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra, at 438. Section 8410 further provided that "[t]he 
person knowingly violating the provisions of [8409] shall be guilty of a felony, and undergo 
imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than one [1] or more than five [5] years . . •  .'' TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 8410 (Wtlliams 1934), quoted in STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra, at 
438-39. 
350. For an account of instances where "Black men were beaten, hanged, dismembered 
and dragged behind automobiles for having romantic encounters - or being accused of 
freshness - with White women," see Spickard, supra note 136, at 292, 283-92. 
351. Karst reminds us that "[a]s the notions of outing and passing remind us, a person's 
interior sense of his or her own race or sexual orientation may or may not be enacted in 
public." Karst, supra note 28, at 283. But as the following text shows, at the same time that 
history outlawed any exterior expression of DuBois's Dutchness, it used several powerful 
tools to deprive DuBois of any interior sense of Dutchness. 
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ancestors.352 History connected DuBois to the African side of his 
ancestry in a much different way, not just by biology but by shared 
experience. His close family members were - identified by them­
selves and society - Negroes.353 Legally and culturally, he was a 
Negro, although like many Negroes in Northern towns, he had sig­
nificant interactions with Whites. As he travelled south and as he 
grew older, even the narrow options for choice that he enjoyed in 
Great Barrington evaporated.354 And so, even if DuBois had the 
choice to follow his bloodlines and identify with his Dutch ances­
tors, intelligent, rational people seldom choose to identify with 
things they know little about to the exclusion of things that they 
hold dear. History thus gave DuBois little reason to choose to be 
Dutch. 
Third, history placed a final limitation on the agency of DuBois, 
the putative Dutchman - a limitation that arose from something 
more nettlesome and ultimately more binding than laws. History 
first made him a part of a "people" - an oppressed people - and 
then created a moral imperative that holds that it is evil for mem­
bers of oppressed groups to sell out and join the other side. Adele 
Logan Alexander recounts DuBois's discussion of the Hunts, a fam­
ily of African Americans who were so light that they did have the 
choice of passing into the White race: 
If everyone in Adella Hunt Logan's generation of the Hunt family 
looked white, Du Bois queried, if only one of their many antecedents 
was "black," and if life in the nineteenth-century South routinely 
heaped pain and humiliation on people of color, as it surely did, why 
then did the Hunts and other similar "voluntary Negroes" choose to 
remain a part of the African-American community . . . .  DuBois un-
352. DuBois's biographer provides an example of how these ties were cut: DuBois's 
great-grandfather, James DuBois, was "a wealthy physician of French Huguenot origins" liv­
ing in Haiti, who sired three children by his slave mistress. He took the two lightest of them 
- including DuBois's grandfather Alexander - to New York and enrolled them in Connect­
icut's "exclusive" Cheshire School for Boys. When he died, the two "Creole sons found 
themselves disowned by their white relatives and forced to give up boarding school for 
skilled labor." LEWIS, supra note 200, at 20. While DuBois did daydream about his White 
great-grandfather and his famous Dutch and Norman Ancestors. none of these dreams af­
fected his racial identity. See id. at 46. 
DuBois's case was by no means unique. Spickard, for example, cites the work of Robert 
Roberts who interviewed more than three hundred Chicago "mulattoes" between 1930 and 
1960. Of these three hundred, "almost none . . .  had ever enjoyed a close relationship with 
his or her White grandparents, and most had no such relationship at all." See Spickard, supra 
note 136, at 330. 
353. See LEWIS, supra note 200, at 11-25. 
354. Williamson notes that from 1850 to 1915, the South "led the nation in turning from a 
society in which some blackness in a person might be overlooked to one in which no single 
iota of color was excused." WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 109. See also id. at 64; Spickard, 
supra note 136, at 272 & 440 n.7. 
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derstood the ludicrous social and political ramifications of race as well 
as any American of his time. "From long teaching and deeply planted 
conviction," [DuBois] explained with obvious distaste, "the over­
whelming opinion of white Americans is that the fact of one black 
ancestor in eight or sixteen makes [a] tremendous difference of iden­
tity, of treatment and opportunity . . . .  " 
Yet even as he pinpointed and exposed the prevailing prejudices 
of white Americans, he had little doubt that the choice was clear for 
the Hunts. They and others chose to remain and identify with the 
darker race for two predominant reasons: responsibility and love, 
both providing secure anchors in a hostile world. DuBois . . .  knew 
that "to take a stand in America as anything but a Negro would have 
made [the Hunts] extremely unhappy, because here there was oppor­
tunity for battle and battle on the highest plane." . . .  "After all" he 
concluded, "life is primarily family and friends [and] one cannot 
lightly cast off his enveloping . . .  bond of love and affection and seek 
to create a new place in a strange world."355 
Of course, if DuBois had been a little lighter, he might have had 
the same choice as the Hunts, and. he could have chosen to commit 
moral "error" by trying to "pass";356 he also could have made good 
arguments that choosing to be Dutch was not an error at all. What 
he could not choose was the feeling, imposed on him by history, 
that if he attempted to be Dutch, he would be doing something 
wrong. 
Lee summarizes: "Appiah's insight is that our racial identity is 
not dictated by our history but is always constructed."357 But, as 
the above discussion shows, if DuBois's racial identity was con­
structed, it was history, not choice, that drew the plans and did the 
heavy lifting. History cut the familial ties between DuBois and his 
White ancestors. History gave DuBois a sense of familial loyalty 
and solidarity with his Negro relatives and forebears. Finally, his­
tory threatened to punish any public expression of DuBois's Dutch­
ness with sanctions ranging from humiliation to death. Moreover, 
because of when and where he was born and the fact that nearly 
half of his distant ancestors were White, DuBois had more choice in 
this matter than most other African Americans. To say that most 
Black people of DuBois's generation (or of the generations that im­
mediately followed) had any significant leeway in constructing their 
racial identity is absurd. 
355. ADELE LOGAN ALEXANDER, AMBIGUOUS LIVES, FREE WOMEN OF COLOR IN RU­
RAL GEORGIA, 1789-1879, at 9-10 (1991). 
356. In some writings, DuBois implied that he had this option, but had rejected it out of 
loyalty to his race. Given his morphology, this left one of DuBois's contemporaries annoyed 
and his biographer skeptical. See LEWIS, supra note 200, at 72-73. 
357. Lee, supra note 115, at 765. 
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2. Choice Today 
News of DuBois's death was announced on the Capitol Mall 
shortly before Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his "I Have a Dream" 
speech,358 and much has changed in the intervening thirty-three 
years. Now there is far more room for self-identification. In fact, in 
reading some law review articles, it seems that is all there is. For 
example, in his careful examination of racial and sexual identity, 
Karst speaks only in terms of "self-identification."359 
Some things, however, have not changed since the time that 
DuBois wrote, and Karst is therefore least convincing when, in dis­
cussing transracial adoption, he defines Black children as "children 
of birth parents self-identified as black."360 In reality, when a 
woman who is pregnant with a Black or biracial child goes to an 
adoption agency, the self-identification of the birth parents has very 
little importance. What matters most is how society will identify the 
child. Second in importance is how society identifies the child's par­
ents. The child's future will tum on these two factors. If she is 
identified as White, she will be in great demand. If she is seen as 
biracial, the demand will be much lower. If she is Black, the de­
mand will be lower still.361 
As I wrote this section, another example passed through the 
newspapers: in March 1996, a baby girl with an incomplete skull 
was born to a Black father and a White mother in Thomasville, 
Georgia. The baby died the day after she was born, and she was 
buried in her mother's family plot at the local cemetery. A few 
days after the burial, the elders of the church discovered that the 
Black man who had stood by the grave - a man they may have 
assumed to be an undertaker - was in fact the father of the child, 
and this meant that a Black child had been buried in the previously 
all-White cemetery. Of course, the child never had any chance to 
self-identify or to learn or choose to be Black; and the deacons 
never asked the baby's father how he self-identified before they 
voted to command that the coffin of the dead infant be removed 
from their graveyard.362 There is room for choice but, forty years 
358. See LEWIS, supra note 200, at 1-4. 
359. Karst, supra note 28, passim. 
360. Id. at 347. Again, my disagreement is with Karst's descriptive labels. In spite of 
what I feel is an overemphasis on self-identification, Karst presents a balanced and persua­
sive discussion of the issue of transracial adoption. 
361. See Roberts, supra note 162, at 246. 
362. See Rick Bragg, Just a Grave for a Baby But Anguish for a Town, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
31, 1996, at A14. 
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after the milling Detroit mob turned a deaf ear to my Uncle Jack as 
he tried to self-identify, we must remember that even now at the 
end of the twentieth century, many choices are still made for us 
because of our race. 
3. The Choice of Our Race by Daily Actions 
Those who wish to deconstruct race, who wish to remind us that 
we reinvent it each day, often claim that we choose our race by our 
daily activities. Haney Lopez, for example, correctly observes that 
our "many daily decisions take on racial meanings."363 He notes 
that "seemingly inconsequential acts like listening to rap and wear­
ing hip hop fashions constitute a means of racial affiliation and 
identification."364 From this he concludes that "[i]t is here, in de­
ciding what to eat, how to dress, whom to befriend, and where to 
go, rather than in the dramatic decision to leap races, that most 
racial choices are rendered. "365 Such choices, he argues, make race 
"to some extent volitional. "366 Lee basically agrees and suggests a 
political basis for racial identity. Writing of Justice Clarence 
Thomas, she notes that "[t]o the extent that racial identity is de­
fined biologically and essentially, Justice Thomas is obviously 
'black.' However, when racial identity is defined politically, as a 
firm commitment to antiracist struggles, Justice Thomas's claim to 
racial authenticity founders."367 
These theories are attractive because they give the illusion of 
choice. They tell us that our race is not dictated by society or gene­
alogy; rather it is something that we can choose as we live our lives 
each day. But these theories actually work to deprive people -
especially African-American people - of choice. In fact, there are 
dangers in categorizing people racially based on the choices they 
make every day. Looking back to one of the "place markers" for 
this article, we see that this is the mistake that my Uncle Clarence's 
neighbors made: they saw an urbane lawyer with three daughters at 
UCLA, and they assumed that he and his family could not really be 
Black. As the neighbors later discovered, they could not have been 
more wrong. While Uncle Clarence chose to follow paths that were 
363. Lopez, supra note 320, at 49. 
364. Id. at 49-50. 
365. Id. at 50. 
366. Id. at 10. Haney Lopez repeatedly acknowledges the practical limitations on such 
choices. See id. at 47, 49. 
367. Lee, supra note 115, at 769. 
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not open to many other African Americans of that era, those paths 
never led him outside of his race.368 
Worse, this suggestion that people choose their race by their 
daily actions or political views or economic achievements limits the 
choices available to Black Americans. Lurking beneath the surface 
of this theory is the assumption that White Americans can make 
limitless choices without ever implicating their race, while every­
thing that African Americans think or do is to be defined and con­
strained by their racial identity. White Americans, after all, can 
occupy any point on the political spectrum, espousing the philoso­
phy of Friedreich Engels or Adam Smith or Ayn Rand, without im­
plicating or abandoning their racial identity. They can live at any 
economic level, from the wealth of Warren Buffet to the poverty of 
the homeless person who asked for a quarter this morning, without 
raising any question as to their race. They can paint pictures as 
diverse as Soup Cans and American Gothic without losing their ra­
cial authenticity. They can straighten or curl their hair, darken their 
skin, change the color of their eyes, and have collagen injected into 
their lips, all without changing their race. Ironically, the argument 
that we can choose our race by our daily activities denies such 
choices to Blacks. For this argument dictates that if a Black person 
is economically successful, she achieves this success at the cost of 
her racial identity. If an African American takes the conservative 
side on a political issue, her racial authenticity is called into ques­
tion. If a Black person likes the Jupiter Symphony or The Magic 
Flute or Water Music, her taste has taken her beyond the bounda­
ries of her race. 
Like one of those computer programs that spins a flat image 
into three dimensions on the screen, this argument transforms the 
race box on the census form into something tall and real. For White 
Americans, this "race" box remains a two-dimensional square on a 
government questionnaire; for Black people, this square rises off 
the page like the fences at Manzanar - booby-trapped and barbed­
wired - and becomes the perimeter of our lives: It tells us the 
music we can appreciate, the 'people whom we can befriend, the 
money we can make, and the politics we can espouse - if we want 
to stay Black. 
But as Barbara Fields has observed: "[An] absurd assumption 
inseparable from race in its characteristic American form takes for 
368. This is the converse of the mistake the deacons at the Georgia cemetery made: they 
saw a Black man standing next to the grieving White mother and assumed that he was the 
undertaker. 
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granted that virtually everything people of African descent do, 
think, or say is racial in nature."369 In fact, all of our actions do not 
turn on racial axes, and to say that each quotidian deed not only 
takes on racial meaning but defines our racial identity is not only 
exaggeration, it is suffocating. Appiah is correct when he says that 
"there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask race to do for 
us,"37° but this is not because there is no such thing as race, but 
because we are asking race to do too much.371 
Toward the conclusion of her eloquent essay, Lee argues that 
"[i]n the theories of racial subjectivity, there must always be room 
for agency, a place for choice, a margin for intention, and many 
possibilities for change. "372 I write as a reminder that in the world 
in which my great uncles lived, and in the world half a century later 
in which we live, race, at least African-American race, is not just a 
matter of self-identification. While we do have choices, to a large 
extent our race is not one of them. Instead, we are "raced."373 If 
we see every act as an expression of our racial identity, we trap 
ourselves in categories we cannot really change; we deny ourselves 
choice, intention, and agency. Fields correctly observes that we -
as a society in the largest sense - reinvent race daily.374 And as we 
do so, as we work for justice and take pride in our racial identity, let 
us avoid implicating race in every daily choice. Let us understand 
that we can make our choices and enjoy our "margins for intention" 
without necessarily bringing our race into every question. Other-
369. Fields, supra note 115, at 98. 
370. APPIAH, supra note 163, at 45. 
371. In speaking of transracial adoptions, Karst eloquently comments on the healthy di-
versity within the Black community: 
Given the multiple dimensions of diversity that characterize the culture of black Ameri­
cans, even a child who is socially defined as black but "raised to be white" will find 
kindred spirits within black culture - and may bring to that culture new interpretations 
of her own making . . . .  This multidimensional quality of individuals is not a complication 
to be lamented but a vital force within every culture. Cultural change is the very oppo­
site of genocide. A culture that stands still is something for archaeologists to exhume 
from the dust. 
Karst, supra note 28, at 352 (footnotes omitted). Hurston's comment, which recognized this 
same diversity over half a century earlier, is worth repeating: 
There is no The Negro here. Our lives are so diversified, internal attitudes so varied, 
appearances and capabilities so different, that there is no possible classification so catho­
lic that it will cover us all, except My people! My people! 
HURSTON, supra note 205, at 172. For a more detailed examination of this issue, see Roy L. 
Brooks, Race as an Under-Inclusive and Overinclusive Concept, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POLY. REP. 
9 (1994). 
372. Lee, supra note 115, at 765 (footnote omitted). 
373. One commentator has observed: "[R]ace is not so much a category but a practice: 
people are raced." D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible, Law, Metaphor, and the Racial 
Self, 82 GEO. LJ. 437, 440 (1993). 
_
374. See Fields, supra note 115, at 118. 
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wise we will need a separate race category on the census form not 
just for the Marxist, dark-skinned African American who loves 
Puccini and straightens her hair, but also for the thirty-three million 
other African Americans whose lives are arranged in thirty-three 
million other, differing ways. 
Which brings us to the census box. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THE CENSUS 
Much has changed in the generation since Loving. Thirty years 
ago the number of children who knew parents of two different races 
was minuscule. Today there are hundreds of thousands of such chil­
dren and their number is increasing rapidly.375 Unfortunately, the 
debate over how the census should deal with this demographic 
trend has become needlessly polarized. On one side of this debate 
are traditional civil rights and minority groups who depend on the 
census's racial statistics in order to safeguard voting rights, job op­
portunities, and school integration plans, as well as to effectively 
enforce antidiscrimination laws. At the Congressional hearings on 
this issue, a representative of one such civil rights organization 
stated: 
Our society's ability to discourage . . .  discrimination is based in part 
on the effective implementation of our civil rights laws. In this re­
spect, the collection of race and ethnic data in the census is funda­
mental. Any changes to the data collection of race and ethnicity must 
be strictly scrutinized to ensure that the integrity of our civil rights 
laws are not compromised.376 
Similarly, one commentator notes that the addition of multiracial 
category could lead to an inaccurate count "which could have dire 
political consequences. "377 
On the other side are several multiracial groups who see the 
matter as one of personal "validation," self-esteem, and the right of 
self-definition. Lythcott-Haims, for example, argues that the ab­
sence of a multiracial category deprives "millions of Multiracial citi­
zens of the right to freely express their true racial identity"37B and 
concludes that "[i]f we send in our forms but the Census [Bureau] 
chooses not to recognize us for what we are, it is as if we do not 
375. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
376. Hearings, supra note 14, at 182 (statement of Steven Carbo, Mexican American 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund). 
377. Lynn Norment, Am I Black, White Or In Between?, EBONY, Aug. 1995, at 108, 110 
(quoting Halford Fairchild). 
378. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 542. 
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officially exist."379 Similarly, Bijan Gilanshah argues: "This gov­
ernmental recognition would validate the existence of the multi­
racial community and identify the mixed movement as possessing 
unique cultural and social attributes. "380 While the multiracial 
groups focus on personal "validation" rather than jobs, housing, 
voting rights, and anti-discrimination laws, their desire for official 
recognition on the census is still deeply felt. As Gilanshah ob­
serves: "Indeed, for the multiracial movement, failure of the gov­
ernment to include a multiracial category would result in cultural 
genocide. "381 
This Part attempts to navigate between these two points of view. 
It concludes that the most accurate way of counting the new gener­
ations of Americans with parents from different racial groups is to 
leave the multiracial inquiry off of the race line and isolate this in­
quiry on a line of its own. 
A. The Broad, Blood-based Multiracial Category 
I first examine the addition of a simple "Multiracial" category to 
the race question on the census forms to serve the purpose of 
counting all those Americans with mixed ancestry in their "multi­
generational history." Using the figures of Maria P.P. Root, such a 
category could include: 
• Thirty to seventy percent of all African Americans. (But not 
those African Americans who lack the necessary one drop of White 
blood.) 
• The majority of Native Americans. (Again, the Native Ameri­
cans who need not apply for this version of the multiracial category 
are those who cannot locate any White blood when conducting 
their genetic title search.) 
• Virtually all Latinos. 
• Virtually all Filipinos . .  
• A significant portion of Whites. (Here, history does get in the 
way of this scheme, because most Whites are unaware of their 
multiracial background. )382 
Rather than attempting to count accurately the members of the ra­
cial groups that have been created by sociohistorical forces, this 
proposal would attempt to count a group that has no social meaning 
379. Id. at 545. 
380. Gilanshah, supra note 13, at 197. 
381. Id. at 197. 
382. See Maria P.P. Root, Within, Between, and Beyond Race, in RACIALLY MIXED PEO· 
PLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 3, 9. 
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whatsoever: the group of people with "mixed blood." Moreover, 
this category could draw so many people from the traditional, so­
cially and historically real racial groups that each of the census' ba­
rometers of racism would give a completely useless reading. With 
race finally gaining recognition as a socially constructed category, 
this is not the time for the census to bring biology back by launch­
ing such an inventory of the nation's genetic content. Conse­
quently, this broad multiracial category has no place on the census 
questionnaire. 
This, however, is not to say that there is no place for a multi­
racial inquiry on the census form. If the question, thirty years after 
Loving, is how many biracial people are there - people whose par­
ents are from different racial groups - this is a question that the 
census should ask and answer. But the question must be asked 
more skillfully and carefully. 
B. Counting Loving's Children on the Race Line 
Of course, not all the proponents of a multiracial category want 
to "rebiologize" race, and there have been two proposals for limit­
ing the multiracial category to a socially important category: the 
burgeoning group of people with parents of different races. One 
proposal would include a multiracial box on the race line together 
with an instruction explaining that this box is to be checked by peo­
ple with parents from two distinct racial groups.383 A second pro­
posal would also add this multiracial box, but would require the 
persons who check it to identify the race of their parents.384 Both 
proposals place the multiracial category on the race line, thereby 
decreeing that people can have a racial identity or a multiracial 
identity, but not both. There are three flaws in these proposals: (1) 
they incorrectly assume that multiracial status is race; (2) they force 
people to choose between their racial and multiracial identities; and 
(3) they will lead to an inaccurate count of biracial Americans. 
1. Multiracial Status as Race 
In proposing a new "multiracial" answer to the race question on 
the census form, sonie theorists claim that multiracial people have 
enough in common to be considered a race of their own. The pro­
ponents of this category suggest that what binds this group together 
383. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 107 (testimony of Susan Graham, Executive Director 
of Project RACE). 
384. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 137. For a thoughtful discussion of the effects of the 
RACE and AMEA proposals, see Payson, supra note 167. 
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as a race is its members' common experience in coping with a "dual 
identity." Bijan Gilanshah, for example, describes this argument as 
follows: 
In sum, experience of the "dual" self serves as a common unifying 
characteristic of multiracial individuals. The new multiracial move­
ment is composed of individuals that have either successfully come to 
terms, socially and psychologically, with their dual racial identities or 
those who continue to seek to reconcile their dual racial selves.385 
There is no question that this dual identity is an important personal 
experience that is shared by the new generations of multiracial peo­
ple, but there are several reasons why this experience is not unify­
ing enough to qualify this group as a race. First, the nature of a 
multiracial person's dual identity will depend on the races of his or 
her parents. A child with a Black parent and a White parent, for 
example, will feel a very different kind of dual identity from that 
experienced by the child of a White and a Japanese parent. As 
evidence of this, we need only compare the intermarriage rates: the 
Japanese intermarriage rate exceeds fifty-five percent, while the 
African-American intermarriage rate is less than ten percent.386 
Obviously, society tliinks of these two mixtures differently (one is 
the norm while the other remains uncommon) and the dual-identity 
experiences facing the children of these mixtures are thus also likely 
to be quite different. 
In addition, multiracial persons will deal with their dual-identity 
experience in vastly different ways. As Gilanshah notes, some 
multiracial persons will come to terms with this identity, others will 
continually struggle with it. Still others will simply reject any dual 
identity by "accepting one racial heritage."387 Consequently, the 
dual experience in itself is not unifying. Indeed, the claim that this 
experience has created common racial traits is unconvincing. 
Gilanshah, for example, argues: 
Government recognition may lead to significant positive inter-group 
consequences in which mixed individuals may act as sensitive, objec­
tive negotiators of inter-group racial conflict. As one author noted, 
"[t]he multiracial often find themselves acting as ambassadors among 
fractious peoples, preaching what is to them biological reality: We 
can live together." With biological, psychological and sociological at­
tachments to multiple racial heritages, multiracial possess unique cre­
dentials for mediating racial conflict. Governmental recognition 
385. Gilanshah, supra note 13, at 192. 
386. See supra note 9. 
387. Gilanshah, supra note 13, at 189. 
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could facilitate and legitimize the multiracial individual's assumption 
of this negotiator role.388 
Of course, it is true that multiracial children are living examples 
that "we can get along." But the attempt to find common ground 
among multiracial people by asserting that they are natural 
mediators is an unpersuasive form of stereotyping. There is no rea­
son to think that a person with one Black and one White parent will 
be significantly more "sensitive" or "objective" or any better at me­
diation than a person with two Black parents or two White parents. 
Like members of any other category, each biracial person will have 
a different aptitude toward "bridge building": Some will be sensi­
tive, others insensitive; some will be objective, others biased; some 
will be good negotiators, others obstreperous; some will take from 
the biracial experience a desire to build bridges, others will take this 
experience in their stride and it will have no effect on their negotia­
tion skills; and still others will hold a resentment toward one par­
ent's people that will undermine any tendency toward bridge 
building. It is unrealistic to tie mediation and bridging skills too 
closely to any racial or multiracial status. 
Another reason that dual identity does not form the basis of a 
racial identity is that countless other people in our society deal with 
dual identities in situations that do not involve race. When the son 
of an Orthodox Jewish family marries the daughter of a conserva­
tive Catholic family, the child of that marriage is likely to develop a 
dual identity which is just as profound as that of many biracial chil­
dren, but this dual identity is not seen as a racial characteristic. 
Of course dual identity is important, and the fact that this iden­
tity is not evenly shared by biracial people does not deprive it of its 
importance, any more than the fact that all Blacks do not share the 
same morphology and culture lessens the importance of those fac­
tors in defining the African-American race. But even if all multi­
racial people shared this dual identity evenly, this shared 
characteristic would not form an adequate foundation upon which 
to build a race, because races are built on far more substantial foun­
dations. These foundations include shared genealogy, shared mor­
phology, shared history, and some degree of shared culture and 
community. The new generations of multiracial Americans share 
none of these things. As Michael Thornton notes: 
388. Gilanshah, supra note 13, at 197-98 (citations omitted). Similarly, Christine C. Iijima 
Hall states that "[t]he future role of mixed people may be that of negotiators." Christine C. 
Iijima Hall, Coloring Outside the Lines, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra 
note 136, at 328-29. 
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Further, the other groups that have designated census categories have 
more clear-cut bases on which to expect similar experiences, both be­
cause society identifies and treats them as separate groups and be­
cause they have common heritages (i.e. cultures). None of these 
categories exists simply because of common experience. Do multi­
racial[ s] have a core (cultural) heritage, or are they viewed as alike by 
others in society? . . .  In fact, what seems to bind multiracial people is 
not race or culture, but living with an ambiguous status, an experience 
similar to that of all people of color. Facing a different set of dilem­
mas does not make one an ethnic or racial group, or signify a culture. 
As a group, multiracials are too diverse to categorize. This group is 
more biologically diverse than others, and has no common ancestry 
and little community. These are things one cannot say about the 
other census groupings.389 
Zack recognized this as she mourned the "cultural suicide" of the 
Harlem Renaissance. If Hughes, Hurston, and DuBois had fol­
lowed Zack's advice and pronounced that "mixed race" Blacks 
were a separate race, then there might now be a separate mixed­
race culture and community in this country, like the Colored com­
munity in South Africa. Of course, Hughes, Hurston, and DuBois 
did no such thing, and, as a result, Zack laments that "[t]hus far no 
historical basis for an American identity of mixed-race has 
emerged."390 Multiracial identity, then, is not a racial identity, and 
there is no basis to add a multiracial inquiry to the race question on 
the census form. 
2. The False Choice Between Race and Multirace 
The proposal for crowding the racial and multiracial categories 
together on the same line is inappropriate for a second reason: it 
forces biracial people to choose between two valid identities. As an 
illustration, consider a young man with a Black father and White 
mother who considers himself Black and who is identified on the 
street and everywhere else he goes as Black. This proposal forces 
this young man to choose one of his identities and deny the other as 
he fills out the census form. If he checks "Black" he will not be 
counted among the numbers of multiracial Americans; if he checks 
"multiracial," he denies his Black racial identity, an identity that 
both he and society strongly embrace. As Thornton notes, many, 
many people will be in this position: It is predictable that many 
people would exclude themselves from this [multiracial] category, a 
trend perhaps more pronounced among those of particular combi-
389. Michael C. Thornton, Is Multiracial Status Unique? The Personal and Social Experi­
ence, in RACIAILY MlxEo PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 321, 324. 
390. ZACK, supra note 166, at 127. 
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nations, Black-other than, say Asian-White, because of the virulent 
nature of racism against Blacks.391 
Similarly, Gilanshah comments: "Some multiracials, for various 
reasons, adopt an either/or approach to identity definition by ac­
cepting one racial heritage in virtual denial of their other racial 
self."392 After an informal unscientific survey. Ebony magazine 
concluded: "it appears that most individuals of Black-White par­
entage opt to identify with African-Americans . . . . Actresses 
Jasmine Guy, Troy Beyer and Lisa Bonet have always made it clear 
that they are Black women, despite their biracial parentage."393 
Ebony believes the views of Lenny Kravitz, son of a White father 
and Black mother, are widespread: 
My mother taught me: "Your father's White, I'm Black. You are just 
as much one as the other, but you are Black. In society and in life, 
you are Black." She taught me that from day one. 
You don't have to deny the White side of you if you're mixed . . . .  
Accept the blessing of having the advantage of two cultures, but un­
derstand that you are Black. In this world, if you have one spot of 
Black blood, you are Black. So get over it.394 
While Kravitz certainly does not speak for all children of Black­
White parentage, multiracial theorists should be the first to under­
stand why it would be wrong to force him (and thousands of others 
who feel the same way) to choose between his strong Black racial 
identity and his weaker, but still important identity as the child of a 
White father and a Black mother. For example, in criticizing oppo­
nents of the multiracial category, Lythcott-Haims argues that 
"[i]ronically, these groups seek to deny others the hardwon fight of 
accurate classification they themselves struggled for."395 Placing 
race and multirace on the same line denies accurate classification to 
Lenny Kravitz and everyone like him. It requires him to be catego­
rized as Black or biracial when, in fact, his racial identity is Black 
and he is biracial.396 
391. See Thornton, supra note 389, at 324. 
392. Gilanshah, supra note 13, at 189 (citing Carla K. Bradshaw, Beauty and the Beast: 
On Racial Ambiguity, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 79). 
393. Norment, supra note 377, at 112. 
394. Id. 
395. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 546. 
396. This proposal thus puts him in the same position that multiracial activists decry: 
"[W]hich parent and heritage shall be denied today?" Lythcott-Haims, supra note 136, at 548 
(quoting Carlos A. Fernandez, La Raza and the Melting Pot: A Comparative Look at 
Multiethnicity, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 135). 
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Finally, multiracial theorists have criticized the Black commu­
nity by asserting that "many blacks accept part-Black people as full 
members of the Black community only to the extent that these part­
Black people do not assert Multiracial identities."397 In proposing 
to place race and "multiracial" in competition on the same line, 
however, they commit the very same transgression: they insist that 
Kravitz and all those like him can be counted as multiracial only if 
they refuse to "assert" their Black identity. 
3. The Multiracial Category on the "Race" Line: Guaranteed 
Inaccuracy 
Placing race and multirace in competition on the same line is 
also a blueprint for inaccuracy. The thousands of biracial Ameri­
cans who identify strongly with the race of one of their parents will 
check "Black" or "White" or "Asian," and, as long as "multiracial" 
is on the race line, they will not be counted in the multiracial group. 
On the other hand, thousands of African Americans with some dis­
tant White or Native-American ancestor will understandably as­
sume that "Multiracial" is a biological category and check that 
box.398 Arthur Fletcher, chair of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, 
fears that some Black Americans will check the multiracial box sim­
ply in order to escape the "stigma" of being Black in America.399 
The Census Bureau will then have to guess as to whether the 
overcount offsets the undercount, and the estimate of the number 
of multiracial Americans will, sadly, be unreliable.4oo Com­
pounding this inaccuracy will be one final, bitter irony: it is the 
children of Black-White parentage who will be most likely to check 
"Black" and therefore be excluded from the multiracial group; and 
it is these same Black-White biracial children who, percentage wise, 
still form the smallest multiracial group.401 Thus it is this small co­
hort of trend setters, the group that most needs validation in num­
bers, that will be most undercounted if "multiracial" competes with 
"Black" on the race line. 
397. Lythcott-Haims. supra note 136, at 540. 
398. See Norment, supra note 377, at 108. 
399. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 273 (testimony of Arthur A. Fletcher). 
400. See Karst, supra note 28, at 339-40. 
401. When multiracial voices seek validation in the census form rather than in the census 
count, the result is far less validation. 
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C. A Line of Their Own 
A possible solution to these problems is to place race and multi­
race on separate lines. My proposal, therefore, is to leave the race 
question as it is402 and follow it with a separate line containing a 
"Multiracial Inquiry." This inquiry would instruct persons whose 
parents are from two different racial groups to identify the race of 
each parent. This proposal resolves each of the problems that arise 
when the multiracial category competes with race on the same line 
of the census form. 
First, it recognizes that multiracial identity is not a racial iden­
tity. Multiracial Americans share neither common culture, com­
mon history, common genealogy, nor common morphology. 
Instead, what binds multiracial people together is the experience of 
dual identity. But even if this experience were evenly distributed 
among multiracial people - which it is not - it would not be 
enough to create a race. 
Second, this proposal validates the socially significant identities 
of mixed-race persons. Those multiracial Americans who primarily 
identify themselves as multiracial can express that identity - to­
gether with the races of their parents - in the separate multiracial 
inquiry. On the other hand, the thousands of biracial people who 
identify with one racial group can voice that identity in answer to 
402. The 1990 Census "race" question reads as follows: 
4. R= 
Fill ONE cin:le for the race that the person 
considers himseltJborselfto be. 
If Indian (Amer.), print the name of the 
enrolled or principal tribe. ---
If Other Asian or Pacific Islander (API), 
print one group, for example: Hmong, 
Fijian, Laotian. Thai, Tongan, Pakistani, Cambodian, and so OIL ----
lfOtherrzce.printra<:e. ---- 1 
7. Is this person of Spanish/Hispanic origin? 
Fill ONE cin:lc for each pcrsotL 
If Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic:, 
print one group. -----
0 White 
0 Black or Negro 
0 lndian (Amor.)(Print thcnamc ofthc 
� ;n_ro.?� .!''..P..?�oP:' ��)-;z - I I I 
· - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·  
0 Eskimo 
0 Aleut 
Asian or Pacific l<!anderlAP!l 
0 Chinese 0 Japanese O Filipino 0 Asian Indian 
0 Hawaiian 0 Samoan 
0 Korean 0 Guamanian 
0 ':'.i� _ _ _ _ _  .9_.9!!1�7,7 
0 �;:;.{Pri,;'t;:;.) .:..t- - - � 
0 No (not SpanishlHispanic) 
0 Yes, Mexican, Mexican-Am., Chicano 
0 Yes, Puerto Rican 
0 Yes. Cuban 
0 Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic 
(Print one group, for example: 
Algentinian, Colombian, Dominican, 
Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, Spanianl, 
��:"_o�� - -- - - - - 1  
I I 
· - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·  
GEN. Govr. Drv., U.S. GEN. Acer. OFF., supra note 15, at 5. 
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the race question, and then, on the next line, they can be counted as 
multiracial in response to the multiracial inquiry. Under this pro­
posal there will be one limitation on self naming: there will not be a 
pre-printed "multiracial" box on the race line of the census form. 
As argued above, omitting this box is conceptually proper and it is 
the only way to avoid the spurious competition between racial and 
multiracial identities. However, anyone who wishes to identify her 
race as "multiracial" will be free to write "multiracial" next to the 
"Other" box on the race line, and more importantly, to fully ex­
press her multiracial identity in response to the multiracial inquiry 
on next line of the census form. 
Third, and most importantly, this proposal is the most accurate 
way to count Loving's children. The other proposals exclude from 
the multiracial category all the thousands of multiracial people who 
can be expected to identify with the race of one of their parents. 
This proposal includes these people. The other three proposals at­
tract members of traditional racial groups who may believe that the 
multiracial category is inquiring into race mixing that may have oc­
curred generations ago. This proposal excludes these people. It al­
lows the census to achieve a complete and accurate count of the 
increasing numbers of Americans with parents from two different 
racial groups. With this proposal, there will be far less need for the 
Census Bureau to aggregate and adjust figures to make up for con­
fusion that would be caused by placing the multiracial box where it 
does not belong. In addition, because the multiracial inquiry will 
include parental information, a data base can be built up for each 
cohort of biracial people (Black-White, Asian-Native American, 
etc.) and these cohorts can be compared for statistical purposes 
with the traditional racial groups.4o3 
In summary, the proposal that I make here does not rebiologize 
race, and it rejects the superficial, blood-based recategorization of 
the races that has been created by American social history. This 
proposal validates the emergence in our country since Loving of a 
new category of mixed-race persons, but - unlike the other pro­
posals - it does not require the multiracial category to compete 
with the traditional races for the allegiance of these people. It rec­
ognizes that in our society it is perfectly predictable that biracial 
403. For a discussion of the usefulness of these statistics in the context of affinnative 
action, see Payson, supra note 167, at 100-02. Another version of this proposal, suggested by 
my colleague Michal Belknap, would ask all respondents to list the race of their parents. 
Over time, this version would give a much better idea of how racial groups come to be con­
structed. A disadvantage of this proposal, however, is that because the inquiry will not be 
limited to multiracial persons, it will provide less validation to this group. 
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persons may have allegiance to one parent's race and still wish to be 
counted as Lov�ng's children. Most importantly, because it does 
not set up such a "competition" between race and mixed race, it 
allows for the most accurate count of mixed-race people. 
The addition of this separate multiracial inquiry best celebrates 
both Loving and the emerging multiracial identity. The worst way 
to validate this identity would be to place it in competition with 
racial identity by telling multiracial Americans that they cannot 
have a race if they want to be counted in the new multiracial cate­
gory. The worst way to celebrate Loving would be to tell Loving's 
children that they cannot call themselves Black. The best way for 
the census to celebrate Loving is by accurately counting how many 
of Loving's children are flourishing in our society. 
CONCLUSION 
However imperfect the census may be, it is our main yardstick 
for measuring the progress we as a society have made toward end­
ing racism. We tamper with it at our peril. Racism is still with us, 
and an accurate means for measuring its hold on our society is still 
vital. 
Few would deny that progress has been made since the April 
day in 1956 when a mob surrounded my Uncle Jack's new home in 
Detroit. Civil rights laws have been enacted, perceptions have 
changed, and racism has waned. What was unthinkable in 1956 -
intermarriage between Blacks and Whites - is now viewed with 
acceptance by a plurality of Americans. There is, indeed, cause for 
optimism. 
But things have stayed the same too. For those who are too 
young to remember struggles like those of my uncles, and for those 
who think that "race" is no longer an issue worth the trouble of an 
accurate count, let me close this paper with a final reference to my 
Uncle Jack and to another incident that occurred on an April day, 
this time in 1996. 
As the mob milled outside of his home and the "neighborhood 
improvement association" knocked at his door, Uncle Jack weighed 
his options, and then told the Time reporter what motivated his de­
cision to move: "I would have held out except for the grand­
children. If they lived here and went to school, the kids would pick 
on them, maybe rough them up. It could hurt them, maybe ruin 
their lives."404 Forty years later, as I worked on the conclusion of 
404. TIME, supra note 25, at 24. 
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this paper, a Black woman named Bridget Ward moved into 
Bridesburg, a White working-class neighborhood of Philadelphia, 
and was greeted with "racial epithets scrawled in black ink on her 
windows, doors and front porch" and with "[k]etchup, looking like 
a trail of blood" leading up her steps.405 Later, after neighbors told 
her she was not welcome, she received a letter threatening the lives 
of her daughters, ages three and nine, if she refused to leave the 
neighborhood.406 As she decided whether to stay or go, Ward 
weighed the same options that had faced Uncle Jack. And, as if an 
old movie script had been updated to reflect a modem setting and 
scene, Ward's words to a UPI reporter hauntingly reprise my Uncle 
Jack's words to Time in 1956: "When they threaten me and my chil­
dren, I've got to go. If I didn't have these kids, I'd stay here to the 
bitter end but I can't jeopardize my children because of these idi­
ots. "407 Forty years after Uncle Jack lost his home, Ward lost hers 
for the very same reason: not because of "self-identification" or 
"choice," but because she is Black. Race still matters. 
Since race still matters, we must be circumspect when presented 
with proposals to redefine it. While we should sympathize with the 
desire to abandon the one drop rule, we must examine how we can 
repudiate this rule without rejecting the race it created; how we can 
separate the evil the Devil did from the good. In my view, rather 
than entangling ourselves in this impossible task, our primary goal 
in designing census categories should be to ensure an accurate 
count, a count that is necessary to gauge the racism that still faces 
both minority and biracial Americans; our secondary goal should 
be to validate the personal identity of those filling out the census 
forms. Perhaps most importantly, we must not set these goals in 
dubious battle against each other; we must find a way to reach each 
of these goals without undermining the other. 
405. See Michael A. Fletcher, A Neighborhood Slams the Door, WASH. PosT, May 18, 
1996, at Al2. 
406. See Black Family Moving from Racist Threat, UPI, May 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, UPI File. 
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